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Introduction
On January 1, 1997, after more than 100 years of presidential lob-
bying,' Congress granted the President of the United States a line item
veto. The line item veto represents Congress' latest attempt to allow
budgetary power to drift to the Executive Branch in order to compensate
for the ineffective internal budgetary processes of Congress.2 The new
law allows the President to veto individual items within an appropriations
bill or, on a more limited basis, a tax bill.3
1. See J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to
Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437 (1990). The authors note:
President Hayes argued in 1879 that "the true principle of legislation ... requires that
every measure shall stand or fall according to its own merits," and he urged the House
of Representatives to "return to the wise and wholesome usage of the earlier days of
the Republic, which excluded from appropriations bills all irrelevant legislation."
Id. (citing Veto Message of Rutherford B. Hayes (Apr. 29, 1879), reprinted in 7 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 523, 529 (J. Richardson ed., 1897)).
2. See Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto be
Transferred to the President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 159-61 (1986).
3. The term "line item veto" refers to the ability of the President to excise separately
listed appropriations relating to the federal budget in a presented appropriations bill. Sidak &
Smith, supra note 1, at 446.
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This Article concentrates on the implications of the Line Item Veto
Act4 (sometimes referred to as the "The Line Item Veto Act of 1996") for
the federal tax legislative process. As a point of departure for this discus-
sion, Part I describes the budgetary process currently used by Congress to
reduce spending and curtail annual budget deficits. Next, Part II de-
scribes how the proposals for a line item veto in the House5 and Senate
6
were compromised in the 1996 Act. The commentary in Part II on the
1996 Act also includes an analysis of constitutional issues, a comparison
with the state line item veto, and the primary criticism of the 1996 Act.
Part III addresses the question of whether it is appropriate to treat tax
legislation in the same manner as spending bills and thereby subject tax
legislation- to the line item veto. It focuses on "tax expenditure analysis"
which is used to estimate the cost, in terms of "lost revenue," incident to
provisions in the federal tax code that treat certain taxpayers or items of
income or deduction in a preferential manner.7 The "lost revenue" is
viewed as being equivalent to a direct government subsidy to the pre-
ferred taxpayer.' The line item veto was made applicable to tax legisla-
tion because of this perceived equivalence. 9
Part IV addresses whether the tax system creates a "sense of integ-
rity" in the public's mind and whether the line item veto is likely to im-
prove that sense of integrity. This Section also examines the generally
acknowledged tax policy criteria to demonstrate that such criteria are be-
ing set aside in the effort to address budgetary deficits.10
In Part V, the "Deduction for Health Insurance Costs of Self-
Employed Individuals" Act ("P.L. 104-7") is reviewed to demonstrate
how a line item veto could have been applied to a recent tax bill and how
the structural procedures adopted by Congress to address the budget defi-
cit distort the tax legislative process. P.L. 104-7 was signed by President
Clinton on the eve of the deadline for filing tax returns for calendar year
1994. It retroactively reinstated and made permanent the 25% deduction
for amounts paid for health insurance by self-employed individuals.12 The
Act also increased the deduction to 30% for tax years beginning after De-
4. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
A. § 691 (West 1997)).
5. Line Item Veto Act, H.R. 2, 104th Cong. (1995).
6. Legislative Line Item Veto Act, S. 14, 104th Cong. (1995).
7. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITuRES 3 (1985).
8. See id. at6.
9. See 142 CONG. REC. S2982 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Biden); 142
CONG. REc. S2991-92 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Exon).
10. For a discussion of tax policy criteria, see infra notes 397-420 and accompanying text.
11. Deduction for Health Insurance Costs of Self-Employed Individuals, Pub. L. No. 104-
7, 109 Stat. 93 (1995) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 32, 162, 1033, 1071, 1245, 1250).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-7.
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cember 31, 1994.13 The revenue losses from the reinstatement of the
health care deduction were paid for, in part, by the repeal of non-
recognition provisions for sales of broadcast assets under section 1071 of
the Internal Revenue Code. 4 In signing the bill, President Clinton la-
mented his inability to veto provisions of the bill"5 granting special tax
benefits to selected individuals. 16 P.L. 104-7 is one example of Congress'
use of the tax code to subsidize certain activities and of the political bal-
ances often struck in tax legislation.1 7
Finally, in Part VI, the author makes recommendations regarding
special tax legislation and the line item veto to restore the integrity of the
tax system, a public policy goal on par with a balanced budget plan.
Budget deficit reduction and revenue reconciliation through revenue-
neutral changes in the federal tax law seem to have improved the integrity
of the federal budget process at the cost of the integrity of the federal tax
system.
I. The Problem of the Deficit and the Budget Process
Following World War I, Congress realized that it could use its taxing
powers as a vehicle to raise enormous revenues to fund wars or any other
project deemed to be in the best interest of the country. 8 In the 1930s,
Supreme Court decisions held that Congress had few, if any, constitu-
tional restraints on its ability to allocate funds for the general welfare. 9
13. See id.
14. See id. at 93-94.
15. See Tax Legislation: Clinton Signs Bill to Give Self-Employed 25 Percent Deduction
for Health Insurance, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 70 at D-4 (Apr. 12, 1995) (reporting that
President Clinton "said that if he had the line-item veto, he would have used it on HR 831 [the
Self-Employed Health Insurance Act] to excise a provision that grandfathered in a transition rule
benefiting two specific transactions. . .
16. See id.
17. See U.S. Budget: Give Me Line Item Veto, Clinton Says, Promising Not to Use It on
Taxes This Year, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 110 at D-20 (June 8, 1995). See also 141 CONG.
REC. H5090-04 (daily ed. May 17, 1995) (statements of Reps. Clinger, Goss, Hall, Blute,
Solomon, and Barrett).
18. See Michael D. Bopp, The Roles of Revenue Estimation and Scoring in the Federal
Budget Process, 56 TAX NOTES 1629, 1649-50 (1992) (citing Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless
Federal Taxing Power, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 253, 264 (James
D. Dwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988) and McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 57
(1904) ("The power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of
the legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected.")).
19. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-10, at 321-23 (2d
ed. 1988). Congress' ability to tax for the general welfare is almost limitless. See Norton, su-
pra note 18, at 253. The Court upheld the Social Security Act in Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937) (unemployment compensation) and Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 646 (1937) (old age benefits). But see Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20
(1922) (holding that Congress cannot use the taxing power to regulate child labor); United States
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Supporting America's efforts in World War II led Congress to greatly ex-
pand its use of the federal income tax as a revenue-raising mechanism.'
After the war, Congress set out to use its vast revenue-raising ability to
provide for the protection of the free world and to promote the general
welfare of the nation through spending which stimulated the economy and
provided fall employment.2"
The elections of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, in the 1960s, be-
gan a period in which the taxing and spending power of the federal gov-
ernment was directed toward stimulating the economy and resolving social
problems on an unprecedented scale. Numerous new entitlement pro-
grams ' and tax incentivesP were instituted. These programs were con-
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding that Congress did not have the power to tax agricultural
processors to subsidize farmers). See also McCray, 195 U.S. at 57.
20. 1 BoRis I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFrTs 1-11 to 1-13 (2d ed. 1990).
21. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 448-49 (1954). Paul
noted the breath-taking event as follows:
In his message to Congress in January, 1944, President Roosevelt had outlined an
.economic bill of rights," the fist point of which was "the right to a useful and remu-
nerative job in the industries or shops, or farms, or mines of the Nation.... In his
September postwar policy message following the Japanese surrender, President
Truman urged early action on the pending employment legislation as a step toward
making the attainment of the economic rights outlined by Franklin Roosevelt "the es-
sence of postwar American economic life." Party lines practically vanished.... In a
sweeping declaration of policy the Employment Act of 1946 set forth the responsibility
of the Federal government:
M use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations and other
essential considerations of national policy, with the assistance and cooperation of
industry, agriculture, labor, and state and local governments, to coordinate and
utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and
maintaining in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enter-
prise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded use-
ful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing
and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production and pur-
chasing power.
Id.
22. President Johnson was effective in implementing many of President Kennedy's propos-
als as well as his own. See David Stoesz, Poor Policy: The Legacy of the Kerner Commission
for Social Welfare, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1675, 1676 (1993) (noting the following programs effectu-
ated during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations: Community Mental Health Centers Act
of 1936, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 290 (1963) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.); Community Health Services Extension Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-109,
79 Stat. 435 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.); Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 24 &'42 U.S.C.) (Medicaid); Food Stamp Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2030
(West 1987 & Supp. 1991)); Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-136, 79 Stat. 552 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); and the
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tinued by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. President Reagan's enor-
mous tax cut in 1981, coupled with growth of military and entitlement
spending during the 1980s, resulted in annual budget deficits of hundreds
of billions of dollars.U Prior to the mid-1980s such deficits had been un-
known.
Much of the problem arose because Congress and the President were
willing to use the government's borrowing power to fund desirable pro-
grams. On those occasions when Congress and the President disagreed
on specific appropriations, Congress merely attached the appropriation as
a rider to other legislation which the President wanted. The President
signed the legislation to avoid a government shutdown or an interruption
in government services.25
Over the years, Congress discovered that it could administer pro-
grams by means of tax incentives just as easily as through direct spending
programs. Following a report in 1969 which suggested that tax incentives
should be recorded in much the same manner as direct expenditures,
Congress decided in 1974 to require that an annual budget be prepared
showing the amount of tax incentives delivered through the income tax
code.26 Called "tax expenditures," these incentives are defined as depar-
tures from a standard income tax.2 For fiscal year 1997, "tax expendi-
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-415. 76 Stat. 23 (1962) (re-
pealed 1973)).
23. Michael Graetz and Deborah Schenk note that:
[T]he use of tax policy as a short-term economic stimulus became commonplace, and
since the early 1960's, the government frequently has explicitly used tax policy to
stimulate economic growth. Income taxes were reduced to stimulate a lagging econ-
omy by such measures as the Revenue Act of 1964, the Revenue Act of 1971, the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975 and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 9 (3d ed. 1995).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 1, pt. 5 §18 (1995) (minority views).
25. One commentator refers to "veto proof" continuing resolutions as combining "the tra-
ditional thirteen appropriations bills into a single bill to which numerous unrelated substantive
riders are attached. Congress then passes the resolution just as the government's spending
authority expires, so that the resolution cannot be vetoed without closing down the government."
Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 736, 737
n.3 (1992) (citing Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year
1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 392-93 (1989)). To avoid spending inter-
ruptions and government shutdowns, Congress has developed the practice of passing continuing
resolutions which has become "the routine omnibus vehicle for hard-to-pass appropriations."
CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 998 (1989).
26. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §
639(c)(3) (1990). See also 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 20, at 3-72.
27. The standard income tax against which deviations are measured is determined by using
two alternative methods. These are the "normal tax" method (favored by congressional sources)
and the "reference-tax-law" method (favored by administration sources). See 1 BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 20, at 3-72 to 3-74. See also OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
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tures" were projected to reach $554 billion,' an amount almost equal to
the total amount collected through the individual income tax for that year.
Congress awoke to the problem of continual and unsustainable defi-
cits in the 1980s and realized that government spending habits had be-
come extravagant and wasteful. Indeed, Congress had lost the ability to
bring the budget into balance without imposing extreme hardship on either
those dependent on government spending or on taxpayers.
In addition to the deficit problem, special interest legislation in the
form of direct expenditures (often called "pork-barrel" spending) as well
as "special interest" tax expenditures have become a way of life for Con-
gress. Both forms of spending benefit the few at the expense of the gen-
eral public. Use of the tax code to provide incentives for certain activities
or to benefit special interests are referred to as "tax subsidies," "tax bene-
fits," "limited tax benefits," "special interest tax legislation," "tax pork,"
"loopholes," "rifleshot provisions," "special tax breaks," or "tax expen-
ditures. "29
Pork-barrel spending is notorious and comes in many forms.3" Spe-
cial tax breaks are not as well understood. Such breaks are, however,
enormously expensive and the revenues lost through them must be made
up through taxes from other taxpayers. For example, five special interest
tax breaks for corporations have resulted in more than $34 billion in lost
revenue." These breaks are deductions or credits that may benefit only
one company or a single individual.3"
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR
1995, 53-66 (1994).
28. See Christopher Bergin, Growth in Tax Expenditures Slowing Slightly, Administration
Projects, 71 TAx NOTES 24 (1996).
29. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical
Vriew, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1662-63 (1992) (noting how the language of tax expenditures sug-
gest that tax expenditures are somehow "corrupt, dangerous, or evil"). See also 142 CONG.
REC. S2291-92 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Exon).
30. See Fed. News Service (Jan. 24, 1995). Two groups involved in monitoring govern-
ment waste are the Citizens Against Government Waste ("CAGW") and the Porkbusters Coali-
tion. They are comprised of senators, representatives, and other public interest groups, and
have identified the following seven criteria to determine whether a project is pork barrel spend-
ing: (1) it is requested by only one chamber of Congress; (2) it is not specifically authorized;
(3) it is not competitively awarded; (4) it is requested by the President; (5) it greatly exceeds the
President's budget request or the previous year's funding; (6) it is not the subject of a congres-
sional hearing; or, (7) it serves only a local interest. Id. The CAGW deems the project pork if
one of these seven criteria is met; however, the Porkbusters Coalition only deems the project
pork if at least three of the seven criteria are satisfied. Recent examples include grants for a
university library in West Virginia ($5 million); an addition to the Mark 0. Hatfield Science
Center in Oregon ($5 million); a development in Lake Placid, New York ($2 million); and a
Center for Political Participation at the University of Maryland ($450,000). Id.
31. See CCAGW. Kasich is Right; Balanced Budget Requires that Everything Be on the
Table, U.S. NEwswRE (May 12, 1995). Tom Schatz, president of the Council for Citizens
Against Government Waste, pointed to the following examples of corporate tax pork: a $5.7
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Special interest tax breaks and pork-barrel spending undermine the
faith of the American people in the tax system and eat away at its founda-
tion. The effect of these practices cannot be measured in purely quantita-
tive terms. As the Federal News Service stated, "Pork promotes fiscal
profligacy, weakens the capacity of citizens to hold elected officials ac-
countable, subverts procedural safeguards established to check and deter
abuses of power, and debases the civic culture. Eliminating pork
would... detoxify the appropriations process and make electoral con-
tests more competitive. ,33
Congress and the President have recognized the wasteful nature of
these practices as well as Congress' inability to curtail spending. A Sen-
ate report stated:
Each year wasteful and parochial projects-unlikely to pass on their own
merits-are tucked into omnibus bills. Often these projects are not ger-
mane to the bill. They may be nothing more than extraneous and inde-
fensible riders that hope to make it to safety in the company of a larger
bill. They are added routinely as part of the price for getting a bill out
of committee or passing it on to the floor.
34
Similar statements have been made in House reports35 and by the Presi-
dent.3
6
billion special tax credit for producers of fuel from non-conventional sources; $4.1 billion for
percentage depletion cost-recovery for oil, gas and non-fuel mineral firms; a $21.5 billion ex-
emption from income taxes for firms operating in Puerto Rico; $1.7 billion exemption of credit
union income from taxation; and a $1.4 billion tax break exempting forestry companies from
uniform capitalization rules. Id.
32. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 137
(1997). Consider the special interest tax break that Senator John Chafee attempted to obtain for
his Yale classmate, Page Wodell. Wodell lost a tax court case which affirmed a $5 million tax
assessment on his grandmother's estate. Senator Chafee amended a Finance Committee bill to
include a provision that would have saved Wodell the $5 million dollar tax. Senator Chafee
later claimed that "[it was just plain unfair," what happened to Wodell. JEFFREY H.
BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH, LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS,
AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 240 (1987). The measure apparently died in a
House Conference Committee. See Chafee Attacked on Tax-Amendment Proposal, UNITED
PRESS INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 28, 1988) available in LEXIS, News Library.
33. Fed. News Service, supra note 30 (recommending four methods for Congress to use to
put an end to pork barrel spending: (1) establish a procedure to rescind all spending items de-
termined to be pork on the basis of objective tests; (2) grant the President line item veto author-
ity; (3) prohibit any member from placing a project specifically benefiting his district or state
into a bill under consideration in his committee (but see "political horse trading, i.e., '[y]ou put
my vote in your bill and I'll put yours in my bill'); and (4) prevent any physical structure or
other project from being named after a member of Congress until 10 years after he or she has
left office").
34. S. REP. No. 104-13, at 880 (1995).
35. In a report on its 1995 line item veto proposal, the House of Representatives chastised
itself for its irresponsibility in passing special legislation, stating:
Enhanced rescission authority is needed to check congressional raids on the Treasury.
Every year outlandish projects and tax benefits are concealed in appropriations bills
[Vol. 49
Rather than restraining the burgeoning deficit directly through
spending cuts or tax increases which impose particular hardships,37 Con-
gress chose to use structural means to limit spending and balance the
budget. The line item veto is the latest attempt by Congress to impose
structural restraints on itself. It addresses not only the deficit but also the
problem of pork barrel spending and tax expenditures. It operates by
shifting new power to the President. As Senator Dole stated, "If we can-
not control ourselves-maybe the Chief Executive can help." 38
Presidential involvement in the budget process began in 1921 and has
increased dramatically since that time. 39 The explosion of tax legislation
and revenue measures.... Appropriations and tax bills are used to profit a favored
few at the expense of the average taxpayer. For example, the Revenue Act of 1992
was passed to create enterprise zones in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots. As the
bill made its way through Congress, it contained over 50 special tax breaks that com-
pletely outspent the cost of the enterprise zones themselves and resulted in a Presi-
dent's veto.
H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 2, at 7-8 (1995). The special tax benefits Congress added covered
the following interests:
[S]pecial exemptions for certain rural mail carriers, special rules for Federal Express
pilots, deductions for operators of licensed cotton warehouses, exemptions for some
small firearms manufacturers, and exemptions for certain ferry operators. Under the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President cannot reach these special tax bene-
fits and has limited ability to rescind funds for narrow, parochial purposes.
Id. at 8.
36. S. REP. No. 104-13, at 5 (1995) quoted President Clinton as follows:
[The line item veto] is a powerful tool for fighting special interests, who too often are
able to win approval of wasteful projects through manipulation of the congressional
process, and bury them in massive bills where they are protected from Presidential
vetoes. It will increase the accountability of government. I want a strong version of
the line item veto, one that enables the President to take direct steps to curb wasteful
spending.
Id.
37. In 1994, the federal budget deficit was estimated at $322 billion and the national debt
stood at $4.2 trillion, up from $914 billion in 1980. See Anthony R. Petrilla, Note, The Role of
the Line Item Veto in the Federal Balance of Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 469 & n.2,
470 n.4 (1994) (citing OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 1994 (1993) [hereinafter FISCAL 1994 BUDGET];
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.A. STATISTICS IN BRIEF 1992: A SUPPLEMENT (1993)).
38. 141 CONG. REC. S4483 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
39. See LouIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POwER 36-58 (1975) (discussing presi-
dential duties in budget matters prior to the Budget and Accounting Act). Prior to 1921, Con-
gress believed that granting budgetary power to the President would diminish its legislative
power. The growth of the national debt after World War I led to the passage of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921. Id. at 32; see Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 13,
Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921). The 1921 Act required the President to construct and submit an an-
nual budget but Congress could freely alter the proposed budget. See Fisher & Devins, supra
note 2, at 162-63. The fear of an imbalance in the three branches of government prohibited a
meaningful extension of budgetary authority to the executive branch. Since then, the passage of
major tax legislation has almost become an annual process in the United States. See Ronald A.
Pearlman, The Legislative Process: 1972-1992, 57 TAx NOTES 939, 939 & nn. 1 & 3 (1992).
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since 19704) has produced a continual stream of new tax law4 1 thereby in-
volving the President in tax matters almost annually. A major shift in tax
policy took place in 198642 when conservative and liberal support in Con-
gress united to limit marginal tax rates to 15% or 30% and broaden the
tax base to obtain a more neutral tax system.43 The return of multiple
rates in 1990, 1993, and 1997 undermined the policy objectives" of
1986. 45 By 1990, the national agenda shifted to deficit reduction.46 Three
40. Since 1972 there have been six major tax bills enacted. See Pearlman, supra note 39,
at 940. The six major tax bills include the following: Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (the first major assault on tax shelters); Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (substantial across-the-board rate reduc-
tions and massive business tax incentives); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (major business tax increases); Social Security
Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-81, 97 Stat. 65 (1983) (substantial employment tax in-
creases); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); and Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 312.
A seventh major bill is the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788
(1997).
41. See Pearlman, supra note 39, at 939. See also Robert Leonard, Perspectives on the
Tax Legislative Process, 38 TAX NOTEs 969 (1988). Robert Leonard, Chief Counsel for the
House Committee on Ways and Means, identifies eleven tax bills signed by President Reagan in
seven years. Id. at nn.1 & 3.
42. Leonard notes:
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was remarkable for a lot of reasons, not the least of
which is that it demanded more of our elected officials than most of them ... were
willing to give. Most elected politicians are incrementalists-reluctant to change the
existing order in any radical way-satisfied to claim victory for progress in small
steps.... The 1986 Tax Reform Act stands out as a clear exception from the tradi-
tion of incrementalism and is a testament to the political leadership of President
Reagan, Chairman Rostenkowski, Senator Packwood, and others in Congress who
somehow overcame public apathy, interest group resistance, and the strong reluctance
of their colleagues to proceed.
Leonard, supra note 41, at 978.
43. See GRATZ & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 10 (citing generally Michael J. Graetz, The
Truth about Tax Reform, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 617 (1988)). By making the tax burden on differ-
ent investments more consistent, the act had a positive effect on the "economic efficiency of in-
vestment decisions." However, lack of adequate revenues, the perceived unfairness of the re-
sulting distribution of tax burden, and the complexity of the act has detracted from its success.
Id.
44. The decision to reform the income tax in 1986 (after studies of consumption and other
taxes) was an important milestone in the decision to continue with an income tax. Id.
45. The 1990, 1993, and 1997 tax acts tended to undermine the achievement of the 1986
Act. The 1986 "vision of low-rate uniform taxation of all sources of income" resulted in a rate
structure of two tax rates (15% and 28%) and the elimination of the differential between the tax
rates applicable to capital gains and those applicable to ordinary income. GRAErZ, supra note
32, at 137. In 1990 a 31% tax rate was added although the capital gains rate remained at a
maximum of 28%. Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 11101, 104 Stat. 1388-573 (codified as amended in
29 U.S.C §§ 901-922) (1990). In 1993, 36% and 39.6% tax rates were added although the
capital gains rate remained unchanged. Pub. L. No. 103-66 §§ 13, 201-02, 107 Stat. 312
(1993). In 1997, reduced capital gains rates of between 8% and 20% were added, thereby cre-
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pieces of legislation address the deficit structurally: the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974;47 the Gramm-Rudman Act;48 and the 1990 Budget
Act, as amended in 1993. 49
The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was passed over President
Nixon's veto, in response to his impoundment of funds for the Office of
Economic Opportunity. 0 In the Act, Congress protected its budgetary
monopoly51 by asserting power to regulate impoundments. 2 Pursuant to
the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President could propose that
specific funds that had been authorized for expenditure by Congress and
ating a further gap between ordinary rates and capital gains rates. Pub. L. No. 105-34 § 311,
111 Stat. 788 (1997).
46. Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. RTv. 609, 611-
12 (1995).
47. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297 (1974).
48. Balanced Budget and Emerging Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038 (1985) (codified as amended in various sections of U.S.C.).
49. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Title XI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573 (1990). See STANLEY E. COLLENDER, THE
GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET FISCAL 1998, at 21 (1997) [hereinafter FISCAL 1998 GUIDE]
(describing amendments to the 1990 Budget Act).
50. For a discussion of the evolution of the budget procedure beginning with the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, see Charles Tiefer, "Budgetized" Health
Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress's 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARv. J.
ON LEGis. 411,426-29 (1996).
51. Despite creating the Congressional Budget Office and the House and Senate Budget
Committees, the Impoundment Control Act left the core responsibilities of prior law intact.
Louis Fisher and Neal Devins note the following provisions of the Act:
Presidential rescissions of appropriated funds require approval by both the Senate and
House. The President could defer the spending of funds, subject to a one house veto.
The Act also created Budget Committees in the House and Senate, established a Con-
gressional Budget Office to supply technical support, and required the adoption of
budget resolutions to set overall limits on budget.
Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 164 (citations omitted).
52. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-88 (1988)). Impoundment is the re-
fusal by the President to spend funds appropriated or obligated by Congress. See Ralph S.
Abascal & John R. Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and
Constitutional Framework, 62 GEo. L.J. 1549, 1549 (1974). An early example of im-
poundment occurred in 1803 when Thomas Jefferson refused to spend $50,000 appropriated
by Congress to build gunships for the Mississippi River. S. REP. No. 104-9, at 2 (1995).
Richard Nixon's refusal to spend $12 billion in appropriated funds for highway, water, and
sewer projects led to the enactment of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Id. "Presi-
dents have tended to impound funds appropriated for programs that exceed his [sic] budget
request or that represent specific projects of interest to Congress. With the exception of
President Nixon's actions, the impoundment of funds has not traditionally been viewed as a
significant tool to reduce federal spending." Id. at 4. It has been argued that Congress has
been reluctant to rescind appropriated funds under the Impoundment Control Act and that
"the President's control over spending decisions was weakened" by the Act. Id. at 1.
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signed into law by the President be rescinded.53 However, the proposal
would die unless approved by both houses of Congress within forty-five
days . 4 The Supreme Court held the one-house legislative veto presump-
tively unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha,55 a result which was applied to
invalidate the Impoundment Control Act.56
Congress' most direct effort to eliminate the deficit was the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985"7 (popularly known as
the "Gramm-Rudman Act"). It was passed to reduce the deficit over a
five year period. Under the Act, Congress delegated some of its budget-
ary power by authorizing the Comptroller General to issue sequestration
orders mandating across-the-board spending reductions when predeter-
53. 2 U.S.C. § 683 (1988), entitled "Rescission of Budget Authority," states in pertinent
part:
(a) Transmittal of special message:
Whenever the President determines that all or part of any budget authority will not be
required to carry out the full objectives or scope of programs for which it is provided
or that such budget authority should be rescinded for fiscal policy or other rea-
sons ... or whenever all or part of budget authority provided for only one fiscal year
is to be reserved from obligation for such fiscal year, the President shall transmit to
both Houses of Congress a special message specifying-
(1) the amount of budget authority which he proposes to be rescinded or which is to
be so reserved;
(2) any account, department, or establishment of the Government to which such
budget authority is available for obligation, and the specific project or governmental
functions involved;
(3) the reasons why the budget authority should be rescinded or is to be reserved.
2 U.S.C. § 683(a)(1)-(3) (1988).
54. 2 U.S.C. § 683(b) states:
(b) Requirement to make available for obligation
Any amount of budget authority proposed to be rescinded.., shall be made available
for obligation unless, within the prescribed 45-day period, the Congress has completed
action on a rescission bill rescinding all or part of the amount proposed to be re-
scinded .... Funds made available for obligation under this procedure may not be
proposed for rescission again.
2 U.S.C. § 683(b) (1988). From 1974 to 1995, Presidents have proposed to rescind $72.8 bil-
lion in appropriated funds, but Congress has only agreed to rescind $22.9 billion. S. REP. No.
104-13, at 872-80 (1995). As Michael Bopp notes:
The 1974 Act established the concurrent budget resolution and reconciliation processes
and created the House and Senate Budget Committees as well as the CBO. In short,
the 1974 Act established a system of controls that have been refined and added to, but
remain largely intact. What the 1974 Act did not include within this system were en-
forcement mechanisms aimed at limiting either spending or the overall deficit.
Bopp, supra note 18, at 1636.
55. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
56. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
57. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in various sections of
U.S.C.).
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mined congressional budget ceilings were exceeded.58 The sequestration
provisions of the Act were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Bowsher v. Synar" because they interfered with the separation of
powers between the legislative and executive branches." In particular,
the sequestration provisions of the Gramm-Rudman Act gave the Comp-
troller General "the ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to be
made."61 The Court reasoned that, because Congress had sole power to
remove the Comptroller General by a joint resolution, Congress had re-
tained control over an executive function, and thereby intruded into the
authority granted to the President in the Constitution.' Since Congress
had provided an alternative enforcement mechanism in the event the im-
poundment procedures under Gramm-Rudman Act were invalidated, 63 the
Court severed the sequestration procedures from the Act.' In practice,
Gramm-Rudman proved too ambitious and Congress found it impossible
to keep within the budgetary ceilings established therein.' It expired of
its own terms on September 30, 1993.'
In spite of Gramm-Rudman, the federal deficit continued to increase,
going from $180 billion in 1985 to $278 billion in 1990.67 Congress re-
acted by passing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.6
Through a combination of tax increases and spending cuts, this Act at-
tempted to reduce the deficit by $500 billion over five years.69 Part XI
58. See Jack Brooks, Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress and the President Pass This Buck?,
64 TEX. L. REV. 131, 139-42 (1985).
59. 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986).
60. Id. at 733 ("[I]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative man-
date is the very essence of 'execution' of the law.").
61. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 252(a)(3), 99 Stat. 1074 (1985) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 902(a)(3) (Supp. 1111985)).
62. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 161 & n. 9.
6. The alternative enforcement mechanisms were referred to as the "reporting proce-
dures" under section 251 of the Gramm-Rudman Act, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (1985).
64. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 735-36. In the event the sequestration provisions were de-
clared invalid, a special committee of Congress would review the report of the Comptroller
General and propose a joint resolution which when voted on by Congress and signed by the
President would serveas the basis for a Presidential sequestration order. Id. at 718-19.
65. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1637.
66. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-964, at 1155-57 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374,2860-62.
67. See Bernard M. Shapiro, Presidential Politics and Deficit Reduction: The Landscape
of Tax Policy in the 1980's and 1990's, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 441, 443-44 (1993). Shapiro
states that the Gramm-Rudman Act failed due to frequent congressional suspensions of the Act,
the lack of positive growth in the economy, and the declaration by the Supreme Court in Bow-
sher that parts of the Act were unconstitutional. Id. at 471 n. 11.
68. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified in various sections of U.S.C.).
Title XI of the Act is known as the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.
69. See Shapiro, supra note 67, at 444.
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of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, the Budget Enforce-
ment Act of 1990, established procedures whereby revenue-losing tax
measures thereafter had to be offset by an equal or greater increase in
revenues elsewhere or by reduction in other spending.' The offsets were
initially based on one and five year estimates of revenue loss.7 1 The Sen-
ate, however, currently uses a ten year period as well.' The Budget En-
forcement Act of 1990 also linked sequesters of "entitlement" spending
on such items as Medicare, Medicaid, and farm price supports to revenue
effects of tax legislation.' The effect of the Budget Enforcement Act of
1990 was to move away from a focus on the actual budget deficit to a fo-
cus on the legislative process.74
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 has two procedures. First, it
limits discretionary spending.' Second, it places a ceiling on a combina-
tion of direct spending (entitlement spending) and receipts legislation (tax
legislation) known as the "pay-as-you-go" system.76 Both procedures rely
on the Gramm-Rudman concept of sequestration for enforcement.77
Spending caps are adjusted in the event that unforeseeable changes in
economic conditions occur;78 thus, Congress is not held accountable for
results over which it has no control. 79 Further, the pay-as-you-go proce-
dures may be waived with a supermajority,80 and items determined to be
emergencies can be exempted from the limitations.8'
70. 2 U.S.C. § 641(d) (1994). See Graetz, supra note 46, at 672 (1995); Shapiro, supra
note 67, at 445.
71. 2 U.S.C. § 642(a)(2)(A) (1994).
72. In 1994, the Senate expanded the interval to ten years if any senator raises a budget
process point of order, which is not enforced by sequestration, but is generally adhered to by the
Senate. S. Con. Res. 63, 103d Cong. (1994) (enacted). See also Senate Passes Budget with IRS
Compliance Amendment, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 4, 1994); Bob Benenson, Free Trade Car-
ties the Day as GATT Easily Passes, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3446, 3449 (Dec. 3, 1994).
73. See Graetz, supra note 46, at 672.
74. Stanley Collender states that "[u]nder the new procedures established by BEA, reduc-
ing the deficit is no longer the goal; limiting spending and guaranteeing that the baseline level of
revenues is collected are now the budget process's primary aims." STANLEY E. COLLENDER,
THE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET: FISCAL 1993 (1992).
75. 2 U.S.C. §§ 665-665e (1994). For fiscal years 1991-1993, authorization and spending
caps were set for three categories of discretionary spending: defense, international, and domes-
tic. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1637. See also James W. Bowen, Enforcing the Balanced
Budget Amendment, 4 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 565, 575 n.37 (1994).
76. 2 U.S.C. § 642 (1994), enforced pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1994).
77. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1637.
78. 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1) (Supp. 1991). The changes include: "(1) changes in economic
and other score-keeping concepts and definitions; (2) changes in expected rates of inflation; and
(3) for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 budgets only, changes in the expected costs of federal credit
programs." Bopp, supra note 18, at 1637.
79. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1637.
80. Con. Res. 63 § 23(c)(B)-(C)(1994). After a budget point of order was raised causing
the ten year requirement to be activated in the Senate, the budget process had to be waived in the
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The pay-as-you-go system operates to sequester funds only if direct
spending and receipts legislation passed during the year will result in a net in-
crease in the deficit82 in that fiscal year or the prior fiscal year.8 3 If a net in-
crease will result, the Office of Management and the Budget ("OMB") will
institute sequestration procedures within fifteen days after Congress adjourns
for the year. Thus, a link is forged between taxation and spending.'
4
The budget deficit and changes in the budget process also affect the
legislative process.' Budget excesses must be offset by revenue-
increasing legislation86 and tax legislation must be revenue-neutral, even
when revenue-losing provisions reflect sound tax policy.87 A critical fea-
ture of the process is that it is carried out on the basis of estimates.8 In
Senate by a three-fifths vote prior to passage of the Amendments to the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs. See Benenson, supra note 72, at 3448-49.
81. 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(D) (1994). The costs associated with Operation Desert Shield
were declared to be an emergency. 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(D)(ii) (1994).
82. In other words, unless all entitlement spending increases or revenue reductions are off-
set by reductions in entitlement spending or increases in revenues, sequestration may result. See
Bopp, supra note 18, at 1638-39. See also FIsCAL 1998 GUIDE, supra note 49, at 28-30.
83. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1639 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. 1991) and noting
that look-back provisions require sequestration for violations occurring during the immediately
preceding year).
84. See id.
85. See Pearlman, supra note 39, at 940. He also noted three budget-related developments
which affected the tax legislative process: changes in the budget process itself; presidential re-
sistance to rate increases but a willingness to allow base-broadening changes; and indexing parts
of the code to prevent "bracket creep" which automatically increased annual revenues. Id.
Much legislation in the 1970s was designed to offset bracket creep, which has been described as
the "single most important force for legislative change throughout the 1970s." Leonard, supra
note 41, at 971-72.
86. Pearlman, supra note 39, at 940.
87. 2 U.S.C. § 642 (1994). See also Pearlman, supra note 39, at 940.
88. Four governmental entities have responsibility for keeping track of revenues, receipts,
and expenditures. The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") and the Joint Committee on
Taxation ("JCT") work for Congress. The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and the
Office of Tax Analysis ("OTA") work in the executive branch. A fifth entity, the General Ac-
counting Office ("GAO"), ensures that the President complies with the Budget Enforcement Act
of 1990. 2 U.S.C. § 904(i) (Supp. 1991). The Congressional Budget Office was created under
the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 201-02, 88 Stat. 297, 302-05 (1974). The JCT was created in
1926. See 26 U.S.C. § 8001 (1990). The duties of the JCT, the CBO, and the OTA are dis-
cussed in Graetz, supra note 46, at 614-17. Graetz notes that "both OTA and JCT revenue es-
timates are of critical importance in the legislative process, with JCT estimates determining
whether a congressional point of order is permissible and OTA estimates determining whether
sequestration is required." Id. at 617. The OTA performs revenue estimates at the request of
the President. The JCT and the OTA have access to confidential taxpayer returns held by the
Internal Revenue Service. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 mandates that the OMB esti-
mates take precedence over the CBO estimates. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901(a)(7) and 902(d) (Supp.
1991). See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1632. The OMB, using OTA revenue estimates, estimates
a bill's budgetary effects and generates a sequestration report, dictating the amount the President
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fact, revenue estimation and distribution tables have come to dominate the
legislative process.9
Revenue estimation measures anticipated changes in federal receipts
that result from legislative changes to the federal tax law. The revenue
estimation methodology first determines the revenue projected under pre-
sent law. The second step is to estimate the revenue yield that would re-
sult from the proposed law." The revenue estimate is the difference be-
tween the two steps. Once the legislation meets the initial requirement of
the pay-as-you-go system and is enacted into law, the estimates become
part of the baseline budget for the subsequent year.91 The system does
not provide any method of adjustment if the estimates later prove inaccu-
rate.
Revenue estimation and scoring of outlays and budget authority play
a crucial role in determining which tax and spending proposals will be-
come law,' particularly since the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 man-
dated revenue-neutrality for tax legislation. It has been observed that "a
growing number of policy decisions have been made based upon the reve-
nue consequences of a proposal as opposed to its consistency with broad
tax policy goals, or its distributional or long-term economic effects."'
Unlike spending bills which often have clear budgetary effects, the reve-
will order sequestered. Id. CBO estimates are given to the OMB, where they are compared
before the OMB transmits its estimates to the House and Senate. Id. In 1991, the House modi-
fied its rules to "make the CBO outlay and budget authority estimates and JCT revenue estimates
binding under the pay-as-you-go system." Id. at 1643 (citing George Hager, Republicans Cry
Foul as House Changes Rules for "Scoring," CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 49 (Jan. 5, 1991)).
89. See Pearlman, supra note 39, at 940-41. Another result is an increase in the number
and importance of congressional personnel and a decrease in the influence of the Treasury De-
partment in the legislative process. See id. at 941-43.
90. Revenue estimates can be labeled "dynamic" to the extent that they take account of the
direct behavioral responses of taxpayers that can be expected from proposed changes in the tax
laws. Although a revenue estimate incorporates limited anticipated behavioral responses to a
proposed change in the tax law, the estimate does not take into account the potential effect the
proposal may have on aggregate economic growth, interest rates or other macroeconomic vari-
ables. Therefore, estimates do not predict the effects a proposal might have on the overall econ-
omy. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1630-31.
Often a change in one tax code section will have revenue effects on another section. Nor-
mally, indirect effects are ignored because they would consume a large amount of time and in-
troduce political considerations into the estimate. To make the job of estimating manageable, it
is assumed that tax changes will not affect nominal GNP or other macroeconomic variables.
Id.; see also Graetz, supra note 46, at 625-26 & nn.45 & 48.
91. 2 U.S.C. § 907 (1994). The President's budget is used as a baseline for economic and
technical assumptions in determining revenue estimates. 2 U.S.C. § 904(k) (1994).
92. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1632-33.
93. Id. at 1633 (citing Barry L. Dennis, Remarks at the Tax Executives Institute 41st Mid-
year Conference (March 26, 1991)). See generally Graetz, supra note 46 (describing in detail
the problems inherent in the legislative process because of the over-reliance on distributional and
revenue estimates).
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nue effects of tax bills are almost always unclear.' The focus on revenue
estimates creates the impression of precision while ignoring the "massive
empirical uncertainties" in the estimating process.' It also diverts the
discussion away from traditional criteria of tax policy.'
The current rules for determining revenue estimates are subject to
abuse by Congress 97 and suggestions to improve the estimating process
have been made. 98 But whatever the rules, creative legislators will still
94. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1633-34.
95. Graetz states:
Congressional decision-making regarding both the revenue and distributional questions
reveals a unitary weakness in the current tax legislative process: Congressional deci-
sionmakers routinely suffer from illusions of precision. Congress today seems to want
tax policymaking to turn on simple numerical answers.... Armed with mathematical
answers to both revenue and distributional questions, tax policymakers routinely es-
chew the difficulties of exercising judgment to strike an appropriate balance among
ambiguous and often conflicting normative goals; in the process, they put aside the
massive empirical uncertainties they inevitably face. Instead, they constrain them-
selves to write laws that conform to misleading or wrongheaded mathematical
straightjackets.
Graetz, supra note 46, at 613. See also id. at 671-72 (proposing the use of a range of revenue
estimates which provides some information regarding the accuracy of estimates).
96. Graetz concludes that:
Congress has mistakenly elevated the significance of estimates of annual revenue ef-
fects of tax legislation for each year of a five- or ten-year budget period by tying po-
tentially serious spending and tax consequences to these numbers. A politician there-
fore is behaving quite reasonably-given these constraints-when her dominant
concern in considering tax legislation is making the revenue numbers "come out
right." The diminished capacity of the traditional normative concerns of taxa-
tion-fairness, economic efficiency, and simplicity-to influence legislation in this
context is not surprising.
Id. at 672-73.
97. Id. at 673-76 (outlining examples of abuse). According to Graetz:
Probably the most egregious use of budget score-keeping rules to finance permanent
tax reductions with temporary revenues is the sale of government-owned assets to pay
for permanent tax changes. It is obvious that the revenue losses from the tax reduc-




For example, estimating the effect of proposed changes on the present value of reve-
nues collected from current taxpayers might limit the likelihood that Congress could
offer taxpayers an overall tax reduction in exchange for accelerating their tax pay-
ments. Jane Gravelle of the Congressional Research Service has recently proposed
"annuitizing" the revenue effects of alternative policy proposals to facilitate more ap-
propriate comparisons of alternative proposals. This approach would convert any tax
proposal, regardless of its effects on the federal government's cash flow, into the
equivalent of an annuity, thereby putting proposals with different cash patterns on an
equal footing. The Gravelle proposal would treat tax provisions in a manner more
consistent with the budgetary treatment of government loans after the 1990 Budget
Act.
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structure proposals "to maximize the likelihood of outcomes they de-
sire. "9
The revenue estimates and the estimating process have been criti-
cized for inaccuracy and politicization."° Public confidence is strained,
for example, when government agencies arrive at significantly different
estimates.' ° It is suggested that there are "too many variables embedded
in the Internal Revenue Code to know with certainty what a taxpayer
would have done had one variable been added or taken away. " "°2 There
is also a strong feeling that the different estimating approaches of Con-
gress' Joint Committee on Taxation ("JCT") and the Treasury Depart-
ment's Office of Tax Analysis ("OTA") result more from institutional
loyalties than theoretical differences. "o3
A second element of the tax legislative process which involves esti-
mates is the use of distribution tables that compare the present-law aver-
age tax rate for various taxpayer groups with the proposed change in "tax
burden." Although not part of the formal legislative process, distribution
tables are routinely prepared for and used by Congress in structuring tax
legislation. In fact, tables demonstrating the distributional effects of tax
Id. at 676-77 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 677.
100. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1645. There is a tendency for the estimating process to be
politicized. Special interest groups view the political process as a means of obtaining objectives
that "cannot be efficiently secured through simple market exchanges." Id. at 1649 (quoting
James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 103, 108 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds.,
1988). Interest groups often generate and present their own revenue estimates which introduce
considerable bias into the legislative process. The bias comes not from biased results, which
would undermine the credibility of the private estimator, but from the process of selecting which
estimates to make and which estimates to present to the appropriate agency. Interest groups pre-
sent only those estimates favorable to their cause. See id. at 1650-51.
101. In 1990 the JCT and the OTA published widely different estimates of the revenue im-
pact of a capital gains proposal. The JCT predicted a revenue loss of $11.4 billion, while the
OTA estimated a $12.5 billion revenue increase. The difference between the estimates was ac-
counted for by different "assumptions regarding the effect of the proposal on realizations." Id.
at 1645. Such assumptions, being judgment calls, may tend to justify the estimates, but they
"ultimately betray the speculative nature of the undertaking." Id. A third study indicated that
both the JCT and the OTC estimates were off and the revenue loss would be at least twice the
JCT estimate. See id. at 1646 (citing Gravelle, Can a Capital Gains Tax Cut Pay for Itself? 14
CRS Report for Congress (Mar. 23, 1990) and Hoerner, Treasury and JCT Both Off Mark in
Estimating Revenue Effects of Capital Gains Cut, CRS Finds, 50 TAX NOTES 1329 (1991)). See
also Graetz, supra note 46, at 670 (discussing capital gains estimates).
102. Bopp, supra note 18, at 1646.
103. See id. at 1647-48 (noting that the JCT leans toward Congress and the OTA leans to-
ward the Executive Branch); Graetz, supra note 46, at 633 (suggesting that whenever different
parties control Congress and the Executive Branch, accusations of manipulation of data will be
made against the various entities producing the estimates).
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legislation, which are often hastily prepared during the legislative process,
have become the "sine qua non of justice and 'fairness'" in tax law."
Distribution tables, regardless of who prepares them, are built on es-
timations of the effect of government action on the distribution of income
and wealth of a given taxpayer group. In reality, this effect is unknow-
able."05 It has been suggested that the use of distribution tables should be
abandoned during the process of drafting tax legislation."°1
What is at stake in the use of revenue estimates"° and distribution ta-
bles to formulate public policy in the tax arena is the loss of the public's
perception of fairness in the tax system.0 8 Simply stated, the information
contained in distribution tables is inaccurate and revenue estimates are
manipulated to reach five-year revenue goals when long-term revenue re-
suits are known to be different than the short-term results. 1 As stated by
one commentator:
It seems impossibly difficult to communicate even the simplest facts
about tax and fiscal policy to the American public. One cannot be en-
104. Graetz, supra note 46, at 618 (quoting MICKEY KAus, THE END OF EQUALITY 22
(1992)). See also Donald W. Kiefer, Tax Policy: What Happened? What Net?, 55 TAx
NOTES 1675, 1678 (1992) (pointing out that in spite of the large changes in marginal income tax
rates from 1977 to 1989, the effective tax rates for the second through the ninth decimal place
varied less than two percent).
105. Although a distribution table gives the impression that the percentage change in tax
burden can be added to the average tax rate for each income group, such an addition would be
irrelevant since the two figures are different. The change in tax burden takes into account the
net benefits from a given governmental action as well as the increased taxes used to create the
benefit. See Graetz, supra note 46, at 624-28, 678-79.
106. Michael Graetz states:
In my opinion, distributional tables should be abandoned as a basis for legislative deci-
sionmaking while legislation is being drafted. Their current capacity to constrain pol-
icy decisions disadvantages the tax legislative process. The typical economist's re-
sponse to empirical uncertainties-producing a range of estimates or indicating
confidence intervals-is an inadequate response to the fundamental inadequacies of
these tables which I have detailed here. Politicians, journalists, and the public are in-
capable of reaching informed and consistent judgments about the compromises that
should be made among the relevant variables; even if they were capable of such judg-
ments, there is no reason to expect any more agreement or better results from those
groups than from the professional staffs. The distributional tables that the staffs pro-
duce, however, create the illusion of precision. They endeavor to tell policyrnakers
precisely how much change in taxes (or "tax burden") is anticipated to be experienced
by people at various income levels; they appear to predict within one-tenth of one per-
cent changes in effective tax rates that are expected to result.
Id. at 666-67.
107. Graetz notes that "[p]rotected by supposed budget scorekeeping safeguards, policy pro-
posals are manipulated to produce revenue results in a five-year budget window when the
longer-term revenue consequences are known to be quite different from that within the budget
window." Id. at 679.
108. See id. at 611.
109. See id. at 679.
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tirely certain whether this is because politicians are engaged in willful
distortions, because the politicians themselves simply do not know the
facts or are misinformed, or because ... the truth in matters of this sort
is at best elusive, and often unknowable.
11 °
In 1995, after Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress,
methodological changes were made in both the JCT and the OTA, 1
leading to the following conclusion:
These methodological changes should shake anyone's remaining confi-
dence that the various staffs' distributional tables discussed... are-or
even can be--driven by economic science rather than by politics. The
mystery deepens as to why these distributional tables should be used to
determine tax legislative outcomes. 
112
Whether the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 will be effective is de-
batable." 3 While Congress appears generally willing to live within the
restrictions set by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,114 in 1992, the
deficit remained at $290 billion." 5 Accordingly, the 1993 Tax Act sought
further deficit reductions of $500 billion over five years. 6 The Taxpayer
110. Id. at 678.
111. See id. at 681-82 (citing Lucinda Harper, Treasury, Congress Disagree How Much
GOP's Gains-Tax Cut Benefits the Rich, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1995, at A2 ("The Treasury's
changes make the Republican tax-cut bill look extremely generous to the rich. Changes by the
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation make the same tax cuts look less generous to the
wealthy.")).
112. Id. at 682.
113. Congress has used a technique which allows it to pass a bill as an emergency measure
and grant the President power to withhold emergency status from parts of the bill with which he
disagrees. In effect, the legislation was an informal line item veto. See Bopp, supra note 18, at
1641.
114. Michael Bopp provides the following example:
[During the] spring and summer, the budget rules faced possible modification, or even
a complete overhaul, during this budget year's negotiations. Impetus for change had
arisen out of the prospect of a 'peace dividend,' or savings associated with diminished
defense spending, which, under the BEA, could only be spent within the defense dis-
cretionary category. Congress wanted to use the peace dividend to offset spending in
the domestic category, or to offset a tax reduction, but the BEA, as written, did not,
and still does not, provide such fungibility to budget authority. Although Congress
chose not to do so, any attempts to dismantle the BEA would likely have met with the
president's disapproval.
Bopp, supra note 18, at 1642 (citations omitted).
115. See Shapiro, supra note 67, at 446. Graetz and Schenk noted that:
The 1990 Budget Act also foreshadowed the political tax debate of the 1992 election;
during enactment of the 1990 Act, economic growth and tax fairness were treated as
irreconcilable enemies, with Republicans arguing for growth, and Democrats insisting
that tax fairness demanded higher tax rates.
GRAErZ & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 11.
116. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396) (1993). See H.R.
REP. No. 103-111, at 729-52 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 249-67 (Conf. Rep. 1993).
Graetz and Schenk state that:
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Relief Act of 1997 projects a balanced budget in the year 2002, although
critics are skeptical. 117
Because budgetary restraints were not entirely successful in elimi-
nating the deficit, attention was focused on other procedures to bring the
government's fiscal problem under control. These included a balanced
budget amendment to the Constitution, a House rule requiring three-fifths
of the voting members to approve income tax increases, and the line item
veto. Although the balanced budget amendment has not been passed, the
House did amend House Rule XXI in 1995 to require a three-fifths vote to
approve income tax increases.' Further, Congress introduced two line
item veto bills in 1995 and passed the final line item veto act in 1996,
which became effective in 1997.
II. The Line Item Veto
A. 1995 Congressional Proposals
In February, 1995, the United States House of Representatives
passed a bill ("H.R. 2") authorizing a Presidential line item veto." 9
The 1990 Act... served as the blueprint for President Clinton's 1993 tax and spend-
ing proposals .... Under the 1993 legislation, defense spending cuts were used to fi-
nance domestic spending, and both the 1990 and 1993 Acts failed to control spending
on entitlement such as Medicare and Medicaid, Social Security or even farm pro-
grams.
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 11.
117. Critics note that meeting the balanced budget by 2002 will require politically painful
votes to keep discretionary spending within the budgetary limits necessary to balance the budget.
Furthermore, they note considerable uncertainty that surrounds the estimates of savings from
spending cuts and costs of tax cuts. Robert J. Caldwell, Bipartisan Budget Accord a Triumph of
GOP Principles, SAN DIEGO UNION, Aug. 3, 1997, at Gi; Robert Reischauer, Those Surpluses:
Proceed with Caution, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1997, at C9; Martin Sullivan, 2002: A Budget
Odyssey, 76 TAX NOTES 872-872 (1997).
118. H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 106 (1995) (enacted as House Rule XXI(5)(c), (d)).
House Rule XXI(5) reads in significant part, "No bill or joint resolution, amendment, or confer-
ence report carrying a Federal income tax rate increase shall be considered passed or agreed to
unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the Members voting." House Rule
XXI(5)(c). The constitutionality of House Rule XXI is currently being challenged in court. See
Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the Framers' In-
tent, and the Judiciary's Role, 100 DICK.'L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1996) (arguing that if the su-
permajority rule violates the intent of the founders, congressmen and voters should find their
relief in the legislature and not the courts); Article, House Rules: Is a Supermajority Require-
mentfor Tax Hikes Constitutional? 83 A.B.A. J. 78, 78-79 (1997) (presenting the views of John
0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport "Yes: Each chamber can adopt its own procedures"
and Susan Low Bloch "No: The framers had only a simple majority in mind"). See generally
John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 486-87 (1995).
119. Line Item Veto Act, H.R. 2, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted).
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Thereafter the United States Senate followed suit by passing its own line
item veto bill ("S-4")'" differing in approach from the House bill. These
bills were debated for over a year and on March 28, 1996, Congress
passed the Line Item Veto Act (the "Line Item Veto Act of 1996" or the
"Act"). 2 1 President Clinton signed it on April 9, 1996, and it became ef-
fective on January 1, 1997.1z
(1) House Bill 2 and "Enhanced Rescission"
H.R. 2 is an example of the "enhanced rescission" form of the line
item veto. It granted the President authority to "rescind all or part of any
discretionary budget authority or veto any targeted tax benefit" " pro-
vided certain determinations were made.124 Within ten days of exercising
his line item veto power, the President was required to notify Congress by
special message of his action. After receipt of the special message, Con-
gress had twenty calendar days in which to disapprove the recission pro-
posal by passing a "rescission/receipts disapproval bill." If the proposal
was not disapproved, it would have taken effect. However, if Congress
passed a rescission/receipts disapproval bill, the President had ten days in
which to veto the "entire" bill. Congress then had five days to override
the presidential veto by a two-thirds vote in each house.
H.R. 2 gave the President the authority to veto discretionary spend-
ing, but not mandatory spending programs (for example, debt interest and
entitlements). The Bill also allowed him to veto targeted tax benefits
which included "any provision of a revenue act the President determines
would provide a federal tax benefit to 100 or fewer taxpayers." " If the
120. Separate Enrollment and Line Item Veto Act of 1995, S. 4, 104th Cong. (1996).
121. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. 104-130, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West 1997).
122. Section 5 of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 provided that it became effective on the
earlier of: (i) the day after the enactment of a bill providing for a balanced budget in seven
year, or (ii) January 1, 1997; and shall have no force or effect on or after January 1, 2005. Id.
at § 5.
123. H.R. REP. No. 104-11(11), pt. V, § 2 (1995). The report also notes that:
With regard to appropriations bills, the language "discretionary budget authority" lim-
its the President's rescission authority solely to dollar amounts. There is no authority
to propose the rescission of provisos, conditions, or other language, nor may the
President reallocate rescinded funds. Moreover, "discretionary" budget authority ap-
plies to funds that may be altered by Congress through the appropriations process,
with the exception of direct-spending (entitlement) programs.
Id.
124. H.R. 2, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (1995) (enacted). The same determinations were incor-
porated into the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
125. H.R. 2, § 4(3). Under H.R. 2, "targeted tax benefit" means:
[A]ny provision of a revenue or reconciliation Act determined by the President to pro-
vide a Federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or other concession to 100 or fewer
beneficiaries. Any partnership, limited partnership, trust, or S corporation, and any
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President vetoed nine separate targeted tax benefits, the disapproval bill
had to be directed to all nine provisions, not a portion of them." This
requirement would have caused a bundling of the rejected targeted tax
benefits that would have eliminated the ability to force bills to stand or
fall on their own merits. 27
The President could have used the power politically to force judicial
decisions," favor parts of the country, or even to insist on some pet
presidential project as the quidpro quo for not vetoing a bill. The shift of
power would have meant that a vote in either House of Congress of "one-
third plus one" would have provided the President with an effective veto
over specific spending. Once given, the power to take the veto back
would have required a two-thirds vote. An effort to put a sunset provi-
sion in the bill was defeated.
The purpose of H.R. 2 was "to restore fiscal responsibility to an out-
of-control Congress." It was passed as part of the Republican Party's
"Contract with America,"' 29 which emphasized fiscal responsibility and
holding Congress accountable for its spending. To increase accountabil-
ity, the Contract called for a line item veto so that pork-barrel spending 3 °
subsidiary or affiliate of the same parent corporation, shall be deemed and counted as a
single beneficiary regardless of the number of partners, limited partners, beneficiaries,
shareholders, or affiliated corporate entities.
Id.
126. H.R. REP. NO. 104-11, pt. 2, at 14 (1995).
127. See id. at 13. This proposal was not included in the Line Item Veto Act of 1996.
H.R. 2, § 5(a) requires that a number of reports be submitted by the President, in connection
with each proposed Presidential rescission of discretionary budget authority and veto of a tar-
geted tax benefit and annually for all such actions during the year.
128. Special consideration was expressed for the President's power over the spending by the
Judicial Branch, of government. Citing President Roosevelt's court-packing scheme of the
1930s, opponents argued that H.R. 2 gives the President too much authority over the budget for
the judiciary, an area of government which had not previously been the subject of criticism for
overspending. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11(11), pt V. § 2, at 20-21 (quoting Reps. Moran and
Norton). See also Robert Destro, Whom Do You Trust? Judicial Independence, The Power of
the Purse & The Line-Item Veto, 44 FED. LAWYER 27 (1997).
129. H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 2, at 7 (1995). See CONTRACTWrH AMERICA (Ed Gilles-
pie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
130. Tom Barrett (D-Wis.) noted that "tax pork" was as bad, if not worse, than pork in
spending bills. He predicts that, as discretionary spending becomes a smaller part of the budget,
special bills in tax acts will become more attractive. Arguing for the President to have broad
authority to "go after tax loopholes and tax carve-outs brokered by special interests and slipped
into revenue bills," Barrett suggested a broader definition of "targeted tax benefits" such as the
following, offered by Representative Slaughter:
[A] benefit in the form of a different treatment for a particular taxpayer or limited
class of taxpayers whether or not such provision is limited by its terms to a particular
taxpayer or a class of taxpayers. Such term does not include any benefit provided to a
class of taxpayer distinguished on the basis of general demographic conditions such as
income, number of dependents or marital status.
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could be cut out of "an otherwise good bill." 31 Further, it averred, the
line item veto bill could be used "to change the tilt of the game from one
that favors spending to one that favors saving. "132
(2) Senate Bill 4 and "Separate Enrollment" 133
Entitled "The Separate Enrollment and Line Item Veto Act of 1995,"
the Senate version of the line item veto ("S-4") modified the procedures
for enactment of certain legislation. It prohibited a House or Senate
committee from reporting an "appropriation measure" or an "authoriza-
tion measure" unless the measure allocated the appropriation in the same
detail as such items were set out and described in the accompanying
committee report. 134 Bills failing to provide the required detail were con-
sidered out of order and would have required a three-fifths vote to over-
ride the point of order.
After any appropriation or authorization measure passed the House
and Senate, the items of the bill were to be "disaggregated" and each item
assigned a new bill number and treated as a separate bill. These separate
bills would have been voted on "en bloc" and would not have been sub-
ject to amendment. 135  The President could then have vetoed any sepa-
H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 2 , at 39 (quoting Rep. Barrett).
131. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 129, at 31. According to the Contract, "The
bill calls for an up-or-down vote on the President's package of rescissions, and the cuts would
automatically become effective unless Congress rejects them. If Congress rejects the package,
the President can veto the rejection and a two-thirds vote would be required to overturn it." Id.
at 24-25.
132. H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 2, at 7. The report notes that the national debt hit $1 tril-
lion in 1981, almost 200 years from the country's founding. By 1995 the national debt was ap-
proaching $5 trillion. Id.
133. Several versions of S-4 were passed by the Senate in 1995. An earlier, enhanced re-
scission version sponsored by Senator Domenici (for himself and others including Senators Dole
and Daschle), is described in S. REP. No. 104-13 (1995).
134. "Appropriations measures" are those which make supplemental, deficiency, or con-
tinuing appropriations. "Authorization measures" are those which contain provisions providing
direct spending as well as any targeted tax benefits. S-4 applies to appropriations measures,
which includes any "general or special appropriation bill or any bill or joint resolution making
supplemental, deficiency, or continuing appropriations." S. 4, 104th Cong. § 5(1)-(2) (1995).
According to James L. Blum of the Congressional Budget Office, an earlier enhanced rescission
version of S-4 would not likely have an impact on spending because it effectively applied only to
discretionary spending, which was already closely monitored. Rescission of mandatory program
funding would also not have an impact, because it would not affect the "underlying laws that
govern the operations and determine the costs of the program." S. REP. No. 104-9, at 11-12.
135. Separate Enrollment Provision, S. 4, 104th Cong. § 4. By voting on the bills sepa-
rately, it was believed that the bills would be more likely to pass constitutional scrutiny. See
141 CONG. REC. S4330-31 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
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rately enrolled items in appropriations measures or authorization meas-
ures, which Congress could then have overridden in the normal fashion.'36
The term "item" in an authorization bill included new direct spend-
ing137 as well as targeted tax benefits. Targeted tax benefits were defined
as provisions estimated to lose revenue during the succeeding one-, five-,
or ten-year period, and which had the practical effect of favoring particu-
lar taxpayers or groups of taxpayers.13 This definition was broader than
the definition adopted by the House.
The Senate bill had a "sunset" provision which provided that the bill
would expire on September 30, 2002. It also had a "lock-box" provision,
requiring that discretionary caps be lowered to reflect rescinded funds to
ensure that rescinded funds were allocated to deficit reduction.
39
The purpose of the Senate bill was to "increase the President's power
over spending and the accountability of Congress by creating an expedited
procedure that would guarantee a vote by Congress on the President's
proposed rescissions and repeals of targeted tax benefits." 14° It would
have strengthened "the President's ability to rescind budget authority" and
to resist "pork-barrel spending." 141 It would have given the President the
power to remove non-germane "wasteful and parochial projects" hidden
in omnibus legislation. The Senate deemed that the line item veto was
needed as a response to the "overly restrictive" Impoundment Control Act
of 1974.142
136. See 141 CONG. REC. H5094-5106 (daily ed. May 17, 1995).
137. The term "direct spending" has the same meaning given in section 250(c)(8) of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. S. 4 § 5(3).
138. S. 4 § 5(5) defines targeted tax benefits as follows:
[A]ny provision:
(A) estimated by the Joint Committee on Taxation as losing revenue for any one of the
three following periods-
(1) the first fiscal year covered by the most recently adopted concurrent resolu-
tion on the budget;
(2) the period of 5 fiscal years covered by the most recently adopted concurrent
resolution on the budget; or
(3) the period of the 5 fiscal years following the first 5 years covered by the most
recently adopted concurrent resolution on the budget; and
03) having the practical effect of providing more favorable tax treatment to a particular
taxpayer or limited group of taxpayers when compared with other similarly situated
taxpayers.
Id. Some senators objected to this broad definition of special "tax benefits" which, arguably,
was broad enough to include the capital gains reduction. S. REP. No. 104-10, at 19 (1995)
(statement by Senator Abraham referring to a comment by Senator Bradley).
139. See S. 4 § 8; S. REP. No. 104-13, at 4; S. REP. No. 104-9, at 10.
140. S. REP. No. 104-10, at 1.
141. S. REP. No. 104-13, at 1-2.
142. See discussion of Impoundment Control Act, supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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B. The Line Item Veto of 1996
(1) The Act
On March 28, 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act of
1996.143 The Act allows the President and future Presidents to "cancel":
(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority;
(2) any item of new direct spending; or
(3) any limited tax benefit.144
This power can only be used if the President determines that such action:
(1) will reduce the federal budget deficit,
(2) will not impair any essential Government functions, and
(3) will not harm the national interest.145
To exercise his cancellation power, the President must notify Congress
within five "calendar days," excluding Sundays, of the enactment of the
law of the items that he canceled.146 The notification is in the form of a
special message to Congress that identifies the reasons for the cancellation
as well as the specific governmental departments, states, and congres-
sional districts affected by the cancellation. 47 It also provides a reference
number for each cancellation. 148  Upon receipt of the special message,
Congress has thirty "calendar days of session" to pass a bill that would
disapprove of one or more of the cancellations in the special message.
The Line Item Veto Act provides for expedited procedures to govern
the consideration of a disapproval bill by the House and Senate. It also
provides for a conference of the House and Senate to reconcile differ-
ences. The time for debate as well as the topics of consideration are lim-
ited in both houses so as to expedite the consideration of the disapproval
143. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West 1997).
144. Id. at § 691(a)(l)-(3).
145. Id. at § 691(a)(A). These are the same determinations required under H.R. REP. No.
104-11(IH), pt. 2 (1995), supra note 132.
146. See Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691(a)(3)(B). The use of the word "cancel" is
chosen to make clear that the President has approved the legislation and it has become law. At
that point the President can cancel. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 20 (1996). The
categories which can be canceled are defined narrowly to make clear that the President may can-
cel only the entire dollar amount. See id. According to the Conference Report:
[W]ith respect to limited tax benefits, the term cancel means to prevent the specific
provision of law that provides the benefit from having legal force or effect .... Mhe
authority granted the President is very narrow-only to collect the tax that would oth-
erwise not be collected or to deny the credit that would otherwise be provided.
Id. at29.
147. See Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691a(b).
148. See id. at § 69la(b)(1)(A).
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bill. The disapproval bill, which is not subject to cancellation, 49 becomes
effective upon signature by the President or, if vetoed in the normal man-
ner by the President, upon a two-thirds vote of both houses to override
the President's veto.'
The President's cancellation authority over discretionary budget
authority and new direct spending is relatively broad. Whole dollar
amounts of discretionary budget authority that can be canceled include
amounts specified in an appropriation law or represented separately in a
table, chart, or explanatory text contained in a statement or committee re-
port accompanying the bill as well as certain other amounts.' Direct
spending, 52 which includes entitlement authority and the food stamp pro-
gram, can be canceled in whole to the extent that the spending represents
an increase over the baseline amount calculated pursuant to section 257 of
the Gramm-Rudman Act.1 53  The Conference Report illustrates the veto
authority in reducing discretionary spending with the following:
The FY 1996 Agriculture Appropriations Act (Public Law 104-37) ap-
propriates a total of $421,929,000 for agricultural research and educa-
tion, of which $49,846,000 is made available for special grants for agri-
culture research. The conference report accompanying this law contains
a table that allocates the $49,846,000 total into lesser dollar
amounts... for example, a $3,758,000 allocation for: "Wood Utiliza-
tion Research (OR, MS, NC, MN, ME, MI). " 154
Assuming the President exercised the authority to cancel this
$3,758,000, this dollar amount would be automatically subtracted from
the $421,929,000 total and from the $49,846,000 earmark.' 55
[T]he President could cancel either the entire $49,846,000 specified in
the statute or the entire $3,758,000 described in the chart in the Confer-
ence Report. However, because the Congress did not break down the
allocations for each state associated with this project the President would
not have the authority to take a portion of the $3,758,000 allocated to
wood utilization research.
149. See id. at § 691(c).
150. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 18 (1995).
151. See Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(7).
152. The term "direct spending" is defined in the Line Item Veto Act as:
(A) budget authority provided by law (other than an appropriation law);
(B) entitlement authority; and
(C) the food stamp program.
Id. at § 691e(5). The definition is intended to be the same as that contained in section 250(8) of
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. See H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-491, at 30.
153. See Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. A. § 691e(8) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-177 § 257, 2
U.S.C. § 907 (1996)).
154. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 22.
155. Id. at 23.
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The conferees intend that cancellation authority only applies to whole
items....
The conferees believe. . .[the $3,758,000] line in the report must be
canceled in its entirety. The President's cancellation authority is strictly
limited. The President has no authority in this example to cancel wood
utilization research for Michigan only. 156
The Line Item Veto Act provides that whenever any discretionary
budget authority, item of new direct spending, or limited tax benefit is
canceled, the resulting savings will be applied to deficit reductions.
These so-called "lockbox" procedures are incorporated into existing pro-
cedures governing discretionary spending limits and pay-as-you-go re-
quirements under the Gramm-Rudman Act.1
5 7
The Line Item Veto Act also allows the President to cancel specific
portions of a tax bill. In fear of relinquishing too much power, the bill's
authors provided that the JCT would review any amendment to the Tax
Code and identify any limited tax benefit during the revenue estimating
process. 5 ' Congress was then given the option of including the Commit-
tee's list in the bill, and if so included, the President would only be per-
mitted to cancel limited tax benefits so listed.5 9 If Congress did not in-
clude the Committee's list as part of the bill, the President would be free
to cancel any item in the bill meeting the definition of limited tax bene-
fit.' 60
Republicans debated what would be classified as a "limited tax bene-
fit. '"161 Arguments ranged from allowing "the President to be able to veto
only provisions that helped 10 or fewer taxpayers" to others promoting
the President "to be able to excise any provisions that helped any special
group. "162
156. Id. at 34. The report expands the example, stating:
To further illustrate... the conferees submit the following example that corresponds
to a chart contained in the same conference report: Aflatoxin (IL), 133,000; Human
Nutrition (AR), 425,000; Human Nutrition (IA), 473,000; Wool Research (TX, MT,
WY) 212,000. In this case, the President may cancel aflatoxin (IL), Human Nutrition
(AR), Human Nutrition (IA), and/or Wool Research (TX, MT, WY). Although there
are two human nutrition research projects listed in two different states, because of the
manner in which they are listed, each project may be separately canceled. Again, the
President may only cancel the entire wool research program and may not cancel only
wool research in Texas.
Id.
157. See id. at 23-24.
158. See Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691f(a).
159. See id. at § 691f(b)(1) & (c)(1).
160. See id. at § 691f(c)(2). See generally Heidi Glenn, Line Item Veto: Terrific or Tooth-
less?, 71 TAx NOTEs 151 (Apr. 8, 1996).
161. See Glenn, supra note 160, at 151.
162. Id.
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Congress finally settled on a definition of a limited tax benefit that
included two types of tax provisions (referred to herein as "revenue-
losing provisions affecting 100 or fewer taxpayers" and "transitional re-
lief," respectively) as follows:
(i) any revenue-losing provision which provides a federal tax deduction,
credit, exclusion, or preference to 100 or fewer beneficiaries... in any
fiscal year for which the provision is in effect;16 and
(ii) any federal tax provision which provides temporary or permanent
transitional relief for 10 or fewer beneficiaries in any fiscal year from a
change to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.164
The term "revenue-losing provision" is defined in the Line Item Veto Act
as a provision which loses revenue either in the first fiscal year for which
the provision is effective or in the period of five fiscal years beginning
with the first fiscal year for which the provision is effective." Further, if
the number of beneficiaries falls below the threshold in any year for
which the provision is in effect, the item would be a limited tax benefit. 1
Revenue-losing provisions affecting 100 or fewer taxpayers are sub-
ject to several important exceptions. First, such a provision is not a lim-
ited tax benefit if the effect is that "all persons in the same industry or en-
gaged in the same type of activity receive the same treatment."1 The
Conference Report provides the following example of this exception:
[A] provision that sets forth the depreciation treatment for equipment
that is used only by automobile manufacturers will not be treated as a
limited tax benefit solely because there are fewer than 100 automakers
located in the United States.
Similarly, a provision that provides the same treatment for all persons
who engage in research and development activities, or all persons who
adopt children, or all persons who engage in drug testing, would not be
treated as a limited tax benefit simply because 100 or fewer persons are
expected to engage in that activity.... In such circumstances, the
benefit is provided as an incentive to anyone who chooses to-engage in
the activity rather than to a closed group of specific taxpayers.16
8
Additionally, an exception is granted to a provision that results in "all
persons owning the same type of property, or issuing the same type of in-
vestment, receive[ing] the same treatment." 69 The Conference Report
provides the following example:
163. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(9)(A)(i).
164. Id. at § 691e(9)(A)(ii).
165. See id. at § 691e(9)(E)(i)-(ii).
166. See id. at § 691e(9)(A)(i)-(ii).
167. Id. at § 691e(9)(B)(i).
168. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-491, at 38 (1995).
169. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(9)(B)(ii).
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[A] provision that sets forth the depreciation treatment for a highly-
specialized type of computer equipment that is owned by fewer than 100
taxpayers (who are not necessarily in the same industry) would not be
treated as a limited tax benefit as long as any person who purchases such
equipment is entitled to the same treatment. 170-
The definition of a revenue-losing provision is further narrowed by
clarifying restrictions that identify four differences which, if present, will
not justify categorization as a limited tax benefit. They are as follows:
1) in the case of businesses and associations, the size or form of the
business or association involved;
171
2) in the case of individuals, general demographic conditions, such as
income level, marital status, number of dependents, or tax return filing
status;
172
3) the amount involved;173 or
4) a generally-available election under the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.174
Due to the breadth of the exceptions to the definition of limited tax bene-
fits that can be vetoed, many critics feel that the President's line item veto
power over tax subsidies is almost nonexistent.175
To rebut the critics of the line item veto, supporters have created a
list of provisions that could fall under the veto pen of the President. The
JCT has identified examples from recent tax bills that would fall within
the ambit of the Act. 76 The JCT's list includes the following: The exten-
sion of the orphan drug tax credit in the Balanced Budget Act of 1995,
and the fifty percent tax credit that would have been allowed for clinical
testing expenses incurred in the testing of some drugs for rare diseases."7
The list also mentions a number of special provisions that target only one
170. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 38. The report continues, "Similarly, a provision
that affects the deductibility of interest with respect to certain types of debt instruments would
not be a limited tax benefit, as long as any person who issued that type of debt instrument re-
ceives the same treatment." Id.
171. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(9)(B)(iii)(I). An example would be a provi-
sion that gives preferential treatment to small businesses. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491,
at 38.
172. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(9)(B)(iii)(lI).
173. Id. at § 691e(9)(B)(iii)(III). An example would be a cap based on the dollar amount of
a taxpayer's investment or the number of units produced by a taxpayer. See H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 104-491, at 38.
174. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(9)(B)(iii)(IV). An example would be when
taxpayers who engage in an activity are given a choice between two alternative treatments, and
fewer than 100 taxpayers are expected to choose one of the alternatives. See H.R. CONF. REP.
NO. 104-491, at 38.
175. See Glenn, supra note 160, at 151.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 151-52.
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person, including a provision in an act that "gave tax relief to a business
located in Bartlesville, Oklahoma."178
Presidential cancellation of transitional relief for ten or fewer benefi-
ciaries is subject to the limitation that a provision would not be a limited
tax benefit if:
(i) it provides for the retention of prior law with respect to all binding
contracts or other legally enforceable obligations in existence on a date
contemporaneous with congressional action specifying siuch date; or
(ii) it is a technical correction to previously enacted legislation that is
estimated to have no revenue effect.
The Conference Report provided the following example of a transition
rule that would be subject to the line item veto as a limited tax benefit:
One provision in the 1986 Act changed the rules for how multinational
corporations could allocate interest expenses for foreign tax credit pur-
poses. The provision included a favorable rule for banks, and also in-
cluded a special exception allowing "certain" non-banks to use the fa-
vorable bank rule. The special exception applied to any corporation if
(A) such corporation is a Delaware corporation incorporated on August
20, 1959, and
(B) such corporation was primarily engaged in the financing of dealer
inventory or consumer purchases on May 290 1985, and at all times
thereafter before the close of the taxable year.
Since ten or fewer taxpayers were expected to benefit from the special ex-
ception for "certain" non-banks, this provision would constitute a limited
tax benefit subject to the President's cancellation authority.
A major concern of critics is that the JCT, in exercising its power to
identify limited tax benefits, will respond to tax attorneys who find "crea-
tive" ways to disqualify a provision from limited tax benefit status."'
With the variety of exceptions to the definition of a limited tax benefit,
these tax attorneys are provided with an arsenal of loopholes to get provi-
sions out from under the limited tax benefit status. Only the most special
of tax benefits could really go to the President without a fight over its
designation as a limited tax benefit.
(2) Constitutionality of the Line Item Veto
The original House 82 and Senate 8' bills as well as the Line Item
Veto Act provide for judicial review of any provision of the bill that a
178. Id. at 152.
179. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(9)(C(i)-(ii).
180. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491 at 39 (1995) (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-514, §
1215(c)(5) (1986)).
181. See Glenn, supra note 160, at 151.
182. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11, at § 7(1995).
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member of Congress believes violates the Constitution. Under the Line
Item Veto Act, an action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief can
be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.184 The decision, if appealed, will be appealed directly to the Supreme
Court. The question is whether the Line Item Veto Act is constitutional.
Two challenges to the Line Item Veto Act, one in 1996 prior to the Act's
effective date, and the second in 1997, after the Act had become effective
but before the power was exercised, were dismissed on grounds that the
respective plaintiffs lacked standing. 185 In the second case, 186 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia declared the Act uncon-
stitutional187 but the Supreme Court set the judgment aside, finding that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the issue."' A third case, New York
v. Clinton, '89 was filed to challenge President Clinton's veto of items from
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 199719° and the Balanced Budget Act of
1997.191 In this third challenge, the same district court (but a different
judge) again declared the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional. 19' On Feb-
183. See The Separate Enrollment and Line Item Veto Act of 1995, S. 4, 104th Cong. § 6
(1995).
184. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11, at § 3.
185. See National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 484 (D.D.C.
1996), aft'd, 101 F.3d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997), rev'g
956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997).
186. Raines, 117 S. Ct. 2312.
187. See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997).
188. 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2314 (1997).
189. Nos. CIV 97-2393 (TFH), CIV 97-2463 (TFH), 1998 WL 63070 (D.D.C. 1998).
190. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997). Two items identified as limited tax bene-
fits, section 968 (relating to nonrecognition of gain on sale of stock to certain farmers' coopera-
tive) and section 1175 (relating to exemption for active financing income), identified as limited
tax benefits were vetoed from this bill. See infra note 525.
191. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 1569 (1997). Section 4722(c), providing New York
State relief from its potential liability to repay certain Medicaid payments to the Health Care
Financing Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services, was vetoed from
this bill. See John Godfrey & Heidi Glenn, Clinton Axes Three Provisions from Budget Bills, 76
TAX NOTES 875 (1997).
192. New York v. Clinton, 1998 WL 63070. The district court concluded that the parties
challenging the Line Item Veto Act had standing and held the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 un-
constitutional as violating the procedural requirements of bicameral passage and presentment and
the constitutional requirement of separation of powers. It is interesting to note that the court
considered the Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., a farmer cooperative and one of the plaintiffs
in the case, an "indirect" beneficiary of one of the vetoed tax provisions, although the coopera-
tive would not be considered a beneficiary under the provisions of section of 1026(9) of the Line
Item Veto Act of 1996. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DRAFT ANALYSIS OF ISSUES
AND PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE LINE ITEM VETO
ACT (PUBLIC LAW 104-130) RELATING TO LIMITED TAX BENEFITS (JCX 48-96) 24 (1996).
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ruary 27, 1998, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal of this
case. 193
The word "veto" is not found in the Constitution.' 94  Instead, the
Constitution refers to the President "returning" a bill to the house in
which it originated."9 Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, which is referred to
as the presentment clause, provides:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return
it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated,
who shall ... proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration
two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, to-
gether with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall like-
wise be reconsidered and if approved by two thirds of that House, it
shall become a Law. 1
It has been the practice of Congress to bundle legislation covering
numerous subjects into single "omnibus" bills which are presented to the
President as a single "bill." 9' Presented with such an omnibus bill, does
the President have power to return separate parts of the bill or must he
return the bill as a whole? 98 President Bush considered the possibility
193. Joan Biskupic, High Court to Decide Legality of Line-Item Veto by July; Oral Argu-
ments in Case Scheduled for April 27, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1998, at A-2.
194. For a discussion of the history of how the clause developed and references to the Presi-
dent's "negative," "revisionary power," or similar references by the Founders, see Sidak and
Smith, supra note 1, at 441-45.
195. Other characterizations included the President's "negative" or "qualified negative," or
the "revisionary check" or "revisionary power." See id. at 441 n.14, 442 & n.16 (citing J.
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66, 465, 627-30
(1966 ed.) (1840)).
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
197. Sidak and Smith use the term "bill" to refer to proposed legislation on a single subject.
They refer to "collections of bills styled as a single bill" as "omnibus bills" or "bundled bills."
Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 449 n.48.
198. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.i. 1725
(1996) (offering the example of a bill concerning both guns and butter). Flaherty identifies the
problem with this type of omnibus legislation by giving the following example:
Suppose the President uses a line item veto to reject the butter portion of a legislative
package but allows the gun provision to become a statute. There are two problems in-
herent in such a course of action. The first difficulty occurs because of the effect of
such a veto on the issue of whether guns and butter should be joined at all. However
appropriate it may be for the President to disagree with Congress on this score, the
President's action denies Congress the opportunity to override this determination and
re-link the measures by a two-thirds majority. Instead, the two items are severed by
virtue of one becoming law, even though the popular will, as reflected through con-
gressional elections, strongly favors the linkage. The more dramatic problem is that
the gun measure will become a binding norm even though it might never have com-
manded a majority standing alone, absent legislative bargaining.
Id. at 1838.
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that the Constitution implicitly allowed a line item veto that permitted him
to veto parts of a bill without congressional sanction.199
Rejecting the idea of an implicit item veto, Professors Laurence H.
Tribe of Harvard Law School and Philip B. Kurland of the University of
Chicago Law School have asserted summarily that the President is com-
pelled to accept legislation in whatever form Congress sends it to the
White House. 20° Professors J. Gregory Sidak of Stanford Law School and
Thomas A. Smith of Cornell Law School have concluded that the question
is more complex than the Tribe-Kurland response suggests. They aver
that assertion in the Tribe-Kurland response would undermine critical
elements of the Framers' "scheme of balanced and separated powers. " 2°'
They believe it would be difficult to find a "constitutional principle that
affirmatively permits Congress to undermine the President's veto [by
bundling numerous bills together] but forbids the President from re-
sponding." Sidak and Smith assert the importance of the issue of the
President's authority as follows:
What steps the Constitution permits the President to take to protect per-
haps his most important formal power-the veto-from the measures
199. The Wall Street Journal reported that President Bush was considering asserting an in-
herent item veto power and inviting a court challenge to his power. See Gerald F. Seib, If Bush
Tests Constitutionality of Line-Item Veto, Reverberations Could Transform Government, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 30, 1989, at A12.
200. See Letter of Tribe & Kurland to Senator Ted Kennedy, 135 CONG. REc. S14,387
(daily ed. Oct. 31, 1989) reprinted in Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 437 n.1 [hereinafter
Tribe-Kurland response]. See also The Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of
the Bar of New York, Revisiting the Line-Item Veto, 50 RECORD 321, 326 (1994) [hereinafter
Revisiting the Line-Item Veto] (suggesting that, because the word "it or its" appears twelve times
in Article 1, Section 7, "bills are to be approved, disapproved and reconsidered in toto and not
in part").
201. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 478-79. Sidak and Smith note the importance of
the veto to the presidential scheme of power in the Constitution. Id. They quote Charles L.
Black, who pondered how far Congress could reduce the power of the presidency as follows:
I arrived at a picture of a man living in a modest apartment, with perhaps one secre-
tary to answer mail; that is where one appropriations bill could put him, at the begin-
ning of a new term. I saw this man as negotiating closely with the Senate, and from a
position of weakness, on every appointment, and as conducting diplomatic relations
with those countries where Congress would pay for an embassy. But he was still ve-
toing bills.
Id. at 478 (quoting Charles L. Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
87, 89 (1976)). Petrilla identifies two schools of thought on the line item veto and the balance
of power as follows:
One group of thinkers seeks to remedy the current defect in the balance of power
through an item veto, but is wary of creating a President who would overshadow and
eclipse Congress' role in formulating federal policy. The other group argues for an
item veto that would ensure strong executive power enabling the President to strike
down riders in legislation.
Petrilla, supra note 37, at 479.
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that Congress has taken to weaken it is one of the most pressing ques-
tions anyone who cares about the separation of powers must face.
Whether the item veto is constitutional or not, it challenges our under-
standing of the separation of powers and of the significance of the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution in defining the roles of Congress and the
President in the lawmaking process.
202
Sidak and Smith identify four types of implicit line item vetoes: the
traditional line item veto;' the subject veto2 4 which allows the President
to veto matters not germane to the main subject of the bill; constitutional
excision" which allows the President to refuse to enforce provisions
which he deems unconstitutional;' and, the Presidential shield veto, 
20
202. Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 440-41. Sidak's article is a reply to the Tribe-Kurland
response which opines that a line item veto would be unconstitutional since the Constitution does
not provide for the veto of a portion of bill. Id. at 437 n.1.
203. The traditional line item veto simply permits the president to veto any individual line
item in an appropriations bill in the same manner as the current veto power. The line item veto
may be limited to an entire item, whereas the impoundment power, which is simply a presiden-
tial refusal to spend appropriated funds, could extend to a portion of the funds appropriated.
This latter power was limited by the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. See id. at 446-48.
204. The subject veto is merely the ability of the president to veto riders on other legislation
which deal with subjects other than that of the main bill. See id. at 449. The subject veto
would allow the individual bills contained within the larger bill to be severed. Many state con-
stitutions prohibit a bill from containing more than one subject. See id. at 449 & n.50. Argua-
bly this type of veto could be implied because it would merely restore to the president the power
he had under the Constitution. However, it is doubtful that the historical evidence would permit
such an implied power. See id. at 449-50.
205. Constitutional excision rests on the proposition that the President is prohibited from
enforcing an unconstitutional provision in a law. Thus, if an omnibus appropriations bill con-
tained a provision that the President considered unconstitutional, he could sign the bill and then
excise the objectionable portions as unconstitutional under his authority to defend the Constitu-
tion. This power is similar to the court's inherent power to sever unconstitutional provisions
from bills. If the court has this inherent power, then why not the President? See id. at 452-57
(discussing constitutional excision). See also Rappaport, supra note 25, at 768 n.129, 771
(criticizing presidential approval of a bill with the intent of not enforcing it on constitutional
grounds and arguing that "a constitutional obligation strong enough to justify and require nonen-
forcement would also require a veto").
206. See Walter Dellinger, Legal Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to the Honorable
Abner I Mikva, 48 ARK. L. REV. 313, 317 (1995) [hereinafter Dellinger Legal Opinion] (sup-
porting the view that the President is not required to enforce unconstitutional statutes, even those
which he signs into law). Dellinger notes that the Supreme Court recognizes this practice: "it
is not uncommon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts which are objectionable
on constitutional grounds." Id. at 318 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13
(1983)). The Dellinger Legal Opinion includes an appendix identifying attorneys general opin-
ions, legal counsel opinions, presidential signing statements and other documents, historical and
congressional materials, and cases bearing on the question of presidential authority. See id.
The Chadha court cited the example of President Franklin Roosevelt's memorandum to Attorney
General Jackson, in which President Roosevelt indicated his intention not to implement an un-
constitutional provision in a statute that he had just signed. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n.13.
In a letter to Bernard Nussbaum, Walter Dellinger notes an argument contrary to this position.
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which allows the President to refuse to enforce bills that interfere with the
prerogatives of his office. 8
Whether the President has an implicit line item veto depends on the
constitutional question of what the Framers intended with the use of the
word "bill."'" It can be argued that "by long usage and plain meaning,"
"bill" means any "singular, entire piece of legislation in the form in
which it was approved by the two houses."21° However, Congress' ability
to circumvent the President's veto by bundling bills together leaves such
an answer unsatisfactory.21'
Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum Counsel to the President, 48 ARK. L. REv. 333, 338
(1995) [hereinafter Dellinger Memorandum for Nussbaum].
207. The presidential shield veto is a variation of constitutional excision. Under this theory,
the President argues that the action of Congress impairs his ability to perform his duties and pre-
rogatives under Article II of the Constitution and, for that reason, the bill becomes unenforce-
able. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 457-60 (discussing the presidential shield veto); see
also Dellinger Legal Opinion, supra note 206, at 316 (asserting that the President can resist any
act which encroaches upon his constitutional powers); Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 695-96
(1988) (concluding that a "good cause" limitation on the Attorney General's ability to terminate
an independent counsel did not prevent the executive branch from accomplishing its constitution-
ally assigned functions).
208. See Petrilla, supra note 37, at 479-89 (identifying two other types of line item vetoes;
the reduction-only veto and the rider item veto). The reduction-only veto is defined as follows:
The reduction-only veto conceives of an "item" as a dollar amount appearing in a
congressional bill, whether expressed in numbers or in words.... The President may
reduce the amount by any degree. A total veto of an appropriation would reduce the
dollar figure to zero.
The reduction-only veto is a non-textual mechanism, it removes nothing from the
bill at issue because it has no effect upon the substantive text of the legislation.
Id. at 481.
The rider-item veto is defined as follows:
A rider-item veto amendment would have two primary features. First, the device
would be a textual-item veto, with the ability to reach the legislative text directly.
Without such a capability, the device would be unable to strike out riders on a regular
basis. Second, the override percentage would be two-thirds of both houses of Con-
gress, thereby helping the President sustain controversial vetoes.
Id. at 484.
209. See Eugene Gressman, Observation: Is the Item Veto Constitutional, 64 N.C. L. REV.
819, 819 (1986); see also Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 466 (indicating that any "inherent"
power to exercise a line item veto must focus on the definition of a "bill" in the presentment
clause, and asking which division of government defines the term).
210. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 466. Professor Tribe notes:
[T]he President may wield his veto on the legislative product only in the form in
which Congress chooses to send it to the White House: be the bill small or large, its
concerns focused or diffuse, its form particular or omnibus, the President must accept
or reject the entire thing, swallowing the bitter with the sweet.
TRIBE, supra note 19, at 265.
211. See Petrilla, supra note 37, at 488. Petrilla states that:
Congressional bills are not easily divisible into "items" or "lines." Though the
substance of a particular bill may be divided into several sections, these sections often
do not firmly delineate boundaries between subjects of the bill. Nothing requires
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Michael B. Rappaport notes the arguments for a restricted definition
of "bill" on the basis of three purposes of the Constitution: "the promo-
tion of legislative deliberation, the protection of the powers of the partici-
pants in the lawmaking process... and the discouragement of extreme
logrolling." 212 An additional argument is that the residual presentment
clause, requiring presentment of orders, resolutions, and votes, supports a
restricted definition. 213 However, Rappaport suggests that the arguments
against a restricted definition are stronger. First, because the Senate was
given the power to amend bills that originate in the House, an unrestricted
definition of "bill" (for example, a "bill" can be in any form passed by
Congress) was unnecessary.214 Likewise, an unrestricted definition of
"bill" is necessary because the President has veto power.2 15 The presence
of a residual presentment clause,216 which acknowledges legislative action
other than through bills, indicates that the term "bill" was not considered
to be restricted. 2 7  Finally, Rappaport notes the inappropriateness of a
definition limiting bills to a "single subject" because it would be impossi-
ble to enforce.2 8
Neither the Constitution, the debates from the Constitutional Con-
vention, nor the Federalist Papers defined the term "bill." 2 9 It is argued
that if bundling of bills into a single omnibus bill is permissible, a line
Congress to organize bills coherently or logically-typicaly, unrelated issues are ad-
dressed in a single section. Sometimes, these sections contain controversial riders;
usually, however, such sections are used by legislators merely as a convenient scheme
for handling dissimilar topics. While some statutes have rules regulating the way a
bill is written, Congress labors under no such limitation. Congress is the master of the
form, style, and content of proposed legislation. If it so chooses, Congress may pass a
bill consisting of a single, long and winding sentence.
Id. at 480.
212. Rappaport, supra note 25, at 743. Logrolling is the practice of attaching riders to bills
which.the president would accept so as to get the main bill passed.
213. The implicit line item veto is also supported by the language of section 7, clause 3 of
the Constitution, referred to as the "residual presentment clause." There, the Framers made
clear that all bicameral measures produced by Congress having the force of law would be subject
to a veto. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. Clause 2 applies to "[elvery Order, Resolution or
Vote to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary,"
U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2, and as a result acknowledges that Congress cannot avoid the veto
power by calling a bill a "resolution" or an "order." This distinction leads Sidak and Smith to
believe the Framers recognized the danger of bundling bills together and perhaps would have
allowed a veto of any congressional maneuver to bundle bills together. See Sidak & Smith, su-
pra note 1, at 475-76.
214. See Rappaport, supra note 25, at 746-47.
215. See id. at 747-52.
216. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
217. See Rappaport, supra note 25, at 752-54.
218. See id. at 754. If an omnibus bill is defined generally enough, almost any omnibus bill
could cover one "subject," although it in fact embraces several subjects.
219. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 469.
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item veto could be implied to preserve the President's veto power.' Si-
dak and Smith state:
Our hypothesis is that the Constitution envisions some limit to the size
and scope of a bill, for as Congress bundles more and more proposed
laws into a single "bill," it diminishes the President's ability to exercise
the veto power to a degree that we think must be inconsistent with the
constitutional order contemplated by the framers. In the extreme case,
Congress could take an entire session's work (including appropriations
legislation) and package it in a single piece of omnibus legislation.221
Sidak and Smith conclude that summarily rejecting the concept of an im-
plicit line item veto is not as clear as the Tribe-Kurland response would
suggest. However, they acknowledge that any item veto would raise per-
220. As stated by Sidak and Smith:
[lff [the framers] thought bundling was permissible, it might have been because they
thought the abuse of this power would, in the end, provoke a concomitant exercise of
the presidential veto power-since the framers were clear that the first function of the
veto was to protect the President from legislative encroachments. The same constitu-
tional silence that sanctions the bundling of bills may also sanction their veto on
something other than an all-or-nothing basis. The Supreme Court has said that the
veto is a legislative power vested in the President.
Id. at 469-70 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
(Black, J.); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 453 (1899)). They
further note:
[I]f [the framers] were concerned that legislative bundling might compromise bicamer-
alism and permit the House to coerce the Senate, it follows a fortiori that they would
oppose the kind of legislative bundling we see today-a bundling whose evident pur-
pose is to eviscerate the presentment process and thus permit the legislature to subju-
gate the executive. Surely the independence and equality of the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government were at least as fundamental to the framers' vi-
sion of the structure and logic of the Constitution as was the bicameral composition of
the federal legislature.
Id. at 474.
221. Id. at 467. Sidak and Smith cite Professor William Clineburg as follows:
[Ilf that word ["bill"] encompasses any single instrument of legislation, the preserva-
tion or destruction of the veto power rests entirely within the domain of congressional
discretion. The President's veto power is preserved intact only if bills are limited to
one subject; it is destroyed completely if a session of Congress incorporates all of its
legislative program in a single instrument. In every instance where a legislative
document embracing congressional treatment of more than one subject is submitted to
the President, his veto power is frustrated if he agrees with the congressional treatment
of one such subject and disagrees with its treatment of another subject, but is required
to approve or reject the document in its entirety. To concede that, at its discretion,
Congress thus may preserve or destroy the veto power by varying the number and va-
riety of the subject it includes for treatment in a bill, is to concede to Congress the
authority to negate a power expressly awarded to the President by the Constitution.
The fallacy of the view that the President may not veto non-germane riders thus is laid
bare.
Id. at 467 n.125 (quoting William Clineburg, The Presidential Veto Power, 18 S.C. L. REV.
732, 753 (1966)).
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plexing problems, such as whether Congress would have enacted the law
without the vetoed part, which raise concerns that the use of the line item
veto could violate bicameralism.' Another problem identified by Sidak
and Smith is whether the President, in vetoing a part of a bill, can with-
hold judgment on vetoing the remainder of the bill pending a court deci-
sion on the item veto.' Again, if the President has an item veto, does
Congress have an item override power to override the President's veto on
an item-by-item basis?'
While an implicit Presidential item veto poses problems, these prob-
lems have not prevented the courts from severing offending provisions
from bills, an act which is tantamount to an item veto. Courts have rou-
tinely severed offending portions of bills and left the remainder in force.
Prior to exercising the power of severing the offending portion, however,
the courts have been careful to conclude that Congress would have in-
tended the remainder to be enforced or that the remaining bill is one
which Congress would have passed even without the objectionable provi-
sions.' However, after severance, there is a bill in force which is in a
form that was never subjected to bicameral consideration and present-
ment.'
222. Id. at 460-62. In Chadha, the Supreme Court, after reviewing views of James Wilson,
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Joseph Story, expressed the importance of the bicam-
eral legislative process as follows:
We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral require-
ment and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions. The
President's participation in the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch
from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The division
of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be
exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings. The
President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two-thirds of
both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby precluding final arbitrary action of
one person. It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action ... [is] a
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). See infra note 252.
223. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 461-63.
224. See id. at 463-65.
225. See id. at 22 (citing TRiE, supra note 19, at 1032-33).
226. Sidak and Smith, while acknowledging that judicial severance is constitutionally trou-
bling, note the ease with which the courts have exercised a severance power:
Professor Tribe astutely noted in 1984 the irony that in INS v. Chadha, a case about
the presentment clause, the Supreme Court did not pause to consider the validity of the
judicial power to sever the legislative veto from the remainder of the statute at issue.
Judicial severing of legislation, he noted, has the same constitutional infirmity as the
legislative veto: "Itihe constitutional safeguards of bicameralism and presentment are
thereby abandoned, and a new law is created by judicial fiat."
Judicial severability, the legislative veto, and legislative bundling all may be
forms of the same corruption of the legislative process mandated by the Constitution, a
process which demands both bicameral consideration and exposure to the President's
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In this context, the position that a bill is simply legislation in what-
ever form Congress chooses to send to the President has intuitive ap-
peal. 27 Considering that judicial severance is based on presumed con-
gressional intent, such a definition would eliminate the judiciary's ability
to sever an offending portion of a bill, and bicameralism and presentment
would be preserved. If this were the case, Congress could only avoid
having an entire bill declared unconstitutional by identifying explicitly
which portions of the bill it would have passed independently. 8  How-
ever, such a provision could just as well provide a basis for presidential
severance as for judicial severance.
Sidak and Smith conclude that the question of an implicit line item
veto is debatable. Nevertheless, they believe the presentment process is
"out of whack" and that, because the issue has received so much discus-
sion, it may now have to be decided.229
While the constitutionality of an implicit line item veto is a complex
question, can Congress, by legislation passed by both houses and signed
by the President, create an explicit line item veto? What power does the
Congress have to authorize the President to selectively veto provisions of
a bill? By granting a line item veto, Congress is acknowledging that any
bill it passes is so structured that the bill would have been passed even
without the provisions that the President has the authority to veto. In this
way, a severance by the President is tantamount to a severance by the ju-
diciary.
The constitutionality of an explicit line item veto may depend on the
specific form in which Congress approves a line item veto bill. The ex-
plicit line item veto can take two forms: 23 the separate enrollment form or
revisionary check. These constitutional infirmities might require a comprehensive so-
lution.
Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 478 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision:
A Law by any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 22-23 (1984) (citations omitted)).
227. See TRIBE, supra note 19, at 265.
228. For example, the severance of a rider affecting Rupert Murdoch was attached to the
continuing resolution for the 1988 federal budget. The rider was declared unconstitutional on
First Amendment grounds in News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
229. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 479.
230. A third form, expedited rescission, was passed by the House of Representatives in
1992, 1993, and 1994. "Expedited rescission legislation.., would establish fast-track proce-
dures for the consideration of the President's proposals to rescind budget authority provided in
an appropriations act or to repeal tax expenditures in revenue acts. These proposals would only
go into effect if passed by a majority of each House and signed into law." S. REP. No. 104-10,
at 7 (1995). Expedited rescission was thought to be "constitutionally acceptable" because each
Member of Congress had to specifically vote on each of the President's rescission proposals.
142 CONG. Rc. H3014 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
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the enhanced rescission form." Only the separate enrollment form is a
true line item veto. Enhanced rescission involves the President's power
to withhold spending through impoundment? 2 (also referred to as "se-
questration," "rescission," and, in the Line Item Veto Act, "cancella-
tion") and not his power to veto legislation.3 3
(a) Separate Enrollment Form
The problem presented by the separate enrollment form of the line
item veto occurs when a "bill" that passes Congress is split into a multi-.
tude of mini-provisions or "lines" that the President can veto individually.
The Presentment Clause, like all constitutional language, is "to be taken
in [its] natural and obvious sense, and [is] to be given the meaning [it has]
in common use unless there are very strong reasons to the contrary." 34
Under the Presentment Clause, a bill or resolution must have "passed
[both] the House of Representatives and the Senate" before being pre-
sented to the President.35 A bill that is fragmented is never truly sub-
jected to the full bicameral process as required by the Presentment
Clause. 6  This is because "the political and practical factors and the
give-and-take of the competing interests that enter into the passage of a
single appropriations bill may be significantly different from those in-
231. Acting Solicitor General Walter DeUinger, a highly respected Professor of Constitu-
tional Law at Duke University on leave to the Justice Department, has suggested that both the
enhanced rescission and expedited rescission forms will pass constitutional scrutiny because they
merely delegate the right not to spend money, whereas the separate enrollment form would pres-
ent numerous constitutional problems. See U.S. Budget: DOJ Official Says Constitutional Line-
Item Veto Not Needed, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) § Gil (Jan. 25, 1995) [hereinafter
DOJ Official].
232. See id.
233. Representative Skaggs stated:
The... Constitution clearly gives Congress the responsibility for crafting legis-
lation, while the President is limited to simple approval or disapproval of bills pre-
sented to him. Article I, section 7 refers to the President returning a bill, not pieces of
a bill....
The President's veto power, as a check on Congress, was recognized to be a blunt
instrument. As Hamilton explains in Federalist [No.] 73, the Framers acknowledged
that with the veto power "the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing
good ones." It was their sense, however, that "the negative would be employed with
great caution."
The line item veto .. turns Article I, section 7 on its head. What the President
might decide to "cancel" under this provision is simply repealed, unless the Congress
goes through an entire repetition of the article I legislative process, including a two-
thirds vote of both houses.
142 CONG. REc. H3014 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
234. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 679 (1929) (citations omitted); see also Wright
v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938).
235. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
236. See Gressman, supra note 209, at 820.
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volved if the houses considered 300 appropriation bills separately." 7
Senate Bill S-4 attempted to meet this objection by having the separately
enrolled bill "repassed" by both houses of Congress before presentment
to the President. However, each of the separately enrolled bills is not
subject to an individual vote and may still violate the requirement of bi-
cameralism in the Presentment Clause.
It could be suggested that Congress could define, by statute, the term
"bill" as any section, paragraph, or item contained within a single piece
of legislation that passes both houses as an entirety as a separate "bill. ,
8
An enrollment clerk could then dissemble legislation into separate "bills"
before they are presented to the President. Such a procedure would be
inconsistent with established practice and would assume that the term
"bill" implicitly includes the varied definitions which Congress can select
for purposes of each item of legislation. It could be argued that such a
procedure is supported by the power of each house of Congress to deter-
mine the rules of its own proceedings; 9 this suggestion, however, would
likely suffer from the lack of a full bicameral debate considered necessary
under the Constitution.2'
The separate enrollment form also involves a change in the balance
of powers between the legislative and executive branches. Congress is
seeking to do indirectly what it has clear power to do directly. Congress
could merely send individual spending bills to the President and allow him
to use his veto to pick and choose between a multitude of bills, each sepa-
rately considered by both houses. 241 Since it seems unable to act directly,
it wants to pass the power to the President through the line item veto.
This power shift would be "at the expense of the Congress, which would
lose its established power to present appropriations bills to the President
in the precise form produced by the deliberative processes of the two
houses. "242
237. See id. at 821.
238. See id. at 819; see also TRIBE, supra note 19, at 266; Rappaport, supra note 25, at
739. Rappaport describes three definitions of "bill": each separate item in an appropriations
bill; financial and substantive provisions distinguished as separate bills; and requirements of a
single subject in each bill. Rappaport also suggests that if the definition of "bill" allows for a
dissection by the President, each house of Congress could also dissect and reject parts of a bill
received from the other house and pass it on to the President. He notes, "[t]he term bill is used
in two clauses discussing the relationship between the houses: the origination clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, and the presentment clause, id. cl. 2." Rappaport, supra note 25, at
742 n. 15. Rappaport asserts that the Constitution does not support an implicit veto. Id. at 738,
741.
239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
240. See TRIBE, supra note 19, at 266-67.
241. See Gressman, supra note 209, at 822.
242. Id. at 822. A minority view in the Senate report on the separate enrollment bill in
1995 argued against the bill, suggesting that "S. 4 would provide the President with greater
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(b) Enhanced Rescission Form
The enhanced rescission form of the line item veto involves the dele-
gation of authority to the President to refrain from spending money ap-
propriated, rather than the authority to actually veto items in an appro-
priation bill.243 Instead, the President proposes rescission of particular
items in an appropriations bill after signing the bill into law. It builds on
the principle that the President, in faithfully executing the laws of the
United States, is required to expend moneys appropriated by Congress
except where Congress authorizes the President to do otherwise.
Although not entirely clear, the President's inherent power to im-
pound funds that have been authorized and appropriated for expenditure is
limited to reasonable impoundments necessitated by the exigencies of the
situation and the administrative necessity. 2' An inherent power to im-
pound funds would undermine the requirement that the constitutional veto
be executed upon presentment of a bill. In fact, an inherent power to im-
pound would be tantamount to a super line item veto since the President
could impound all or any part of the amount appropriated, whereas the
line item veto could only be exercised in whole. The enhanced rescission
power than a constitutionally approved item veto" thereby affecting the constitutional balance of
powers. S. REP. No. 104-13, at 11 (1995) (statement of Dr. Robert D. Reischauer). The re-
port notes:
As a result of INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), the one-House legislative
veto over deferrals was unconstitutional. A federal appellate court later held that the
one-House veto in the Impoundment Control Act was inseverable from the deferral
authority. Because of that ruling, Presidents could no longer propose deferrals for
policy reasons (disagreeing with the purpose of a program). Future deferrals would
have to be limited to routine administrative actions. City of New Haven, Con. v.
United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Congress enacted the principle of the
1987 ruling into law. 101 Stat. 785, § 206 (1987).
Id. at 2 n.1.
243. Walter Dellinger believes that an enhanced rescission line item veto bill will not face
constitutional challenge because it merely involves the ability not to spend. See DOJ Official,
supra note 231 and accompanying text.
244. An early case, Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, recognized that the President
lacked the power to impound funds stating, "[1"]o contend that the obligation imposed on the
President to see the laws faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel
construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible." 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838).
However, the President may have a limited power to impound funds when, in the exercise of his
reasonable judgment, the expenditure of funds in the manner appropriated would result in a
waste of public funds when the congressional purposes cannot be achieved. Professor Tribe
suggests that the President could withhold appropriations for cleaning up the Chicago River if
the river no longer needed cleaning, but the President could not impound the funds to balance
the budget. See TRIBE, supra note 19, at 196 & n.13 (citing Train v. City of New York, 420
U.S. 35, 42-48 (1975), as indicating that the court will determine whether impoundment is con-
sistent with the congressional purpose based on the statute and its purpose); see also Kendall, 37
U.S. at 613; James W. Bowen, Enforcing the Balanced Budget Amendment, 4 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 565, 579 (1994).
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form of the line item veto seeks to regulate the process of impoundment,
as was done under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974.245
The Line Item Veto Act delegates the President authority to "cancel"
discretionary budget authority, new direct spending, or limited tax bene-
fits within five calendar days after the enactment of the bill to which the
cancellation applies.246 Upon receipt of notification of the President's ex-
ercise of the cancellation power, Congress can pass a disapproval bill to
restore the items canceled by the President. The disapproval bill is pre-
sented to the President in the normal constitutional manner. The Presi-
dent can then veto the disapproval bill, after which Congress can override
it with a two-thirds vote.
247
The Conference Agreement on the Line Item Veto Act emphasized
that the cancellation power only becomes effective after the President has
signed the law and it has thereby become enacted in its entirety. This
factor ensures that "the President affirmatively demonstrates support for
the underlying legislation from which specific cancellations are then per-
mitted."248 It indicates that the legislative process has been concluded
when cancellation takes place and, thus, cancellation is not a true veto and
the presentment requirement is not' offended. It is also argued that by
completing the legislative process, the only remaining question is whether
the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 complies with the "standards governing
statutory grants of discretion to the Executive Branch. "2A9
Having completed the legislative process, it could be argued that
cancellation is tantamount to a repeal of a bill, which only Congress may
accomplish through the legislative process and presentment to the Presi-
dent. In finding the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 unconstitutional, the
district court framed the issue as whether the Act was merely an "en-
largement" of the President's "historically sanctioned impoundment
power" or was a "radical transfer of the legislative power to repeal statu-
245. Representative Solomon noted in the congressional debates:
From Thomas Jefferson to Richard Nixon, Presidents had the right of rescission. If
they did not want to spend the money because it was not necessary, they did not have
to do it. Unfortunately ... the Supreme Court made him spend the money ... and
that is why we are in the fiscal mess we are in today.
142 CONG. REC. H2978 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep. Solomon).
246. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West 1997).
247. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
248. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 20 (1995). Since the bill has been approved en-
tirely, the objections that the veto allowed bills which were never considered by the House or
the Senate in such fragmented form, or that the President has not accepted the bill as a unit, are
eliminated. See Revisiting the Line-Item Veto, supra note 200, at 328.
249. Brief for Appellant at 37, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (No. 96-1671).
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tory law. "'o The district court held that, once the President has signed a
bill, his only responsibility is to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."251 To cancel the legislation, the district court held, would be
to unilaterally repeal the law,'s 2 which is essentially a legislative act and
must comply with the constitutional requirements for presentment. Sup-
porters of the Act argue that cancellation is merely "administering it in
accordance with its terms."2r3
In Raines, the district court held that "cancellation under the Act is
simply not the same thing as impoundment or any other suspension of a
250. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 33 (D.D.C. 1997). It is clear that Congress cannot
delegate its lawmaking function. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1744 (1996).
Dissenting in Mistretta v. United States, Justice Scalia stated:
The focus of controversy, in the long line of our so-called excessive delegation cases,
has been whether the degree of generality contained in the authorization for exercise of
executive or judicial powers in a particular field is so unacceptably high as to amount
to a delegation of legislative powers. I say "so-called excessive delegation" because
although that convenient terminology is often used, what is really at issue is whether
there has been any delegation of legislative power, which occurs (rarely) when Con-
gress authorizes the exercise of executive or judicial power without adequate stan-
dards. Strictly speaking, there is no acceptable delegation of legislative power. As
John Locke put it almost 300 years ago, "[tihe power of the legislative being derived
from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other, than
what the positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make
legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making
laws, and place it in other hands." Or as we have less epigrammatically said: "That
Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government or-
dained by the Constitution." In the present case, however, a pure delegation of legis-
lative power is precisely what we have before us. It is irrelevant whether the stan-
dards are adequate, because they are not standards related to the exercise of executive
or judicial powers; they are, plainly and simply, standards for further legislation.
488 U.S. 361, 419-20 (1989) (Scalia, I., dissenting) (citations omitted).
251. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. at 37 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
252. See id. at 34. The district court in New York v. Clinton also concluded that the Line
Item Veto Act violated the bicameral and presentment requirements, stating, "There is no way
of knowing whether these laws, in their truncated form, would have received the requisite sup-
port from both the House and the Senate. Because the laws that emerged after the Line Item
Veto are not the same laws that proceeded through the legislative process as required, the re-
sulting laws are not valid." 1998 WL 63070, at *11. Of course, the court assumes that the
President's signing of the laws is valid and that the underlying laws are valid as they existed
prior to the exercise of the line item veto. The court does not consider the possibility that the
underlying laws were never truly enacted because the President's signature was not uncondi-
tional. It is just as logical to say that there is no way of knowing whether the President would
have signed the bills if he did not have the line item veto to correct the three items he planned to
veto. In other words, Congress passed the legislation knowing of the possibility that the Presi-
dent might use the line item veto.
253. Brief for Appellant at 50, Raines, (No. 96-1671).
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statutory provision. Instead, cancellation is equivalent to repeal." 4 The
court summed up the distinction as follows:
Cancellation forever renders a provision of federal law without legal
force or effect, so the President who canceled an item and his successors
must turn to Congress to reauthorize the foregone spending. Whereas
delegated authority to impound is exercised from time to time, in light
of changed circumstances or shifting executive (or legislative) priorities,
cancellation occurs immediately and irreversibly in the wake of the
operationalizing "approval" of the bill containing the very same mea-
sures being rescinded.
25 5
Supporters of the Act argued that presidential impoundment is well
established and the only question is whether Congress intended that the
appropriations be "mandatory" or "permissive."256 The Act, they pointed
out, merely makes the appropriations presumptively permissive for a pe-
riod of time.257
It was argued that since Congress has the power to repeal the Line
Item Veto Act of 1996 or to suspend it for particular bills, Congress has
not delegated legislative power." The district court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that until Congress exercises such power, the President has
become a "co-maker" of the national laws.5 9
Finally, the court addressed Field v. Clark,2 °a case in which Con-
gress delegated to the President the power to suspend certain tariffs
(thereby raising tariffs on the affected commodities) in the event the
President made certain findings that foreign governments were imposing
"reciprocally unequal and unreasonable tariffs on the commodities." The
Supreme Court upheld the delegation of such authority to the President.
The district court in Raines distinguished Field on two grounds.
First, Field involved "suspension" and not "cancellation" of the tariff
254. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. at 36. See also New York v. Clinton, 1998 WL 63070
(finding cancellation equivalent to repeal, but not addressing the relationship of the line item
veto to impoundment).
255. Raines, 956 F. Supp. at 36.
256. Which is to say, discretionary. Throughout the history of the republic, Congress has
delegated power to the President to spend money based on his discretion. Examples include the
long-standing practice of passing "lump sum" appropriations, appropriations of a "sum not ex-
ceeding" specified amounts, or giving authority to move funds between parts of a particular de-
partment. Brief for Appellant at 2-4, Raines, (No. 96-1671) (citing Abascal & Kramer, supra
note 52, at 1579-80; Ralph S. Abascal & John R. Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part 11:
Judicial and Legislative Responses, 63 GEo. L.J. 149 (1974)). See also Louis Fisher, Presi-
dential Spending Discretion and Congressional Controls, 37 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135,
160-61 (1972); Nile Stanton, History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated
Funds, 53 NEB. L. REv. 1, 14-30 (1974).
257. See Brief for Appellant at 36, Raines, 117 S. Ct. 2313 (No. 96-1671).
258. Sde id.
259. See id. at 37.
260. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
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law. "t Second, the district court found that the Supreme Court in Field
had merely upheld legislation with "contingencies" in which the President
would later determine the facts and suspend the law accordingly. In such
cases, the President is merely the instrument carrying out the predeter-
mined intent of Congress. The President first determined the factual con-
dition existed and then suspended the tariff according to the statute. The
Line Item Veto Act of 1996 is different, according to the district court,
since the President is granted the authority to make the fundamental
choices. In fact, giving the President the hard choices was the very pur-
pose of the Act, it held.' The merits of the district court's holding in
Raines remain in doubt, since the Supreme Court vacated the judgment on
the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit.3
A constitutional challenge to the enhanced rescission Line Item Veto
Act could focus on the congressional ability to override the President's
proposed cancellations, particularly whether the "disapproval bill" com-
plies with the full constitutional requirements when presented to the
President. In INS v. Chadha, the one-house legislative veto was held un-
constitutional because the full bicameral process of deliberation and pre-
sentment on each bill was not followed.' The legislative veto in the
1996 Act can easily be distinguished from one-house legislative veto at
issue in Chadha because both houses of Congress consider and pass the
disapproval bill before it is presented to the President in the 1996 Act.
NeverthelIess, there are differences between a disapproval bill and a
"regular" bill which may rise to constitutional levels. To override a re-
scission bill, Congress could pass a regular bill reinstating the items can-
celed. However, to do so would require going through the entire legisla-
tive process, including committee consideration of the bill and the
possibility of amendment.
The Line Item Veto Act could be viewed merely as an expedited
"procedure" for passage of a disapproval bill which considers only items
which the President has canceled. While consideration of the disapproval
261. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. at 37-38.
262. Id.
263. Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997). The Supreme Court will review the district
court's holding in New York v. Clinton. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
264. Representative Skaggs notes that the Constitution provides:
"All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States" [and] "If he [the President] approves, he shall sign it, [the bill] but, if not, he
shall return it with his objections."
Those are the basic parameters of the legislative responsibilities ... under the
Constitution and.., it is not in our power to change them....
The Court has spoken ... in the Chadha case, there making it absolutely clear
that the powers of neither branch with respect to the division of responsibility on leg-
islation can be eroded.
96 TAX NOTES TODAY 71-27 § 1100 (Apr. 10, 1996) (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
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bill would be something less than a full constitutional process, it could be
argued that the expedited procedure is merely an exercise of Congress'
power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings. "261 The major differ-
ence would be that Congress binds itself to the expedited procedure until
the 1996 Act expires or is repealed.
Analyzing the Line Item Veto Act in terms of impoundment may be
appropriate for consideration of spending measures, but it may be inade-
quate for the analysis of cancellation of limited tax benefits. 266 In many
ways there are similarities between direct spending and spending through
tax subsidies.267 Congress has broad power to lay and collect taxes for
the "general Welfare of the United States. "21 Since Congress can use the
taxing power in a regulatory manner provided some revenue-raising pur-
pose is present, can it delegate to the President the power to cancel tax
measures for reasons unrelated to the purpose of the tax measure? Article
I, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." 269 When Congress
amends the tax code in such way as to reduce taxes, it is not simply
authorizing the President not to spend. Instead, Congress is determining
the scope of taxable income, a determination that becomes law when
signed by the President.
265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. See Brief of the Association of the Bar of New York
Amicus Curiae in support of Appellees at 10, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (arguing
that the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 violates the Rules Clause since it is an attempt to bind fu-
ture Congresses to the expedited procedure for re-approval bills and allows the President to limit
the content of legislation).
266. See Dellinger Memorandum for Nussbaum, supra note 206, at 333 (arguing that just as
the application of the line item veto "to appropriations would not cause constitutional problems,
the application of the enhanced rescission form to targeted tax breaks also would not create diffi-
culty"). Dellinger also stated that other proposed bills that require separate enrollment by
breaking up bills for each line item for the President's veto would be "foolhardy" because of the
constitutional questions that would arise. He also believed proposed constitutional amendments
by Senators Paul Simon (D-Ill.), Hank Brown (R-Colo.), and Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) for the
line item veto would be unnecessary and probably would fail because of the three-quarters ma-
jority required for an amendment. See id.
267. For a discussion of tax expenditures, see infra note 358 and accompanying text.
268. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The broad power is indicated in J.W. Hampton Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), where the court stated, "So long as the motive of
Congress and the effect of its legislative action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the gen-
eral government, the existence of other motives in the selection of the subjects of taxes can not
invalidate congressional action." Id. at 412. Further, in McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27
(1904), the Court stated, "Since... the taxing power conferred by the Constitution knows no
limits except those expressly stated in that instrument, it must follow, if a tax be within the law-
ful power, the exertion of that power may not be judicially restrained because of the results to
arise from its exercise." Id. at 59.
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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A taxing matter specifies what income is to be taxed and what in-
come is not to be taxed. To cancel such a provision is not simply to
withhold spending, but is a determination as to whether a given taxpayer
will have to pay a tax. For the President to decide to exercise the power
of cancellation solely because he has determined that additional revenue is
necessary to reduce the deficit would be an exercise of legislative power.
Indeed, the Constitution instructs that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives."'27 For example, assume that
the tax code is amended to exclude all disability benefits from gross in-
come for fifty taxpayers exposed to chemicals during the Gulf War. Can
the President cancel the exclusion and collect the tax simply because the
President determined that the revenue is needed to reduce the deficit? If
so, then income which is not taxable under legislation approved by Con-
gress and the President will, in fact, be taxed.
Congress has been allowed to suspend taxes when statutory condi-
tions have been met. Field v. Clark,27 discussed earlier, upheld the
President's power to suspend the provisions of the act that provided for
the free importation of sugar and other specified commodities upon the
finding of certain conditions. 2' Such suspension automatically imposed a
tariff on the commodities thereby increasing the tax on the affected com-
modities.
While Congress can delegate legislative power, it must do so with
appropriate guidance as to how such power can be exercised. 273 The
delegation of power must be accompanied by roughly intelligible stan-
dards so as to be understood by the executive exercising the power or the
judiciary enforcing it. 4 The standard for determining whether Congress
has given sufficient guidance is broad, and no statute has been held un-
constitutional as an impressive delegation of power since 1935.275 The tax
code can be used to regulate commerce so long as the bill relates in some
270. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 cl. 1.
271. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
272. See id. at'680-81.
273. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1934); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
274. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr. &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Powers uniquely limited to Congress, such as
the power to confirm treaties, cannot be delegated. See TRIBE, supra note 19, at 362-64. In
exercising delegated power, agencies cannot use the power to achieve ends outside the intended
area. "The open-ended discretion to choose ends is the essence of legislative power; it is this
power which Congress possesses but its agents lack." Id. at 263; see also Hampton v. Mow Su
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
275. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374.
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way to raising revenues for the general welfare. Taxes that are solely
regulatory must bear a "reasonable relation" to the regulation.276
The Line Item Veto Act delegates the power to "cancel" limited tax
benefits. In this respect, cancellation means, "to prevent the specific pro-
vision of law that provides such benefit from having legal force or ef-
fect." 21 Is the power to cancel a delegation of legislative power? The
conference report on the Act makes clear that the word "cancel" was
carefully defined to prohibit the President from rewriting or changing any
portion of the underlying law.278 In the context of limited tax benefits, it
is asserted that cancellation only allows the President to terminate the
government's "obligation to forego the collection of revenue otherwise
due to the federal government in the absence of a limited tax benefit. "279
This convoluted description suggests that not spending appropriated
money is constitutionally equivalent to demanding that a citizen pay a tax
that is not due under the tax code. Cancellation of limited tax benefits,
however, is tantamount to laying and collecting taxes on the affected per-
son, a legislative power which can only be delegated with appropriate
standards.28 °
276. See United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 62, 93 (1918) (requiring registration by per-
sons subject to the tax and stating, "[i]f the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to
the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated be-
cause of the supposed motives which induced it"); see also United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S.
22, 31 (1953) ("Unless there are provisions extraneous to any tax need, courts are without
authority to limit the exercise of the taxing power.").
277. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(4)(C) (West 1997). Representative Skaggs
objected to the cancellation process:
What is even more bizarre in this particular proposal is the provision for the 5-day
cancellation period. Now, think about that. This is a metaphysical leap of Herculean
proportions.
The enactment provisions of the Constitution say that once the President signs a
bill, it shall be law. We propose that he then gets a 5-day cancellation right after
signing a bill? That is absolutely absurd. This defies any logical reading of the clear
meaning to the provisions of the Constitution... with respect to legislation.
96 TAx NoTEs TODAY 71-27 § 1100 (Apr. 10, 1996) (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
278. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 21 (1995).
279. Id.
280. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218 (1989). The Court
noted:
Earlier this Term, in Mistretta v. United States ... we revisited the nondelegation
doctrine and reaffirmed our longstanding principle that so long as Congress provides
an administrative agency with standards guiding its actions such that a court could
"'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,'" no delegation of legisla-
tive authority trenching on the principle of separation of powers has occurred.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The standards for delegation of taxing power are the same as those
for other legislation.I The only standards for the exercise of the line
item veto are that the President make the determination that the item ve-
toed will:
(1) reduce the Federal budget deficit,
(2) not impair any essential Government functions, and
(3) not harm the national interest.m8
These are general standards that, while in no way relating to the content
or purpose of the items canceled, provide standards which are about as
clear as standards in other areas that have survived constitutional chal-
lenge. 3
For the cancellation power over limited tax benefits to be effective, it
must comply with the requirements of Mistretta v. United States,' in
which the Court upheld the delegation of the legislative power to formu-
late sentencing guidelines to a commission in the judiciary branchn 5 In
analyzing the separation of powers challenge, the Court recognized two
issues: First, whether there is an unconstitutional accumulation of power
in one branch; and, second, whether the activity unconstitutionally un-
dermines the integrity and independence of the branch receiving the
power. 86 The Court noted that analysis of these issues involves an in-
quiry into the "unique aspects" and "practical consequences" of the con-
gressional plan to determine whether the commingling of powers is per-
missible. 7
281. See id. at 223. The Court held that fees (arguably the equivalent of taxes) collected
from users of hazardous pipelines and used to finance pipeline safety programs did not violate
the delegation doctrine, since the restrictions placed on the Secretary's discretion to assess pipe-
line safety user fees satisfied the constitutional requirements of the nondelegation doctrine. See
id.
282. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691(a)(A) (West 1997).
283. In Skinner, the Court noted the following examples of broad delegation which have
been upheld:
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778-786 (1948) (upholding delegation of
authority to War Department to recover "excessive profits" earned on military con-
tracts); Yakus, supra, at 420, 426-427 (upholding delegation of authority to the Price
Administrator to fix prices of commodities that "will be generally fair and equitable
and will effectuate the purposes" of the congressional enactment); FPC v. Hope Natu-
ral Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600-601 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power
Commission to determine just and reasonable rates); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194, 225-226 (1943) (upholding delegation to the Fed-
eral Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as "public interest,
convenience, or necessity" require).
Skinner, 490 U.S. at 219.
284. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
285. See id. at 372-74.
286. See id. at 383-84.
287. See id. at 393.
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By reason of the narrow definition of limited tax benefits, it is un-
likely that the power to cancel such items would be deemed to be an un-
constitutional accumulation of power or to undermine the integrity of the
executive branch. These factors will likely be insignificant under the
Mistretta analysis. However, the executive branch, with its responsibility
for the administration of the tax laws, may find the cancellation power an
effective means of enhancing the fairness of the tax system.
Whether the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 interferes with the balance
of powers is still an open question. Delegation of the power to cancel
spending bills represents the greatest interference of the executive branch
into a congressional function. If the veto of spending bills is unconstitu-
tional, the entire Act would likely be invalidated, since it would be hard
to conclude that Congress would have passed the Act if only limited tax
benefits could be vetoed.
(3) Comparison with State Item Veto Authority
A recurring argument in favor of the presidential line item veto is
that the President should have the same power as forty-three state gover-
nors to veto items in appropriations bills. 8 Proponents of the item veto,
including many former Presidents," consider the state experiences as a
model of how the item veto can help balance the budget. In fact, "[m]any
of the ... resolutions that the Congress has considered since 1876 were
based on the allegedly positive experiences states have had with the item
veto. 2
While the state experiences may appear relevant, a closer look re-
veals that many of the state experiences are not transferable to the federal
government. For example, state constitutions tend to reflect a bias against
288. See Rappaport, supra note 25, at 740 & n. 11 (citing President Reagan, State of the
Union Address (Feb. 4, 1986)); Courtney P. Odishaw, Note, Curbing Legislative Chaos: Ex-
ecutive Choice or Congressional Responsibility?, 74 IOWA L. REv. 227, 230 (1988). The states
without an item veto are Indiana, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
A seventh state, North Carolina, has no veto power of any kind. See Daniel S. Strouse, The
Structure of Appropriations Legislation and the Governor's Item Veto Power: The Arizona Ex-
perience, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 113, 117 (1994) (citing HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 99TH CONG.,
2D SESS., ITEM VETO: STATE EXPERIENCE AND ITS APPLICATIONS TO THE FEDERAL
SITUATION 4-6 (Comm. Print 1986). Strouse notes "[a] 'dizzying array' of variations on the
item veto appeared in state constitutions after the first one was adopted by the Confederate States
in 1861; most were in place by 1915." Id.
289. Presidents Grant, Hayes, Arthur, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon,
Ford, Reagan, and Bush have supported the idea of a line item veto. See S. REP. No. 104-9, at
5 (1995). The report also states, "More recently, President Clinton campaigned on a line item
veto, claiming that he could reduce spending by $9.8 billion over four years .... " Id. Only
two recent Presidents, Taft and Carter, have opposed the line item veto. See id.
290. Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 185.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
legislatures.29 This bias is seen in state appropriation bills which are of-
ten highly itemized and structured to facilitate an item veto by governors.
It is also seen in state constitutions which limit bills to a single subject,2' 9
require two-year budget cycles, and provide effective impoundment pro-
cedures. An important factor in the spread of the state line item veto is
the balanced budget requirements that are constitutional provisions in
forty-nine states.2'
These state structural elements have no parallels at the federal level
and, for the most part, render the state model of line item vetoes inappro-
priate for the federal government. To force the federal government to
prepare such bills would add a degree of rigidity to the bills, making it
impossible for the federal agencies to administer them without continually
returning to Congress for modification of their funding authority.
State experiences with the line item veto have also involved state
court decisions which addressed a number of questions in interpreting the
constitutional and statutory provisions.294 For example, must an appro-
priation be vetoed in its entirety or can it be vetoed in part (called a "re-
duction veto")? 295 If the governor has a reduction veto, how far can he go
in recasting the legislative intent? Also, what constitutes an "item" for
291. See id. at 178 (noting the anti-legislative sentiment in the late nineteenth century which
resulted in the governors being perceived as more trustworthy than legislators, who were per-
ceived as being open to bribes for introducing special legislation).
292. See id. at 180-81 (noting the requirements of the Alabama Constitution). Rappaport
argues that articulating and consistently applying a single subject restriction is impossible. See
Rappaport, supra note 25, at 755.
293. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 178 n.97. Vermont is the only state without a
balanced budget requirement. See id; see also 31 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE
BOOK OF STATES 230-31 (1996-97 ed.).
294. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 162. Fisher notes a particular instance where
one judge complained about the tests employed in some partial reduction cases:
To hold that the exercise of the partial veto power may not have an "affirmative,"
"positive" or "creative" effect on legislation, or that the veto may not change the
"meaning" or "policy" of a bill, as some courts elsewhere have done, would be to in-
volve this court in disingenuous semantic games. While these tests may be appealing
in the abstract, they are unworkable in practice.... These tests are inescapably sub-
jective. Without an objective point of reference, this court would be reduced to de-
ciding cases upon its subjective assessment of the respective policies espoused by the
legislature and the executive ....
Id. at 176 (citing State er rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 264 N.W.2d 539, 557-58 (1978) (Hansen, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
295. See id. at 166. Wisconsin's constitution provides that appropriation bills "may be ap-
proved in whole or in part by the governor." Wis. CONsT. art. V, § 10. A Wisconsin court
held that the power included the power to change substantive provisions which change the bill's
effect. See Kleczka, 264 N.W.2d at 552; see also Strouse, supra note 288, at 152 (discussing
the Arizona experience, where the court rejected an implicit reduction veto). Florida has held
that to allow the governor to reduce an appropriation would violate the separation of powers
doctrine. See Chiles v. Children, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
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purposes of the item veto?2' Do substantive provisions such as conditions
on spending constitute "items" so as to be subject to the veto? These and
other questions raise continual problems'and uncertainties at the state
level.2"
These state procedures may not apply at the federal level because the
United States Constitution contains few limitations on the spending power
and is silent on the procedures to be adopted by Congress to authorize and
appropriate funds.298 Congress and the Executive actually prefer to pass
funding in a lump sum in order to accommodate the need for administra-
tive discretion.2" This preference would eliminate many of the benefits
of the state item veto unless congressional rules were amended to require
itemization of appropriations bills.
Even if the state constitutional restrictions are not applicable at the
federal level, the question of whether the state line item veto is an effec-
tive tool of budget restraint or merely an additional tool for the governor
to pressure the legislature (or vice versa) for political purposes is subject
to debate."° Studies are inconclusive." 1 Dr. Robert D. Reischauer, Di-
rector of the Congressional Budget Office, asserted:
296. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 166.
297. For a discussion of the problems encountered in the use of the line item veto in Flor-
ida, see Jon Mills, Battle of the Budget: The Legislature and the Governor Fight for Control, 18
NOVA L. REv. 1101 (1994). Mills focuses on the situation of the Florida budget and the fight
over impoundment (defined by the author as when the "Executive declines to enter into obliga-
tions or commitments for the full amount appropriated by the Legislature") between the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. Id. For an in-depth analysis of Arizona's line item
veto, see Daniel S. Strouse, supra note 288, at 145.
298. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 185.
299. See id. at 186. Appropriations and authorization bill formats are passed exclusively
through House and Senate rules and according to Congress' interpretation and execution of its
rules. There are no formal requirements, such as at the state level, that require any sort of indi-
vidual lines for spending legislation. See Louis Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process
in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 51, 104-05 (1979).
300. See Strouse, supra note 288, at 155 (describing the Arizona experience with use of the
item veto for purposes other than reduction of appropriations).
301. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 182-85 (citing numerous studies). The congres-
sional debates on the line item veto suggested a concern for the political realities of the situation.
Representative Skaggs noted as follows:
Even more pernicious, and the invitation to usurpation that lies in this language
can also be understood by going back to... the late eighties when we were still de-
bating whether we would continue aid to the Contras. Now, if I happened to have
been fortunate enough to have gotten, let us say, a provision in an appropriations bill
for a needed post office or a needed courthouse in my district, and it was down at the
White House awaiting signature at the same time we were debating aid to the Contras,
I would guarantee you I would have gotten a call from someone at the White House
saying, "Congressman, I notice you had some success in dealing with this need in your
district. We are pleased at that, but we need your support on aid to the Contras."
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Evidence from the states suggests that the item veto has not been used to
hold down state spending or deficits, but rather has been used by state
governors to pursue their own priorities... for example, a
study... over a 12-year period found that governors were likely to use
the authority to pursue their own policies or political goals but not to re-
duce spending.3X
Fisher and Devins conclude that the line item veto would have little
effect on the deficit if only discretionary spending were subject to the
veto. 33 Where spending is determined by benefit levels through perma-
nent appropriations, changes can be made without appropriations bills.
Furthermore, state legislatures have become adroit at combining programs
which a governor approves with those he does not approve °.3  States have
a tendency to attach excessive spending measures (called "logrolling") 3 5
to appropriations bills to please constituents and then put the onus on the
governor to veto the measures, a politically undesirable result for the
governor.
Fisher and Devins also reason that an item veto would tilt the balance
of power toward the President. Even though they recognize that Con-
gress' practice of bundling omnibus bills has diluted the constitutional
veto, they feel that the President's considerable influence in the legislative
process has more than made up for such dilution. 3' Fisher and Devins
note that the effect of the item veto may well depend on whether the
courts favor the legislative or the executive function. State experience has
not been uniform. 3' They suggest that the threat of its use might be more
important than the actual use. 3°" They note:
The item veto may help resolve some disputes, but it can also heighten
conflict among the branches. Notwithstanding decades of state court de-
That is exactly the kind of absolutely evil excess of power that we are inviting future
Presidents to use. Pick your issue. That is one that comes to my mind.
142 CONG. REC. H2978 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
302. S. REP. No. 104-13, at 11 (1995) (testimony before the Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs on Jan. 12, 1995) (citations omitted).
303. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 189. Fisher's article was written in 1986, when
the Reagan administration was considering a line item veto covering only the domestic discre-
tionary programs funded in annual appropriations bills which covered less than 15% of total
spending. See id.
304. See id.
305. Rappaport defines "logrolling" as:
[Tihe addition of a provision to secure legislative support because of the desire for that
provision rather than for its contribution to a bill's integrated operation. Identifying
which bills are passed because of normal logrolling is difficult. Moreover, some use
of logrolling arguably contributes to an efficient legislative process, without unduly
sacrificing other values.
Rappaport, supra note 25, at 745 & n.25.
306. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 191-93.
307. See id. at 193-95.
308. See id. at 195.
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cisions, no stable set of operating principles has yet to emerge. Indeed,
the situation is more judicially unsettled than it was fifty years ago.309
Finally, even if state experiences were directly applicable to the fed-
eral government, the provisions dealing with limited tax benefits under the
Line Item Veto Act of 1996 have no state parallel. No state governor has
line item veto authority over tax legislation. 30  By limiting the line item
veto to appropriations measures, the potency of the state veto is diluted,
since the legislature can encourage various projects through tax deduc-
tions and exemptions. Thus in some respects, the federal line item veto
might be more effective.
(4) Critique of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996
In evaluating the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, one sees a number of
obvious benefits. The 1996 Act marks an advance over the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974. Under the Impoundment Control Act, a presidential
proposal to rescind funds dies unless acted upon by Congress within 45
days. Under the Line Item Veto Act, the presidential cancellation pro-
posal takes effect unless Congress acts against it. The burden is now
placed upon the Congress to take action.311
Under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President could
not eliminate targeted tax benefits. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 ap-
plies the line item veto as a check against tax benefits that are tucked
away in omnibus bills and revenue measures. These tax bills "are used to
profit a favored few at the expense of the average taxpayer."
312
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 builds on the Budget Enforcement
Act of 1990 in that it uses the same definitions for spending categories
and allows the veto to be exercised within these categories. Moreover,
309. Id. at 196.
310. See 142 CONG. REc. S2968 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Roth). Roth
would prefer to limit the line item veto to spending legislation. He notes that the definition of
limited tax benefit is narrow and that a mechanism is created which may prevent the President
from making independent decisions of which items constitute limited tax benefits. Further,
"cancellation" and "impoundment" are terms which normally refer to restraints on spending and
seem inappropriate when applied to tax legislation. See id.
An Arizona court ruled that, because the governor's item veto authority was restricted to
appropriations, he could not disapprove a gasoline tax. Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard
Oil Co., 218 P. 139, 144-45 (Ariz. 1923). A Wisconsin court ruled that the governor could not
exercise his item veto on a revenue bill that contained a revolving fund, even if it impaired his
item veto authority. State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 264 N.W. 622, 624 (Wis. 1936). See
also Fisher & Devins, supra note 2, at 174.
311. H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 2, at 9 (1995). For an article supporting the concept that a
line item veto would strengthen the Presidential powers in a normative way, see Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 78-81
(1995).
312. H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 2, at 8.
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deficit reduction features of the 1996 Act reduce the Gramm-Rudman
baselines for canceled items, whereas the Budget Enforcement Act re-
quired only revenue-neutrality.313
Giving the President a line item veto helps to "restore" 314 the appro-
priate balance of power between the President and Congress.315 That bal-
ance, which was once struck by the President's veto power, had been
weakened by the modem trend of increasing use of omnibus legislation.316
Proponents also argue that the line item veto will help move the
country toward a balanced budget and will add a degree of visibility to
special benefits which otherwise would remain hidden in omnibus appro-
priations bills or major tax legislation. The definition of spending which
can be canceled is broader in the 1996 Act than originally contemplated in
the 1995 House and Senate proposals. The veto power applies to any
"dollar amount of discretionary budget authority" 317 and to "new direct
spending" as well as limited tax benefits.
One estimate indicates that forty percent of the federal budget is con-
sidered discretionary spending, and that "nearly half is appropriated for
defense expenditures, usually at the request of the President. "318 That
leaves approximately twenty-one percent of the federal budget to what is
commonly referred to as "pork-barrel" spending. 319  Thus, almost sixty
percent of the federal budget is "nondiscretionary, " M  and therefore, is
not addressed by the appropriations process.321
313. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691c (West 1997).
314. 135 CONG. REc. S615 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dixon).
315. See Neal Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 993, 996 (1990).
316. See id. With omnibus legislation, the President is forced to make the difficult decision
of vetoing an important legislative bill because of small pork barrel items hidden in the bill or
pass the legislative item with the items left intact. This has caused the President's veto power to
decrease in significance dramatically. See generally id. at 994-97.
317. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691(a) (West 1997).
318. FISCAL 1994 BUDGET, supra note 37, at 2. Estimated receipts for 1997 of $1.495 bil-
lion are derived from the following sources: individual income taxes 39%; Social Insurance
receipts 33%; corporate income taxes 11%; borrowing 9%; excise taxes 4%; other 4%. Esti-
mated expenditures of $1.676 billion for 1997 are estimated as follows: direct benefit payments
to individuals 49%; national defense 16%; grants to states and localities 15%; net interest 15%;
other federal operations 5%. Meet the Neiv Budget, Same as the Old Budget, 70 TAx NOTES
1711, 1712 (1996) [hereinafter Meet the New Budget].
319. FISCAL 1994 BUDGET, supra note 37, at 2. It would be difficult to cut a substantial
portion of this twenty-one percent since much of this money goes to necessary projects such as
highway repair or cancer research. It is estimated that a President with the item veto could
probably cut about three percent of the annual budget-$14.42 billion. See id.
320. See id. The survey reveals that 46% of the budget funds entitlement programs, and
14% goes toward the interest on the national debt. See id.
321. See Petrilla, supra note 37, at 471.
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While existing entitlements may not be subject to the line item veto,
any "new" direct spending that is estimated to result in an increase in
budget authority or outlays for direct spending relative to the most recent
baseline calculated pursuant to the Gramm-Rudman Act may be subject to
the veto.3" As a result, growth in these programs may be slowed or
eliminated. The veto of limited tax benefits will have only a nominal ef-
fect on the deficit. Nevertheless, considering the overall scope of the
veto, it is conceivable that it will have the effect of curtailing spending
should a President determine to use it for that purpose.
The primary arguments against the line item veto are that the meas-
ure will not solve the deficit problem3" and that it will tilt the balance of
power toward the executive branch.324 The savings that could be accom-
plished through the veto seem minimal in light of the harsh reality of the
estimated $5 trillion debt. The purpose of the item veto, however, is not
solely to balance the budget, but also to restore fiscal responsibility to
Congress as well as eliminate special tax provisions that amount to politi-
cal payoffs. In the long-term, small steps such as the line item veto could
potentially add up to a balanced budget.
Members of Congress felt the coverage of the 1996 Act was too nar-
row to be effective. However, it was noted that the line item veto did not
apply to just the small portion of the budget dealing with discretionary
spending, but was expanded over the 1995 proposals to cover new
spending in all entitlement programs, including food stamps.3z
Noting that all spending is not the same, it was suggested that the
veto would restore fiscal responsibility because the President could veto
unnecessary projects from spending bills. As an example, one Con-
gressman stated, "Alpine Ski slides in tropical locations and ice hockey
warming huts are not of the same importance as people with adequate
needs for post offices and courthouses .... 326 Still others thought that
pork-barrel spending was so great that delaying effectivity of the Act until
1997 would result in the waste of billions of dollars.327
322. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(8) (West 1997). The baseline calculations are
found in 2 U.S.C. § 907 (1996).
323. Some argue it could lead to an increase in the deficit:
With the item veto at its disposal, the executive branch assumes more responsibility
for eliminating wasteful spending programs. This invites legislative irresponsibility
because legislators will tend to rely on the executive branch to cut out wasteful provi-
sions with the item veto. By discouraging legislative discipline, critics argue that the
item veto actually could discourage fiscal efficiency.
Mark Crain & Jim Miller, Budget Process and Spending Growth, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1021, 1031-32 (1990).
324. See H.R. REP. 104-11(11), pt. 2, at 10 (1995).
325. See 142 CONG. REC. 112976 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Solomon).
326. See 142 CONG. REc. H2979 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bunning).
327. Representative Orton, arguing for immediate effectivity, stated:
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One particular criticism of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 is that it
will have a detrimental effect on the process of drafting tax legislation.3"
Since state legislatures have not granted line item veto power over state
tax laws, 329 the application of the line item veto to tax legislation is "truly
an experiment.'3° The critical issue to tax legislation is the application of
the definition of "limited tax benefit" in the Act. Some legislators feel the
definition is so narrow that any tax lawyer can find a way to avoid appli-
cation of the line item veto.331 Others suggest the definition could be ex-
panded by focusing on the purpose of the proposal and asking what "tax
benefit" is being given.332 For example, if a tax proposal allowed a multi-
employer pension plan to maintain cash or deferred arrangements (401(k)
plans for example),333 the proposal could be viewed as applying to a single
pension plan, in which case it would be a limited tax benefit. However, if
each member of the pension plan is deemed a separate beneficiary of the
amendment, it would not be a limited tax benefit.334 An expansive view
of the definition of limited tax benefits would make the amendment sub-
ject to the line item veto.
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 has been criticized because it is
feared that certain tax benefits, although reflecting sound policy, may be
labeled "limited tax benefits" and will not be considered for that reason.
Lawmakers, who are concerned about public impressions, may not want
to be associated with items labeled "special interest legislation" and will
therefore refrain from making many proposals. 335 Furthermore, limited
tax benefits often form an integral part of important compromises within
The concern I have is that the line-item veto.., will not go into effect when we pass
the bill .... It is not like we do not have a problem ongoing with pork-barrel
spending. I have in my hand the Citizens Against Government Waste's 1996 Congres-
sional Pig Book. In that they identify $12.5 billion in just 8 appropriation bills that we
passed in 1996, 8 of the 13, $12.5 billion of pork.
142 CONG. REC. H3001 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Orton).
328. See Rick Grafneyer & Rob Bennett, How the Line Item Veto Affects the Tax Legisla-
tive Process, 71 TAx NOTEs 689 (1996).
329. See 142 CONG. REC. S2967 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Roth).
330. 142 CONG. REC. S2933 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996).
331. See 142 CONG. REc. S2956 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Stevens); 142
CONG. REC. S2961 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd). See also Graetz, supra
note 46,. at 672-75 (discussing Congress' manipulation of budget scorekeeping rules to achieve
targets necessary to justify desired spending increases).
332. See Grafineyer & Bennett, supra note 328, at 691.
333. See id. See additional examples in EXAMPLES OF LIMITED TAX BENEFrrS WrrHIN THE
MEANING OF S. 4, THE LINE-ITEM VETO ACT, appended to CONTRACT WITH AMERICA
ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 1996, 142 CONG. REC. H2987, at H3011-12 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996).
334. In this case, the 1996 Act provides explicitly that all qualified plans of an employer are
treated as a single beneficiary. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691e(9)(D)(ii) (West 1997).
335. See Graflneyer & Bennett, supra note 328, at 692.
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major tax legislation that, if eliminated, would jeopardize entire tax
bills. 36
Identifying what is a "provision" for purposes of defining "revenue-
losing provisions" and "provisions providing transitions relief' will also
be difficult because bills are made up of numerous parts and various
words, phrases, sentences, or sections of a bill can affect groups of tax-
payers differently. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 may be applied dif-
ferently for provisions providing revenue loss and for those providing
transition relief. For example, a transition rule can be drafted as part of
the substantive bill or as a separate provision. A "rule of reason" ap-
proach could be taken to determine when a provision is a targeted tax
benefit. Such an approach is taken in applying the Byrd rule,337 which
prevents non-budgetary provisions from being inserted into budget recon-
ciliation bills.
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 provides a mechanism for resolving
the "definition of limited tax benefit" by giving primary responsibility to
the JCT for the initial determination of which items in a bill are limited
tax benefits. The JCT has issued proposed procedures to govern their
determinations (the "Proposed Guidelines") under the 1996 Act.338 The
1996 Act puts a great deal of authority in the hands of the JCT, even
though the process of estimating the number of taxpayers who will receive
the benefit is often as imprecise as estimating revenues.339 The congres-
336. See id. According to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan:
[C]ompromises make major legislation agreeable and effective. Supposing a member
with which a chairman worked were asked to make a concession in return for an ac-
commodation; supposing that member had to think: The minute this bill becomes law,
that chairman will go to that president and say, "Take out that provision that was made
for the senator from Louisiana, because it was only done to get your bill by, Mr.
President." You will not have that which makes legislation possible. You will not
have that spirit of trust, which performance reinforces and creates the stability of our
institutions. For if there is no trust, there will be no compromise, and if there is no
compromise, there will be no government-no stable government.
142 CONG. REC. S2972 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
337. Grafmeyer describes the Byrd Rule as follows:
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 contains section 313, which is commonly
referred to as the Byrd rule. Because budget reconciliation bills can limit debate, the
Byrd rule attempts to limit the scope of items in such bills to those proposals that are
budgetary in nature (as opposed to policy driven). Proposals that have little or no
budget effect or have a budget impact that is merely incidental to their nonbudgetary
effects are subject to a 60-vote point of order in the Senate.
Grafmeyer & Bennett, supra note 328, at 696 & n.23. See Tiefer, supra note 50, at 437-38 (de-
scribing the usefulness of the Byrd rule in the 1995-96 budget battle).
338. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DRAFT ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND PROCEDURES FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE LINE ITEM VETO ACT (PUBLIC LAW 104-
130) RELATING TO LIMITED TAX BENEFITS (JCX-48-96) (1996) [hereinafter "Proposed Guide-
lines"].
339. See Grafmeyer & Bennett, supra note 328, at 693.
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sional conferees on a tax bill have the option of including the JCT listing
of limited tax benefits in the bill being considered. If they decide not to
include the list, the bill will go to the President, who will then independ-
ently determine which provisions are limited tax benefits.34
Congress may well pressure the JCT to exclude favored items from
its list of limited tax benefits. On the other hand, Congress may include
items on the list which the President will cancel and thereby allow Con-
gress to take credit for supporting the tax break while the President takes
the heat for its failure to become law. The opportunity for abuse by the
JCT, Congress, and the President will be considerable and such abuse
will be difficult to discover. Much of the success of the Act as applied to
tax legislation will depend on how the JCT staff applies the new rules.
Some indication of their interpretations are found in the Proposed Guide-
lines.341
A sharper criticism is the suggestion that the same political compro-
mises which have been the hallmark of tax legislation over the past few
years will dominate the structuring of limited tax benefits. Consider a
President armed with the new line item veto and faced with a recalcitrant
Congress. 342 He will either: (1) fight Congress, lose, and claim he did
the best he could; (2) beat Congress into submission using the veto and
claim victory; or, (3) spar with Congress over many issues but generally
reach an accommodation which uses the veto on only a few items having
little impact on the overall budget. Only the third possibility makes sense.
The President could not accept the press stories of defeat under possibility
one and Congress' unlimited ability to fashion veto-proof bills will pre-
vent possibility two from coming to fruition. Possibility three permits
power to flow back and forth between the executive and legislative
branches, leaving the budget participants in the same balance as before.
It may be that a threat by the President to use the veto will have more ef-
fect than its actual use.343
Members of Congress, concerned with the shift of power to the
President, objected to the line item veto on a number of grounds. Some
members thought the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 was unconstitutional be-
cause it violated the separation of powers doctrine and was unsound be-
cause it would be used as a tool to force Congress to include pork-barrel
items favored by the President.3 44 In particular, it was often noted that if
340. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691f(c) (West 1997). The 1996 Act prohibits judi-
cial review of JCr or congressional determinations of limited tax benefits.
341. See Graflneyer & Bennett, supra note 328, at 696.
342. This analysis essentially follows that formulated'in Gene Steuerle, An A- for the Line-
Item Veto, 71 TAx NOTES 255 (Apr. 8, 1996).
343. See id.
344. See Roukema's Release on Line Item Veto, 96 TAx NOTES TODAY 71-24. Representa-
tive Roukema stated:
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thirty-four senators representing less than nine percent of the population
agreed with the President, the President could block any legislation.3 45 A
common fear of legislators was that the line item veto would be used to
target "rescissions. against particular legislators or particular regions of
the country or against the judicial branch" unless Congress agreed to a pet
presidential project.3 46  This latter concern is reflected in the 1996 Act's
requirement that the President identify the state and congressional district
affected by the veto's exercise.
Representative Barrett argued that the line item veto is an ineffective
vehicle for taking care of special interest tax breaks. He suggested the
reason that it is ineffective is that, although the Republicans argued for a
flat tax to eliminate tax loopholes, they refused to broaden the line item
veto to allow for cancellation of loopholes. He concluded:
[The Republicans] had no desire to give the President of the United
States the ability to get rid of special interest tax loopholes. Why not?
Because they are the gift that just keeps on giving. You can tuck them
away into a revenue bill. You do not have to go through the appropria-
tions process. It just keeps giving and giving and giving.347
Representative Beilenson was also skeptical of the veto's effect on limited
tax benefits. He stated:
[T]he legislation is unlikely to accomplish what its advocates claim it
will in the way of including special-interest targeted tax benefits....
That is because the bill allows the Joint Tax Committee, which is con-
trolled by the House and Senate tax-writing committees, to determine
[A] congressional override of a presidential veto requires a two-thirds vote. This
means that any president who can get 34 senators to go along will have virtually un-
stoppable power over how our money is spent. In the real world of Washington poli-
tics, this gives the president a new tool to punish and reward lawmakers by threatening
to line item veto spending in their districts-a tool that will inevitably lead to more
partisan bickering, legislative horse-trading and even more pork barrel spending.
Id.
345. 142 CONG. REC. H2976 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
346. 142 CONG. REC. H2978 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Beilenson). He
also notes how the purpose of social security insurance can change, stating, "In addition, the
legislation would take a giant step toward turning Social Security retirement benefits into a re-
ward for turning age 65 rather than insurance against the loss of income that comes with retire-
ment, as the Social Security system was designed to provide." Id. Representative Smith of
Michigan noted as follows:
I served under three governors while in the State legislature in Michigan. Every one
of those governors ... used the leverage of the line item veto to get spending they
wanted. A lot of States have the line item veto. Almost every one of those States also
have a constitutional provision that says they have to have a balanced budget .... In
the U.S. Government, where we do not have that kind of safeguard of a balanced
budget, there is a danger of actually increasing spending and not decreasing spending
as some presume.
142 CONG. REC. H3002 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith).
347. 142 CONG. REc. H2999 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barrett).
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what provisions in the bill constitute a targeted tax benefit before it is
sent to the President. Thus it is highly unlikely that many special-
interest tax benefits, if any at all, will be subject to the line item veto
authority. 348
Others are more confident the JCT will act in an impartial manner.349
Some members of Congress opposed applying the line item veto to
limited tax benefits. They emphasized that the public finds tax breaks less
objectionable than spending provisions because the former merely allow
people "to keep their own money" while the latter takes one person's
money and gives it to someone else. Thus, it is more important for the
present to be able to veto individual spending provisions than limited tax
benefits.3 50 Representative Skaggs considered the inclusion of limited tax
benefits to be deceptive because the limited scope of the coverage and the
numerous exceptions make discretionary and direct spending more vul-
nerable to cancellation than tax benefits.35 '
IMI. Are "Tax Expenditures" Expenditures?
The underlying justification for extending the line item veto to tax
legislation is the recognition that tax breaks can be just as wasteful and
costly to the Treasury as direct spending.352 Furthermore, the Budget En-
forcement Act of 1990 linked spending directly to taxes by requiring that
revenue reductions or direct spending increases be offset by revenue in-
creases or direct spending reductions in other areas. 53 Unlike the state
line item vetoes which do not apply to tax legislation, the Line Item Veto
Act of 1996 applies to limited tax benefits, accepting the view that tax de-
ductions, credits or other revenue-losing attributes of the federal tax code
can be equated to direct spending.354
348. 142 CONG. REC. H2979 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Beilenson).
349. See 142 CoNG. REc. 112976 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bunning).
350. See 142 CONG. REc. H-3003 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bunning).
Representative Solomon praised Representative Bunning for his work on the line item veto and
stated, "Mr. Jim Bunning, someone I used to worship when I was growing up. He was a hero
of mine because of his baseball prowess, throwing no-hitters and pitching shutouts. He is no
less a hero today, especially for what he has done today on this line-item veto." 142 CONG.
REC. H2978 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Solomon). Other critics say the bill's
definition of targeted tax benefits hobbles the president's line-item veto power, but supporters
have provided a laundry list of provisions that would be or would have been subject to the presi-
dent's veto scalpel. Heidi Glenn, President Delays Signing of Line Item Veto Bill, 96 TAX
NOTES TODAY 68-1 (Apr. 5, 1996).
351. See 142 CONG. Rac. H3014 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
352. See 142 CONG. REc. S2991-92 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Exon).
353. See FISCAL 1998 GUIDE, supra note 49, at 28-30. See also supra note 82 and accom-
panying text.
354. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
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Tax expenditure analysis was developed in the late 1960s by Profes-
sor Stanley Surrey.355 Surrey classified tax provisions as either normative
or subsidizing. He argued that subsidizing tax provisions were the
equivalent of direct spending (expenditures) and should be considered in
much the same manner as spending.356 Before specific tax expenditures
can be identified, it is necessary to define the normative tax base so de-
viations from that base which cause revenue losses can be identified and
labeled as tax expenditures. For example, a "normal" income tax system
might exempt a certain amount of income to permit a minimal level of
support to every family or household.357 Thus, Surrey did not consider a
standard deduction or personal (including dependency) exemptions as de-
viations from a normal tax base, and therefore did not classify them as tax
expenditures. Others would argue that any deviation from a broad deter-
mination of income should be a tax expenditure. 58 For example, the so-
cial security (employment income) tax system does not exempt a minimal
amount of family or household income.
Although Surrey asserted the equivalence, he felt that direct govern-
ment outlays were a preferred method of achieving legislative objectives
over the tax expenditure method. 59 Tax expenditures are defined as
"revenue losses attributable to provisions of the federal tax law which al-
low a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of
tax liability." 3'6 The concept of tax expenditures has become a well-
accepted analytical tool. Since 1974, the President's budget submissions,
as well as reports accompanying congressional budget resolutions, have
355. Professor Surrey served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy during
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. See generally William D. Andrews, In Memoriam:
Stanley S. Surrey: A Source ofInspiration, 98 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 332 (1984).
356. See STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 1-14 (1973). See also supra note
26 and accompanying text.
357. See SURREY, supra note 356, at 178.
358. The legislative history of the Impoundment Act of 1974 indicates that tax expenditures
are to be defined with reference to a normal income tax structure. However, a normal tax
structure is not easy to define, because several variables are considered in this analysis and these
variables are constantly changing (for example, because of social considerations). See also
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 5 (1985); HENRY C.
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF
FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938) (giving the Haig-Simons definition of income).
359. See SURREY, supra note 356, at 148-54.
360. 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (1990). See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1995-1999 (Nov. 9, 1994) reprinted in part in GRAETZ &
SCHENK, supra note 23, at 44; see also ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING,
SPENDING, AND TAXING 591 (1980).
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been required to include five-year projections of tax expenditures as part
of the annual budget process.61
What purposes do tax expenditures serve in our society? Tax expen-
ditures are one of the means by which the federal government pursues
public policy objectives and, in most cases, represent alternatives to
budget outlays, credit assistance or other policy instruments. Tax expen-
ditures are designed to meet a variety of needs and objectives (for exam-
ple, refundable tax credits for low income persons and accelerated depre-
ciation for businesses). Moreover, nearly all tax expenditures are
intended either to encourage certain economic activities or to reduce in-
come tax liabilities for taxpayers in special situations.362 Some of the
largest tax expenditures proposed for the 1997 fiscal year included $70
billion related to medical insurance and medical care costs and $56 billion
related to pension deductions and earnings buildups within pension
plans.3 63 The total tax expenditure budget for the 1997 fiscal year was
$554 billion, compared with individual and corporate income tax receipts
of $748 billion.3 4
Is it appropriate to consider tax expenditures as the equivalent of di-
rect expenditures? In many cases, tax expenditures can accomplish the
361. See 2 U.S.C. § 639(c)(3) (1990) (adopted as part of Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act of 1974, requiring promulgation of annual tax expenditure budget). See
also GRAErz & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 46 (providing a list of normal tax expenditures);
SuRREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 358, at 31-33, 45 (discussing tax expenditures in the Con-
gressional budget process).
362. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 47.
363. The largest tax expenditures are as follows (revenue losses in billions of dollars):
Provisions Tax Expenditure 1997 1997-2001
Exclusion of employer contributions
to medical insurance and medical care 70 423
Exclusion for employer pension plan
contributions and earnings 56 283
Mortgage interest deduction on
owner-occupied housing 53 294
State and local real estate tax deduction
other than on owner-occupied housing 31 170
Step-up in basis of capital gains at death 30 156
Accelerated depreciation of
machinery and equipment 30 160
Deductibility of charitable contributions 26 144
Earned income credit'
Effect on revenues 6 34
Effect on outlays 20 111
'The earned income tax credit is a refundable tax credit and accordingly has an effect on both
revenues and outlays.
Tax Expenditures Chapter from the President's Fiscal 1997 Budget, reprinted in part in 71 TAx
NOTES 107, 127-29 (1996).
364. See Meet the New Budget, supra note 318, at 1712.
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same objective as direct expenditures. If Congress determines that low
income mothers should receive $1,500 in child care assistance, it could
provide such assistance through a direct cash payment of $1,500 or it
could provide a tax credit $1,500 for child care expenses. Similarly a de-
duction of up to $10,000 for child care expenses would allow a mother in
the 15% tax bracket to save $1,500 on her taxes, although few taxpayers
would reach the maximum levels. Subject to some restraints inherent in
the tax system, either method would put $1,500 in the mother's pocket.
Equating direct expenditures with tax expenditures encounters both
practical and legal problems. A practical difference is that tax expendi-
tures are paid for with "pre-tax" dollars, whereas the recipient of direct
spending is often required to include the amount in his gross income.3"
Thus, a direct expenditure would have to be higher than the tax expendi-
ture to provide the same benefit.36 In every case Congress must consider
whether to provide financial assistance at all and, if so, in what form and
in what amount. 67
Commentators and politicians debate whether it is more efficient,
substantively or procedurally, to implement a program through direct
spending or tax subsidies.368 In some cases the tax subsidy is more eco-
nomical because the existing tax system provides an efficient means of
communicating the subsidy to the affected parties.369 On the other hand,
it has been argued that direct spending committees have the expertise to
formulate policy that tax writing committees do not possess. 37 0 However,
365. See SURREY, supra note 356, at 136-37.
366. See id.
367. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 361, at 99 (noting that once the government has
decided to provide financial assistance to achieve a particular objective, it must decide which of
the principal routes it wants to take, tax expenditures or direct spending programs).
368. A second reason tax subsidies have been challenged procedurally is that they "were not
subject to the same scrutiny as direct monetary expenditures." Edward A. Zelinsky, James
Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax
Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168 (1993). The tax expenditure budget, mandated in 1994,
responded to that critique. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-344, § 308, 88 Stat. 297, 313-14 (1974).
369. See Zelinsky, supra note 368, at 1165-66.
370. See id. at 1166-67. Zelinsky cites Professor Yorio's argument:
The process by which tax subsidies are enacted and administered also increases the
risk that they would fail a cost-benefit test. To begin with, a tax subsidy enters the
Code after review primarily by the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee .... Moreover, the duty of administering tax subsidies is left to
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which generally has no particular expertise with
respect to the problem that the preference was enacted to remedy. Although it may be
theoretically possible for the relevant tax committees and the IRS to obtain and digest
the information required to make a rational cost-benefit decision about a specific tax
expenditure, the process of education and learning is likely to be haphazard and in-
complete. As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible for two congressional com-
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tax writing committees are alleged to be more competitive, less suscepti-
ble to capture by special interests, and more open to public and media
scrutiny than the direct spending committees.371 It is argued that the bulk
of governmental spending is achieved through direct spending, not be-
cause of the technical limitations on the tax system, but because direct
spending committees are more "capturable" and thus respond more fa-
vorably to influence by special interests.3 2
It is alleged that tax expenditure analysis exhibits a procedural as
well as substantive preference for direct spending over spending through
the federal tax system. Defenders of tax expenditure analysis argue that
"tax subsidies ought to be preferred... when there is a need for de-
tached administration and oversight by decisionmakers less susceptible to
capture."" However, the tax system is a limited resource that may be
subject to capture if its capacity is overextended.
Equating direct expenditures with tax expenditures also raises legal
questions. If, instead of assisting mothers in the above example, Con-
gress desires to assist ministers of the gospel,374 a. -direct payment to assist
in their housing would likely violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, whereas a tax deduction or exclusion of amounts paid by the
church for a parsonage allowance would not. 5 In the case of ministers
of the gospel, the tax expenditure in the form of a deduction is not found
to involve the use of governmental revenues to support religion, but
merely allows certain taxpayers (for example, ministers of the gospel) not
to pay taxes on a certain types of income.376 Whether a realistic distinc-
tion exists between direct expenditures and tax expenditures for purposes
of the Establishment Clause is a subject of continued debate.3 7
mittees and one administrative agency to master the plethora and diversity of proposals
for using the Code to accomplish societal goals.
Id. at 1169-70 (emphasis added) (citing Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 395, 425 (1987) (citations omitted)).
371. See id. at 1166-67. Zelinsky does not argue that the tradeoff between expertise and
capture always favors the tax writing committee, only that the tradeoff should not be ignored in
favor of the expertise of the direct spending committee. See id. at 1175.
372. See id. at 1190.
373. Id.
374. I.R.C. § 107 (1986).
375. But see Walz v. Tax Commissioner of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(stating that tax exemptions and general subsidies are qualitatively different, because subsidies
involve the direct transfer of public funds to subsidized enterprises and use resources taken from
taxpayers as a whole, while exemptions involve no such transfer, but instead assist exempted
enterprises only passively).
376. See SuRREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 361, at 100 (stating that both tax expenditure
programs and direct spending programs involve the use of governmental funds).
377. See Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), which rejected the
exclusion of student groups promoting a "religious" view from participation in a state university
program that used student fees to print student newsletters. In a concurring opinion, Justice
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By providing a line item veto for limited tax benefits, Congress has
further incorporated tax expenditure concepts into the tax legislative proc-
ess and determined that the line item veto should be a part of its effort to
curtail excessive spending. Applying the veto to limited tax benefits also
suggests such benefits are wasteful and detract from the integrity of the
tax system.
The concept of tax expenditures has been questioned in connection
with the line item veto. During the debate over an earlier version of the
line item veto which contained a broad definition of "tax benefits" subject
to the veto, it was asserted that the basic concept of "tax expenditures"
was flawed because it assumed that "taxpayers' income belongs to the
federal government first. 378 Tax expenditure analysis builds on the con-
cept that the government has a right to the "normal tax," and that any-
thing less is a gift back from the government.
As noted above, tax expenditures almost equal revenues from income
taxes. By defining "limited tax benefits" narrowly, Congress ensured that
the impact of the 1996 Line Item Veto Act's cancellation power over tax
legislation will be small as compared to its impact on discretionary
spending and "new" direct spending, where the President can cancel sig-
nificant amounts of spending. This narrow definition preserves Congress'
ability to structure large tax expenditures without subjecting them to the
line item veto. In this respect, the restrictions under the Budget Enforce-
ment Act of 1990 are more potent than the line item veto because tax ex-
penditure proposals must still be paid for under that Act. In fact, the nar-
row definition of limited tax benefit may have an unexpected result by
providing an incentive for Congress to structure more programs as tax
expenditures to avoid the line item veto.
Thomas reasoned that since: (i) property tax exemptions for religious institutions did not violate
the Constitution (Walz, 397 U.S. 664) and (ii) tax expenditures were equivalent direct expendi-
tures, neutral payments to a printer on behalf of a student religious organization would not vio-
late the Constitution. Justice Souter responded:
Justice Thomas's assertion, that "[a] tax exemption in many cases is economically
and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary subsidy," . . . assumes that
the "natural" or "correct" tax base is so self-evident that any provision excusing a per-
son or institution from taxes to which others are subjected must be a departure from
the natural tax base rather than part of the definition of the tax base itself.
Id. at 881 (Souter, J., dissenting). Zelinsky supports the Walz decision, suggesting, "[I]n light
of the greater susceptibility to capture of direct expenditure institutions, the Court's First
Amendment distinction between tax subsidies and direct appropriations is sound from a proce-
duralist perspective." Zelinsky, supra note 368, at 1192. He notes that Professors Surrey and
McDaniel "label Walz 'naive[]' and 'inadequate,' an opinion that 'will not withstand economic
analysis.'" Id. at 1193.
378. LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT, S. REP. No. 104-10, at 19 (1995) (minority
views of Sen. Abraham). Senator Abraham would prefer to limit the use of the line item veto to
spending legislation.
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Tax expenditures distort the market- system. If tax expenditures were
eliminated, income tak rates could be reduced by 40%. 9  Congress'
control over tax expenditures has enormous market consequences in such
areas as health care, pensions, and housing. Tax expenditures have be-
come a systemic part of the federal tax system and the economy. Never-
theless, there are a number of reasons to prefer the direct spending over
tax expenditures, particularly for special interest tax expenditures: 310 the
persons who benefit from tax expenditures are often unknowable; the cost
of tax benefits is unknowable and unlimited, depending upon which tax-
payers decide to take advantage of the benefit; and numerous tax benefits
undermine the integrity of the tax system since taxpayers cannot know
whether other taxpayers pay their fair share. Applying the line item veto
to some tax expenditures may be an effective weapon against those which
benefit only a few taxpayers. However, it will have no effect on the
overall system of tax expenditures or the deficit.
IV. The Integrity of the Tax System
In proposing a line item veto members of Congress described the
legislative process, including the tax legislative process, as resulting in
"wasteful and outlandish projects," "indefensible riders," "raids on the
Treasury," and "manipulation of the congressional process." These are
words of moral discourse and raise the question of the integrity of the tax
system and of the persons who pass the tax laws. In fact, by passing the
Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Congress admitted that it is unable or un-
willing to restrain spending through its collective will and asked the
President to find the restraint it lacks. This unwillingness is particularly
alarming when applied to tax expenditures. With direct spending, people
can see where Congress uses the taxpayers' money. With tax expendi-
tures the recipient and the amount of benefit is seldom known by the pub-
lic. For the tax system to be effective, it must be perceived by the public
as fair. The presence of unseen special interest tax expenditures under-
mines this perception.3"'
379. if tax expenditures were eliminated, tax revenues would increase by $554 billion to
$1.299 trillion. This would allow a 40% reduction in rates, while still raising the $745 billion
amount raised under the current rates. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
380. But see ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING, AND
TAXING 549 (1980) (stating that the Budget Committees could try to align tax expenditures and
direct expenditures in a way that would force Congress to choose between the two forms of gov-
ernmental assistance; however, it should be noted that tax reformers had more success incorpo-
rating tax expenditures into the Budget Act than in persuading Congress to treat these subsidies
as the budgetary equivalent of direct expenditures); see also SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note
361, at 100-06 (providing a list of negative characteristics of tax expenditure programs).
381. Professor Tribe suggests that "the politics of representative democracy.., inevitably
leads to the appropriation of a lot of money for 'pork barrel' projects and the enactment of a lot
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"Integrity" is a word that is not often applied to a tax system. Es-
sentially the word means "rigid adherence to a code or standard of values;
probity." 382 Applying it to the tax system, the question is whether the
system adheres to the principles which it espouses. Is there an internal
consistency?
The integrity of the tax system came to the forefront of domestic
policy in the late 1960s under the rubric of "fairness" when the Secretary
of the Treasury issued a report indicating that twenty-one individuals with
incomes over $1 million paid no tax in 1966.383 The President responded
with the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which addressed the public concern of
fairness.38
During the 1970s taxpayers' nominal incomes increased each year as
a result of inflation. Although individuals were no better off economi-
cally, they incurred an increased tax burden as they were pushed into
higher tax brackets. This phenomenon, known as "bracket creep," cre-
ated budget surpluses. From 1975-80, five tax acts were passed to offset
bracket creep and the resulting budget surpluses which were expected to
have a negative effect on the economy (called "fiscal drag") .3" The bills
also directed large portions of these unlegislated tax increases into many
new tax expenditures.386
During the 1980s, indexing was added to certain fixed-dollar deter-
minants of individual tax liability to offset the effect of inflation. Never-
theless, by delaying the effective date of the indexing provisions and not
fully insulating the tax code from inflation, Congress continues to reap the
benefits of unlegislated tax increases.387 Prior to indexing, it was easy to
project balanced budgets in the near future.388
of bills encrusted with non-germane riders." TRIBE, supra note 19, at 265-66. He points out
that "it must be remembered that one legislator's 'pork barrel' is another's 'essential govern-
mental initiative.' And it is not beyond the realm of possibility that what the people really want
from the federal government is pork barrel." Id. at 267 n.37. Tribe cites DAVID STOCKMAN,
THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS (1986) for the observation that "Congress understood that the nation
had opted for a spending regime built around government subsidies and largesse." Id. See also
Revisiting the Line-Item Veto, supra note 200, at 333.
382. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 667-68 (2d College ed. 1991).
383. See Leonard, supra note 41, at 971.
384. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. (1969)).
385. See Leonard, supra note 41, at 971 (identifying the five acts).
386. See id. Tax expenditures grew from $82 billion in 1974 to $322 billion in 1984, while
total federal revenues grew from $154 billion to $355 billion. Id. Leonard concludes:
[I]nflation-driven bracket creep was the driving force of the tax legislative process
throughout the 1970s, motivating Congress to initiate tax legislation... to provide tax
relief, fiscal stimulus to the economy, and a spate of new tax expenditures.
Id. at 971-72.
387. See id. at 972.
388. See id.
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In the early 1980s, tax shelters dominated the fairness issue with
many high income taxpayers paying little or no tax. In a 1984 Treasury
Department report," 9 a sample of eighty-eight taxpayers with an average
income of $193,000 reported an average gross income after losses of
$22,207. 39 The report noted:
Of the 88 returns sampled, 19 returns, with an average gross income be-
fore loss ... of $243,710, reported a total income tax payment of $500
or less; 37 returns, with an average gross income before loss of
$172,134 reported a total tax payment of $6,000 or less. By compari-
son, a typical family of four with positive income of $45,000, but no tax
shelter losses, would pay $6,272 in taxes.3 91
This report, in part, led to the enactment of passive activity loss limita-
tions in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Further, in the early 1980s, the
budget reconciliation process began to force significant changes in the tax
law to meet the growing deficits.3 2
When Congress responds-to perceived abuses, it recognizes the im-
portance of public perception3i 3 to the ability of a tax system to command
respect and compliance on a widespread voluntary basis.39 One element
of this perception is the belief that the distribution of tax burden is "fair"
among people at different income levels.395 When rates are, perceived as
being equitable there is a higher degree of income tax compliance.39 In
1916, the maximum income tax. rate was 7%, and 206 "million-dollar"
incomes were reported. In 1921, the highest tax rate was 77%, but only
twenty-one "million-dollar" incomes were reported.
389. See TREASURY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984).
390. See id. at 9.
391. Id. See also Taxes Paid By High-Income Taxpayers and the Growth of Partnerships,
28 TAX NOTES 717 (1985) (setting forth in its entirety a study prepared by the Treasury De-
partment documenting the use of tax shelter investments by wealthy taxpayers to reduce their
taxable income).
392. See Leonard, supra note 41, at 973.
393. See Graetz, supra note 46, at 611.
394. CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EvIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE COURSE OF
CIVILIZATION 371 (1993). Section 3.1 of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF
TAXATION GUIDE TO CoMMITTEE OPERATIONS (1994-1996) provides the following mission
statement: "As the national representative of the legal profession, to serve our members and the
public through education and leadership to achieve an equitable, efficient, and workable tax
system." To carry out the mission one of its goals is "[tlo improve public understanding of,
confidence in, and respect for the tax system." Id.
395. See Graetz, supra note 46, at 609.
396. See ADAMS, supra note 394, at 380.
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A. Tax Policy Criteria
The area of tax fairness is formally addressed under the well-
established criteria of tax policy. 3" The three criteria398 most often re-
ferred to are equity, efficiency, and simplicity."
Tax equity involves the principle that taxes should reflect the tax-
payer's "ability to pay" and embraces both "horizontal" and "vertical"
equity. Horizontal equity seeks to insure that people with equal incomes
bear the same tax burden.' Vertical equity asks whether existing tax law
"differentiates appropriately among unequals.'4°' For vertical equity, the
driving principle is that people with higher incomes are better able to pay
the tax and should pay larger amounts of tax or larger percentages of their
income in taxes.' ° The equity criteria must be evaluated in terms of the
income of each person or class of persons. This evaluation involves the
determination of who is equal and what income will be measured. 43
The efficiency criteria reflects the principle that tax should not inter-
fere with the economic decisions of persons in the marketplace. Here the
focus is on "the allocation of goods and services that would occur in a
397. See Graetz, supra note 46, at 609, stating:
Although their meaning and contours have long been controversial, the general
criteria for evaluating changes in tax law enjoy both stability and consensus. At least
since Adam Smith, there has been virtually universal agreement that the nation's tax
law should be fair, economically efficient, and simple to comply with and to adminis-
ter. Tax law changes should be designed to make the law more equitable, easier to
comply with, more conducive to economic growth, and less likely to interfere with
private economic decision making.
Id. at 609-10.
398. Craig E. Reese notes that in his 1776 classic, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith
identified four characteristics of taxation: equity, convenience, certainty and economy. Reese
notes four others which are often identified-productivity, neutrality, socioeconomic effects and
political feasibility. See generally FLORIDA TAX WATCH INC., TAX REFORM AND TAX
FAIRNESS, IDEAS IN ACTION (1992). Smith used the term equity to refer to horizontal equity;
now the term also encompasses the concept of progressivity, which is often called vertical eq-
uity. Id. For a discussion of equity and efficiency and the behavioral premises on which they
rest, see Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive
Out Inequities?, reprinted in ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (Midway 1979) (1924).
399. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 30.
400. See id. at 32.
401. Id.
402. STEPHEN G. UTz, TAX POLICY, AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL
DEBATES 31 (1993). The principle that persons with higher income should pay a greater per-
centage of their income in taxes is a reflection of the economic principle of diminishing utility.
This principle suggests that beyond a certain point, each additional incremental increase in in-
come brings less utility or value to the income earner than the immediately preceding unit of
income and thus it is less painful to tax that additional unit.
403. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 32.
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market economy in the absence of taxes."' To the extent that taxes do
not change the incentives to engage in certain activities or allocate re-
sources, the taxes are said to be "neutral," which is a corollary of effi-
cient. "Efficiency" refers to policies that promote economic growth or
that direct benefits to intended beneficiaries without benefiting unintended
third parties. 4°5 One difficulty with stressing economic neutrality is that
the tax code is riddled with provisions whose sole purpose is to stimulate
or inhibit private decision making in the marketplace.
Simplicity is often viewed as an attribute of efficiency (complex tax
rules create their own inefficiency) and equity (complex tax rules favor
the rich and aggressive who can afford to decipher and use them).' Al-
though simplicity is important, it is not easy to achieve because political
considerations often prevent simplification.' The Treasury Department
in its classic 1984 study, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Eco-
nomic Growth, 8 identified the following additional criteria for evaluating
tax legislation: lower tax rates, revenue-neutrality, fairness for families,
perceived fairness, an inflation-proof tax law, trade-offs among alterna-
tives, fair and orderly transitions, and implications for spending. '
Finally, the income tax embodies the concept of progressivity. Pro-
gressivity, which reflects the concept of vertical equity, requires that per-
sons with higher levels of income pay higher rates of tax. A progressive
tax is distinguished from a proportional tax, which taxes all income at the
404. Id. Graetz and Schenk suggest that such a definition is "nonsensical" because the input
of governmental institutions into the economy are a necessary ingredient for the proper func-
tioning of the economy. See id. at 33.
405. See id. at 32.
.406. See id. Complexity has been divided into three categories: compliance complexity,
transactional complexity and rule complexity. Compliance complexity involves the Internal
Revenue Service, the taxpayer, and their respective abilities to comply with the rules. Transac-
tional complexity involves the ability of taxpayers to structure their transactions so as to mini-
mize taxes. Rule complexity involves not only the tax code but also the regulations and other
administrative and judicial pronouncements, and requires a balancing between detailed rules and
ease of understanding. See id. at 33. The three categories of complexity derive from DAvID F.
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266-67 (1986).
407. As stated by Graetz and Schenk:
Despite universal complaints about complexity, there is no effective political'constitu-
ency for tax simplification, and when Congress must choose between a simplification
of the tax law and a complex alternative that either produces additional revenue or is
claimed to increase economic efficiency or tax equality, the quest for simplification far
too often is abandoned. Thus, complexity will continue to be a hallmark of our tax
system.
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 34.
408. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984).
409. See id. at 13-20.
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same proportion, or from a head tax, which taxes each person the same
amount regardless of income or wealth.
A progressive rate structure is thought necessary for several reasons.
First, it ensures that taxation is based on the ability to pay.410 Second, it
reduces economic inequalities between taxpayers. 41 Third, it counterbal-
ances the effects of other taxes, such as federal payroll taxes, which are
considered regressive. 42  Fourth, higher rates on higher income reflect
the repayment for government benefits which affect higher income indi-
viduals more favorably.413 Those who object to the progressive rate
structure rely on markets to allocate income appropriately and efficiently,
and see no need for redistribution by the government.
The institution of budget controls on the tax legislative process, in-
cluding the line item veto, have had an important impact on these tradi-
tional criteria for evaluating tax law. The goal of tax legislation may
change over time as one criterion dominates the agenda. In 1981, tax
legislation 41 4  subordinated horizontal equity in favor of economic
growth, 415 whereas, in 1986, the equity criterion prevailed because the
Tax Reform Act was revenue- and distributionally neutral.
Since 1986, tax legislation has been decidedly for the purpose of
deficit reduction at the expense of equity and efficiency concerns.416
Deficit reduction goals have dominated the discussion,417 pushing to the
sidelines questions of distributional consequences and equity.4 8 If the tax
410. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 35.
411. See id. at 35.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (West 1997)).
415. See Graetz, supra note 46, at 610.
416. See id. at 612. Graetz notes that the rate increases in 1993 were made retroactive to
the beginning of 1993, but allowed deferred payments of the tax for three years to achieve five
year revenue targets. See id.
417. See id.
418. See id. at 613. The consequence of excessive focus on the deficit has been to push tax
policy criteria to the background. It has been noted as follows:
[E]ach tax bill [must] be revenue neutral [and] any revenue reducing amend-
ment.., must be accompanied by changes that increase revenues by a like amount.
This practice has seriously impaired the ability of the tax writing Committees and the
Treasury to try to ensure that tax bills reflect accepted tax policy principles. As a re-
sult, tax legislation in 1990, 1992, and 1993 increased complexity but, more critically,
the nature of the complexity in too many instances was unprincipled from the stand-
point of tax policy.
PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 22 (3d ed.
1994).
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system is to be built on a concept of "ability to pay," a focus on the defi-
cit may be counterproductive.4"9
While distributional effects are considered whenever Congress passes
new tax legislation, these effects are based on estimates which often re-
flect the bias of the estimator." Furthermore, as will be seen in P.L.
104-7, unrelated tax provisions are combined in the same bill solely for
the purpose of achieving revenue-neutrality. It is hardly satisfying to
eliminate existing tax breaks purely to support the enactment of new tax
breaks.
Thus, the traditional tax policy criteria have been relegated to a sec-
ondary position as the tax debate has begun to focus on the deficit and the
structural restraints necessary to curtail spending. Fairness, to the extent
fairness is defined in terms of these criteria, is another victim of congres-
sional excesses.
B. Integrity and Voluntary Compliance
In 1988 a report prepared by the Commission on Taxpayer Compli-
ance, a cooperative effort of the IRS and the American Bar Association,
noted that one of the salient features of the United State's income tax
system is that it is administered on a voluntary basis.421 This feature alone
makes it the envy of the world.4' At that time, the Commission con-
cluded, "There does not appear to be an epidemic of increasing noncom-
pliance."" However, the perception that the IRS is insensitive to tax-
payer concerns undermines taxpayer compliance. So as not to encourage
tax noncompliance, the Commission urges public officials to "resist the
temptations that arise from time to time to gain political advantage by
419. See Graetz, supra note 46, at 613.
420. The reliance on revenue estimates creates questions of tax integrity. Whenever "two
government entities derive significantly different revenue estimates of the same legislative pro-
posal, the controversy threatens an erosion of public confidence." Bopp, supra note 18, at
1645.
421. See M. Bernard Aidinoff et al., Report and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compli-
ance, 41 TAX LAW. 329 (1988).
422. During the 1940s, tax compliance was considered good. Justice Jackson stated, "The
United States has a system of taxation by confession. That a people so numerous, scattered and
individualistic annually assess itself with a tax liability, often in highly burdensome amounts, is
a reassuring sign of the stability and vitality of our system of self-government." GERALD
CARSON, THE GOLDEN EGG 252 (1977) (quoting Justice Jackson).
423. Aidinoff, supra note 421, at 330. The Commission cautions against confusing tax eva-
sion with tax avoidance that results from claiming deductions, credits, or other benefits allow-
able under the tax laws, or from structuring transactions, as'permitted by those laws, to mini-
mize taxes. Tax "avoidance" seems inevitable given the complexity of our economy and of our
income tax laws. "Even experts will reasonably and honestly disagree about what the law al-
lows." Id. at 339.
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criticizing the Internal Revenue Service or the tax laws. One component
of the definition of good citizenship in America is the duty to pay one's
legal share of the democratically determined cost of government."4 24
The moral climate is important for reducing tax losses. According to
the Commission, "[tiax cheating... reflects a weakness in public moral-
ity and a degree of public acceptance of such cheating."" The Commis-
sion believes that tax cheating can be reversed if "[iinfluential individuals
in all fields ... speak out publicly against tax cheating."426 "At the same
time, the news media and many elected officials have produced a stream
of stories, comments and cartoons that have been critical of the Internal
Revenue Service and tend to undermine public acceptance of the obliga-
tion to pay taxes."427 Why is there noncompliance? The Commission of-
fers this as an important factor: "the moral fabric that sustains our vol-
untary tax assessment system has frayed. "
4
Ethical attitudes also affect taxpayer compliance.429 Some behavioral
studies of taxpayer compliance suggest that ethical beliefs about tax com-
pliance are not relevant to taxpayer compliance, while others consider
ethical propensities to be necessary to an understanding of compliance.
"Ethical values affect the decision process by screening or setting bounds
on choice possibilities and limiting the means available to achieve desired
outcomes."43 One study reported that, "[w]hen tax evasion is seen as a
moral issue, individuals are less likely to evade taxes regardless of the tax
situation. "431
Today there appears to be wide public discontent with the income tax
system and with the Internal Revenue Service. This discontent takes
various forms, including emigration of the rich out of the country,432 the
expansion of the underground economy, and the growing inclination to
"evade whenever and wherever possible."433 Even in Congress, every
member seems to have a proposal for reform that replaces the income tax.
According to classical economist Adam Smith, tax evasion and dis-
regard of tax laws occur when there is "a general suspicion of much un-
424. Id. at 384-85 (emphasis added).
-25. Id. at 330.
426. Id. at 332.
427. Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
428. Id. at 336.
429. See generally Philip M. J. Reckers et al., The Influence of Ethical Attitudes on Tax-
payer Compliance, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 825 (1994).
430. Id. at 827.
431. Id. at 833.
432. See Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 6, 109 Stat. 96 (1996) (establishing study of expatriate taxa-
tion).
433. ADAMS, supra note 394, at 381. One commentator concludes from these examples that
"the income tax is no longer levied with the consent of the taxpayer" and that consent of the
Congress and the President is not equivalent to consent of the people. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
necessary expense, and great misapplication of the public reve-
nue .... 414 Capitalizing on the situation, skillful planning and tax
avoidance have become a cottage industry in the United States,435 with the
rich taking the lion's share of the benefits through the ability to defer or
shield large amounts of income.436
C. Integrity and Tax Expenditures
Many tax expenditures are considered by taxpayers to be "loop-
holes" favoring the rich. 437 From the government's standpoint, the loop-
holes are merely ways to encourage desirable economic and social be-
havior.438 Tax expenditures, in that they reduce the tax paid by certain
taxpayers, "cause people in the same economic circumstances to be
treated differently." 4 9  Since tax collections are reduced, the treasury
must make up the loss by either raising other taxes, reducing expendi-
tures, or increasing the deficit. In other words, tax expenditures are not
free.' 0
A major problem with tax expenditures is that there is no effective
way to determine whether they affect the taxpayer's decision-making,
since they merely pay taxpayers for doing what they would or should do
anyway. 441 Tax expenditures are "invisible," meaning that the identity of
the beneficiary is not known. 2 Invisibility makes expenditures a popular
method for rewarding political supporters since "[ilt is easier to hide
benefits for individuals, and especially for corporations, in a tax bill than
it is in an expenditure bill."' 3
434. Id. at 395.
435. See id. at 401-02.
436. See id. Adams concludes:
I think we should describe all tax immunity as evasion, because all wealth (labor in-
cluded) should pay its fair share of the cost of maintaining society. Wealth that does
not do so evades its responsibility to the society that protects and sustains it. Tax mo-
rality should apply to governments as well as individuals. It is just as immoral for
governments to grant exemptions as it is for citizens to hide their income. This, of
course, is a new concept of tax morality, but we are in need of new thinldng from
which new tax inventions can be developed.
Id. at 441.
437. See D. RONALD PASQUARIELLO, TAX JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND MORAL ASPECTS OF
AMERICAN TAX POLICY 2 (1985).
438. See id.
439. Id. at 88.
440. See id. at 93.
441. See id. at 94.
442. See B. GuY PETERs, THE PoLITICS OF TAXATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
196 (1991).
443. Id. As stated in House Report No. 104-11, pt. 2, at 10 (1995):
November 1997] THE LINE ITEM VETO
When pressure groups demand and receive tax favors from the gov-
ernment, as was done in P.L. 104-7, it becomes obvious that some effort
needs to be made to severely limit or deny Congress the power to grant
special tax breaks to individual taxpayers and to force Congress to make
taxes more uniform throughout the country."" A serious defect in our tax
system is "its conflict with the foundation of democracy, which is that a
law, to be just, must mete out equal treatment to all."445 The ability to
grant tax immunities and exemptions symbolizes the inequality in the tax
system.446 Legislators who are the arbiters of this huge largess would un-
doubtedly resist any mandate requiring broad equality in the tax system.'
D. Integrity and the Line Item Veto
The integrity of the tax system is ultimately dependent on an individ-
ual's willingness to restrain the desire for personal advantage in favor of
the public good. The individual could be a member of Congress, the
President, a taxpayer, a tax accountant or tax attorney. Perhaps restraint
on the part of all of the above is necessary." 8 It is obvious that taxpayers
Instead of being able to hide narrow, limited-interest provisions in omnibus bills with
the assurance that they will ride to safety, legislators will now be held accountable.
The President can return those provisions to Congress and have their merits, or de-
merits, examined in the light of day. Rather than trading deals to slip provisions in a
bill as part of time-honored logrolling, legislators will have to make a public and visi-
ble effort to enlist the support of their colleagues to disapprove President's recommen-
dation. This type of heightened accountability will be a healthy check on wasteful
legislative habits.
Id.
444. See ADAMS, supra note 394, at 442.
445. Id.
446. See id.
447. See id. It has been argued that the general welfare clause "was designed to prevent
spending tax moneys for the welfare of some special groups, areas, or persons, that is, to pre-
vent pork barreling." Id. at 444. The need for uniformity suggests that it is the duty of gov-
ernment to develop a just tax and the duty of the taxpayer to pay a fair share "of the costs of
maintaining the government that serves and protects them." Id. at 451. Thus, tax deductions
and exclusions are unjust unless they are reasonably available to everyone. See id. at 452.
448. The success of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was an example of self-restraint for the
public good. Joseph Pechman described it as follows:
[O]bservers regarded tax reform of [the 1986] magnitude an impossible dream ....
The factors contributing to the success. . . included deep concern by the administra-
tion and Congress over the public's faith in the tax system; a Republican President
who accepted high corporate taxes and considerable loophole closing in the interest of
reducing tax rates; the persistence of Senator Bill Bradley and other congressmen and
senators who supported base broadening and rate reduction; support by influential
businessmen who found the idea of "a level playing field" and low tax rates appealing;
the skills of [committee chairmen] in judging how far they could push their colleagues
without losing their support; and dedicated congressional and treasury staffs who were
always prepared with modifications to satisfy political realities without fatally weak-
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are not required to pay more than the law requires." 9 Since tax avoidance
only involves the acceptance of the incentives offered by government
through the tax laws, "an individual would be a fool if he or she did not
take full advantage of opportunities that are made so readily available."4"'
If one is unhappy with a given tax outcome, "all that is required is a suf-
ficiently strong political voice to have the desired loophole written into
law."4" A good purpose for it is irrelevant. Indeed, the higher the tax
rates, the greater the number of loopholes.452 There seem to be no limits
on how far individuals will go in pursuit of tax avoidance.
The line item veto is a formal tool that places the legislative burden
on the President to provide the restraint lacking elsewhere. If he is will-
ing to take the political heat for the purpose of purifying the tax system
and restrain the excesses of Congress, it can have a limited effect.
Standing against government distribution of largess, however, has been
historically something few are willing to do. Another, perhaps more re-
alistic view, is summed up as follows:
In tax legislation, personal interests and ideologies conspire to produce
arguments for action, justifications for inaction and rationalizations for
things done or left undone. Ideology and self-interest generally have
little respect for facts, and the abuse and misuse of facts is a standard
weapon of the politician's arsenal. Unfortunately, when Congress is
making tax policy, information and misinformation serve simply as tools
for argument. There is a glut of factual controversy, what economists
euphemistically call "empirical uncertainty," about the effects of taxa-
tion. Even the most fundamental factual questions about the effects of
tax legislation often lack definitive answers. For example, despite 80
ening the bill. Unless the power of special interest groups can be curbed, the mo-
mentum achieved in 1986 will not be carried over into future years.
JOSEPH PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 57 (5th ed. 1987). See generally BERNARD
WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 261-92 (3d ed. 1995);
BERNARD WOLFMAN ETAL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 3 (3d ed. 1995).
449. Learned Hand's famous dictum is well-known:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and
all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands:
taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demiknd more in the
name of morals is mere cant.
Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).
Randolph Paul refers to such statements as "rusty platitude[s]" that have a "hollow ring" when
used by tax professionals to justify their lack of activities in the public interest. PAUL, supra
note 21, 72-73. He notes that such persons "consistently fail to espouse amendments of the In-
ternal Revenue Code and policies which will operate in favor of the government." Id. at 773.
450. PETERS, supra note 442, at 192.
451. Id. at 205.
452. See id. at 207. Peters notes, "Even after the 'tax reform' of 1986, that tree ['Christ-
mas tree of tax benefits'] is still laden with numerous goodies for taxpayer[s] who have the skill
and financial resources to make use of them." Id. at 208.
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years of experience, we still do not know for sure who actually pays the
corporate income tax: shareholders, consumers, employees, all owners
of capital, or some combination thereof. Firm belief about the conse-
quences of tax policy, however, is omnipresent. Tax facts enjoy an al-
most religious, mythological character. Whenever adequate facts do not
exist or are controversial, the task of ideologues in the political process
is made easier. The role of objective policy analysts, if there is such a
beast, diminishes.45 3
Against this backdrop of self-interest and uncertainty, the line item
veto, with its exceptions and uncertainties, is likely to be a very limited
weapon against the tax legislative process.
V. Public Law 104-7
The line item veto, the budget process, tax expenditure analysis, the
need for integrity in the tax system and the criteria for tax policy con-
verge in the tax legislative process. A good example of this process is
Public Law 104-7, 414 "Deduction for Health Insurance Costs of Self-
Employed Individuals," which President Clinton signed on April 11,
1995. P.L. 104-7 retroactively reinstated and permanently extended 455 the
deduction for the health insurance costs of self-employed individuals.456
Because the reinstatement and extension was expected to reduce revenues,
Congress was required to provide offsetting legislation so that the bill
would be revenue-neutral under the pay-as-you-go system.457
To accomplish this neutrality, Congress repealed section 1071 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which provided nonrecognition of gain on sales
and exchanges of certain broadcast properties to minority-controlled busi-
nesses. 4 8  Additional revenue was raised by amending section 1033,
which restricts nonrecognition treatment on involuntary conversions in
453. GRA=rz & SCHENK, supra note 23, at 3.
454. Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 1, 109 Stat. 93 (1997) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(1)
(1997)) [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 104-7].
455. See id. Senate Report No. 104-16 notes that the deduction for health insurance costs of
self-employed individuals was added in 1986 "to reduce the disparity between the tax treatment
of owners of incorporated and unincorporated businesses." S. REP. No. 104-16, at 11 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 89, 92. It was "enacted on a temporary basis, and has been
extended several times since enactment." Id. Further, the Committee believed that "allowing
the deduction to expire and then extending it creates unneeded uncertainty for taxpayers. Thus,
the Committee believes the deduction should be made permanent." Id.
456. See Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 1.
457. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Estimated revenue effects of Pub. L. No.
104-7 as agreed to by the House and Senate are set forth in Joint Committee Print JCX-19-95
(Mar. 30, 1995).
458. I.R.C. § 1071 (1988). The history and process of the tax certificate program is dis-
cussed in Bruce R. Wilde, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities:
A Critical Re-Exoamination of Policy, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 979 (1990).
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certain related-party transactions, 9 and section 32, which relates to cer-
tain limitations on the earned-income credit.' Thus, P.L. 104-7 is a me-
nagerie of code sections joined together solely because of the desire to
grant tax relief to self-employed individuals.461
A. Health Insurance Deduction for the Self-Employed
Prior to the enactment of P.L. 104-7, section 162(0)2 of the Internal
Revenue Code allowed self-employed individuals4 to deduct 25% of the
amount paid for "insurance which constitutes medical care for the tax-
payer, his spouse, and dependents." 4 Former section 162()(6) provided
a "temporary" deduction that did not apply to tax years beginning after
December 31, 1993. Thus, as taxpayers approached the April 15, 1995,
deadline for filing their 1994 tax returns, the deduction was in doubt. On
April 11, 1995, the President signed P.L. 104-7 which retroactively rein-
stated the deduction for 25% of amounts paid for health insurance of self-
employed persons in 1994. It also made the deduction permanent and in-
creased it to 30% beginning in 1995. Legislation passed in 1996 and
1997 will gradually increase the deduction to 100% by 2007."
459. I.R.C. § 1033(i) was amended to deny deferral of gains realized through an involuntary
conversion of property if the replacement property is bought from a related person. Pub. L.
No. 104-7, § 3. Also, I.R.C. § 10330) was amended to allow a taxpayer to treat as an invol-
untary conversion the sale or exchange of property related to the FCC's reallocation of certain
microwave spectrums. Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 3.
460. I.R.C. § 32(i)(1) has been amended so that a taxpayer is not eligible for the earned in-
come tax credit if he or she receives more than $2,350 of "disqualified income." Pub. L. No.
104-7, § 3. Disqualified income includes: (1) interest and dividends includable in gross income
for the taxable year; (2) tax-exempt interest received or accrued in the taxable year; and (3) net
income (if greater than zero) from rents and royalties not derived in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. I.R.C. § 32(i)(2). All subsequent citations will be to the Internal Revenue Code unless
otherwise noted.
461. Pub. L. No. 104-7 also provided for a study by the JCT of changes to the Code re-
quired to tax individuals who renounce their citizenship to avoid tax on income earned while
citizens of the United States. Pub. L. No. 104-7, §§ 6(a)(1), (2), (7) & (11). See Tax Legisla-
tion: JCT Staff Releases Report on Expatriation Tax Avoidance; Archer Promises Legislation,
1995 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at D13 (June 5, 1995).
462. I.R.C. § 162(1) (formerly I.R.C. § 162(m)) was introduced into the Code in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. It gave the self-employed taxpayer a choice of taking the 25% deduction
under section 162(l) or a 100% deduction under section 213 (subject to the 7.5% floor). To
some extent, section 162(l) reduced the incentive for businesses to incorporate merely to obtain
the medical deduction. See S. REP. No. 99-313, at 30-31 (1986); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-
841, at 11-21 (1986).
463. "Employees" as defined in I.R.C. § 401(c)(1) (1994).
464. I.R.C. § 162(i)(/)(A) (1996).
465. Section 311(a) of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No.
104-7 (codified as I.R.C. § 162(l)(1) (1996)) initially amended section 162 to provide for a de-
duction of 40% in 1997, 45% in 1998-2002, 50% in 2003, 60% in 2004, 70% in 2005, and
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To understand the tax policy implications of section 162(o, the self-
employed individual should be compared to an employee in the same in-
come category. Under section 162, a corporate employer deducts the full
cost of employee health insurance plans, and under section 106, the em-
ployee can exclude from gross income employer-provided coverage under
accident or health plans. 46  Subject to certain restrictions,467  self-
employed taxpayers (for example, sole proprietors and partners) can de-
duct 25% of the cost of their personal coverage under section 162(0. 4
The deduction under section 162(o, while offering some tax relief to self-
employed individuals, is not comparable to the tax subsidy for health in-
surance received by employees with incomes comparable to a self-
employed individual.
Without section 162(o, taxpayers paying their own health insurance
costs would be able to deduct the amount under section 213 as a medical
expense. 469 However, section 213 only permits a deduction to the extent
medical expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income.470 This high
threshold was intended to eliminate any meaningful medical deduction ex-
cept in extreme cases to help defray extraordinary medical costs.471 It af-
fords little help for health insurance premiums because the premiums sel-
dom exceed the threshold. By allowing a deduction for health insurance
80% in 2006 and thereafter. The delayed increases would reduce the cost of the bill in terms of
budget offsets under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. Note that the largest increases are
more than five years into the cycle. Thereafter, section 934(a) of the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34 (codified as I.R.C. § 162(/)(1) (1997)) amended section 162 to pro-
vide for a deduction of 40% in 1997, 45% in 1998-99, 50% in 2000-01, 60% in 2002, 80% in
2003-05, 90% in 2006, and 100% in 2007 and thereafter.
466. I.R.C. § 106 (1994) provides that "[g]ross income of an employee does not include
employer-provided coverage under an accident or health plan."
467. These restrictions include limiting the deduction to the amount of the taxpayer's earned
income from the trade or business giving rise to the individual's self-employed status, I.R.C. §
162(/)(2)(A); eliminating the deduction if the individual or his spouse participated in any other
subsidized health plan, I.R.C. § 162(l)(2)(B); denying a deduction under section 213(a) for
amounts not deducted under 162(/) if a deduction is taken under section 162(/), I.R.C. §
162(l)(3); and not allowing the deduction for purposes of computing the self-employment tax,
I.R.C. § 162(l)(4).
468. See I.R.C. § 162(/)(1). Section 1(b) of Pub. L. No. 104-7 amended I.R.C. § 162(l)(1)
by striking "25 percent" and inserting "30 percent." Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 1(b).
469. See I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(D) (1996).
470. See I.R.C. § 213(a).
471. James W. Colliton, The Medical Expense Deduction, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 1307, 1317
(1988). Colliton states:
[T]he deduction exists because most people think it is a good thing to have in the tax
law. In simple terms, the deduction is politically popular. Most view the deduction as
a justifiable way for the government to provide relief for those who have suffered per-
sonal medical catastrophes, or in other words, "Why shouldn't we give a tax break to
those who have suffered medical disasters?"
Id. at 1321-22.
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costs under section 162(o (or an exclusion for the employee in the case of
employer-provided insurance) the Code "allows tax benefits for the rou-
tine, everyday costs of medical insurance even though there is no serious
medical condition or undue financial burden." a' Such a result is incon-
sistent with the theory of section 213.' Taxpayers who receive em-
ployer-paid health insurance and persons who pay for their own care (in-
cluding health insurance), whether self-employed or otherwise, should be
given equivalent tax subsidies.474
The tax treatment of health care expenses raises questions of vertical
equity. The 7.5% floor under section 213 allows low income taxpayers to
deduct expenses more readily than high income taxpayers, but the tax
benefit is low because they are in a low tax bracket. Higher income tax-
payers have a higher threshold but once the threshold is met, the benefit is
greater because they are in a higher tax bracket. Problems of vertical eq-
uity are often seen as problems more appropriately addressed through the
progressive rate structure and not through adjustments to the deduction
itself.475
Thus, while section 162(o contains elements of sound tax policy, it
does not go far enough to create equity with employees receiving em-
ployer-provided health insurance until 2007.476 On the other hand, it
leaves the non-employees who pay for their own health care (including
insurance) without any tax benefit, thereby creating three categories for
health insurance deduction purposes.47
472. Id. at 1317.
473. See id. at 1371. The medical expense deduction has been the subject of considerable
debate. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REv. 309, 314 (1972) (supporting exclusion of income used for medical expenses,
arguing from the standpoint that consumption should be taxed and that medical expenses should
be excluded from the concept of personal consumption). See also Mark G. Kelman, Personal
Deductions Revisited: Why they Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Wy They Fit Worse
in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979) (arguing against Andrews' position).
474. See Colliton, supra note 471, at 1371.
475. See Andrews, supra note 473, at 339. Andrews also notes the impact of the medical
expense deduction on the allocation of resources to health care services. He avers that a di-
lemma is created for tax policy analysts in-that the tax code can either allow the deduction and
thereby create some distributional equity in the delivery of medical services to all people, or
eliminate the deduction and allow an efficient allocation of medical services through the market
mechanism. Acknowledging that a logical solution to the dilemma is not likely, he opts to ac-
cept the misallocation of the market in exchange for the distributional equities and thereby advo-
cates keeping the deduction. See id. at 342-43.
476. See supra note 465.
477. The health care market is an example where tax expenditures and direct expenditures
dominate the market. First, the market for health insurance is distorted by providing an exclu-
sion of such benefits from employees' gross income. I.R.C. §§ 105-06 (1994). The result is
tax-subsidized health insurance for many employees. The elderly and the poor receive subsi-
dized health care through direct spending (Medicare and Medicaid). Not everyone benefits from
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B. Offsetting Public Law 104-7 Revenue Losses
The offsetting provisions of Pub. L. No. 104-7 generally conform to
the tax policy criteria discussed earlier. The limitation on investment in-
come for purposes of the earned income tax credit appears consistent with
the principle of horizontal equity, since individuals having substantial in-
vestment income are not generally considered the principal targets of the
credit. The focus of the credit is on low-income persons and supports
their efforts to enter the workforce. Persons with significant assets are
often out of the workforce as a matter of choice and do not require addi-
tional encouragement. Thus, the amendment is consistent with the princi-
ple of vertical equity.
The repeal of section 1071, which governed the sale or exchange of
broadcast property, is more controversial. It is instructive to look closely
at this controversy because it illustrates the many problems associated
with tax expenditures and special tax benefits in particular. It also illus-
trates the application of the equity and integrity criteria.
(1) The Tax Certificate Program
Repealed section 1071 provided that a taxpayer who sold or ex-
changed a broadcast property could treat the transaction as an involuntary
conversion under the non-recognition provisions of section 1033478 if the
sale was necessary to carry out a Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) policy relating to the ownership and control of "radio broadcasting
stations. "4 9 The repeal of section 1071 would subject the gain on the sale
or exchange of a broadcast property to the same tax rules applicable to
other taxpayers who sell or exchange other businesses.480
Section 1071 was included in the Revenue Act of 1943 to help
broadcast licensees who were forced to sell their broadcast properties to
conform to the FCC's new regulations prohibiting the ownership of more
than one station in the same city. 481' The legislative history behind section
1071 indicates that tax certificates were intended only to be issued to
subsidized health care. Until recently, self-employed persons, denied a deduction for health in-
surance, bore the entire cost of health insurance. See 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 20, at
36-18.
478. Section 1033 provides that gains and losses from the involuntary conversion of property
will not be recognized if the proceeds are reinvested in other properties. I.R.C. § 1033 (1994).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-i (1994) (stating the general and special applications of invol-
untary conversions).
479. I.R.C. § 1071 (1994) (repealed 1995). See also 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1071-1-1 to 1071-3
(1994) (elaborating on the specific applications of I.R.C. § 1071).
480. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 831 (JCX-6-95) 2-5 (Feb. 8,
1995).
481. Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, § 123(a), 58 Stat. 44 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 23(/) (Supp. III 1944)) [hereinafter Revenue Act of 1943].
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those sellers who were required to sell their broadcast properties involun-
tarily.482 Over time, tax certificates began to be issued regularly in vol-
untary sales "as an incentive to licensees to divest themselves of commu-
nications properties grandfathered under the multiple ownership rules." 48 3
In 1977, the National Association of Broadcasters petitioned the FCC
to expand its tax certificate program in order to promote minority owner-
ship of broadcast properties. 4 Beginning in 1978, the FCC decided to
promote minority ownership of broadcast facilities and issued a policy
statement485 declaring that the previous measures taken to promote diver-
sity were not enough. 486  An FCC tax certificate would be offered to a
taxpayer who agreed to sell a broadcast facility (assets or stock) to mi-
norities or minority-controlled entities. 487 The statement defined minori-
ties as "those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed, American Eskimo, Aleut,
American Indian, and Asiatic American extraction. "488 To avoid "token"
minority interest the statement required the minority ownership to be over
50% or "controlling." 489  The FCC was not required to consult with the
IRS over the issuance of tax certificates or to estimate the tax conse-
quences of the certification.4 °
482. See FCC Announces New Policy Relating to Issuance of Tax Certificates Pursuant to
Section 1071 of the Internal Revenue Code, 14 F.C.C.2d 827 (1956).
483. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d
979, 983 n.19 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Policy Statement] (citing Issuance of Tax Certificates,
19 Radio Reg. 2d (P & F) 1831 (1970)).
484. See Erwin G. Krasnow et al., Maximizing the Benefits of Tax Certificates in Broad-
casting and Cable Ventures, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 753, 754 (1991).
485. See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 483. The Commission's equal opportunity
stance was an extension of its long-standing view that public interest is best achieved by in-
creasing diversity of viewpoints in broadcast programming. See Policy Statement on Compara-
tive Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 n.4 (1965).
486. See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 483, at 980-81. The Commission stated:
[We are compelled to observe that the views of racial minorities continue to be inade-
quately represented in the broadcast media. This situation is detrimental not only to
the minority audience but to all of the viewing and listening public. Adequate repre-
sentation of minority viewpoints in programming serves not only the needs and inter-
ests of the minority community but also enriches and educates the non-minority audi-
ence.
Id.
487. S. REP. No. 104-16, at 14-15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 95-96. See
also 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 483, at 981.
488. 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 483, at 980 n.8.
489. Id. at 983 n.20.
490. See Revenue Act of 1943, supra note 481. Specifically, the tax certificate allows a
taxpayer who sells a broadcast entity to a minority to elect:
(i) To treat such sale or exchange as an involuntary conversion under the provisions of
section 1033; or (ii) To treat such sale or exchange as an involuntary conversion under
the provisions of section 1033, and in addition elect to reduce the basis of property, in
accordance with the regulation prescribed in §1.1071-3, by all or part of the gain that
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The 1978 policy statement represented an entirely new application of
the tax certificate power granted to the FCC under section 1071.491 In a
1982 policy statement, the FCC broadened the tax certificate policy to in-
clude persons providing start-up financing or buying shares within a year
of the certificate. 4' The Commission's power to use the tax certificates to
promote minority ownership was accepted without challenge. 49
The impact of the Minority Tax Certificate Program is debatable. 94
It has been estimated that during the period from 1989 through 1991,
"broadcast and cable acquisitions involving minority tax certificates to-
taled well over one billion dollars" 495 and that the value of a tax certificate
reduced the purchase price for most stations between 11 % and 17% .9
(2) Repeal of Section 1071
The Senate Finance Committee reviewed section 1071 and concluded
that it contained "serious tax policy problems.,497 The original intent of
section 1071 was to help taxpayers who were compelled to sell their radio
stations as a result of the FCC's policy prohibiting ownership of multiple
would otherwise be recognized under section 1033; or (iii) To reduce the basis of
property, in accordance with the regulations prescribed in § 1.1071-3, by all or part of
the gain realized on the sale or exchange.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1071-2(a)(1) (1994).
491. The original statute granted the power to use tax certificates in transactions "certified
by the [FCC] to be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Commission with
respect to the ownership and control of radio broadcasting stations." See Revenue Act of 1943,
§ 23(0.
492. Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcast-
ing, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 857 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Policy Statement] (providing that a tax cer-
tificate would be issued to investors who either: (1) contributed start-up financing that allowed a
minority to purchase a broadcast property or (2) bought shares in a minority-owned entity within
one year after the license was granted to the entity to operate the broadcast station).
493. The political and arbitrary nature of the FCC's administration of this policy is demon-
strated by a 1981 case. In re Storer Broadcast Co. applied the definition of minority group
(American Indians or Alaska Natives, Asians and Pacific Islanders, Blacks and Hispanics) to
Adolfo Liberman. 87 F.C.C.2d 190, 193 (1981). Liberman was born in Poland and was the
descendent of Spanish Jews. See id. at 191. The FCC determined that his family was regarded
as Hispanic in his community, based on their residencies in Mexico and Central America for
years and their ability to speak Spanish. See id. at 191-92. Liberman was then granted a tax
certificate based on these distinctions. See id. at 193.
494. The 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 483, at 981 (quoting Federal Communications
Commission's Minority Ownership Task Force, Minority Ownership Report (1978)) noted that
minorities, while 20% of the population, controlled less than 1% of the commercial radio and
TV stations. As of June 30, 1994, minorities comprised 23% of the population and controlled
2.9% of the broadcasting stations (323 of 11,128 commercial radio and TV stations). See Poli-
cies and Rules Regarding Minority and Female Ownership of Mass Media Facilities, 10
F.C.C.R. 2788, 2789 (1995).
495. Krasnow, supra note 484, at 754.
496. See id. at 760 & n. 26.
497. S. REP. No. 104-16, at 17 (1995).
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broadcast stations in the same city during World War II. The Committee
criticized section 1071 because it gave too much discretion to the FCC; its
costs exceeded the benefits; it provided tax benefits "for routine and vol-
untary" transactions; FCC standards for issuing tax certificates were
vague; 498 the true cost of the program was unknown because there was no
IRS review of the tax certificates granted by the FCC; and because the
entire tax benefit could accrue to non-minority sellers rather than to mi-
nority owners.4 9
Section 1071 has been the subject of intense criticism. Howard Rud-
nitsky has argued that the goal of increasing the influence of minority
groups in broadcasting via the tax certificates was an "ill-founded hope"
and that the tax certificates "further enrich[ed] already rich corporations
like the New York Times and Gillett Broadcasting as well as a handful of
investors including Bill Cosby, New York Yankee outfielder Dave-
Winfield and Oprah Winfrey."" ° Sixty-two minority deals were made
between 1987 and 1989. Rudnitsky estimates that from 1978 to 1989
broadcast sellers were allowed to defer $500 million through the tax cer-
tificate program."'
Citing government reports, Bruce Wilde estimates that, due to sec-
tion 1071 tax certificate plan, the government has lost $100 million per
year in revenue from corporate tax returns. 5°2 He also notes that less than
$50 million per year has been lost from individual returns due to section
1071 tax certificates (including certificates granted for non-minority rea-
sons). 3 Additionally, Wilde asserts that the program represents flawed
tax policy and an ineffective and inefficient way to implement federal
policy.0 4 Wilde concludes that the certificate program should not have
been in the tax code because it was a "tax expenditure" that "encour-
age[d] a desired behavior rather than ... measure[d] income and raise[d]
revenue." Since the FCC was not limited in the number of certificates it
could issue and it was not held accountable for what the program cost in
lost tax revenue, "[e]ven more than for other tax expenditure programs,
the true cost of the tax certificate program [was] hidden from government
498. Id. The Committee cited as an example the word "control" as used in its minority
ownership policy. See id. The definition does little to guarantee that a minority will in reality
manage the station after the sale is certified. See id.
499. See id.
500. Howard Rudnitsky, How the Rich Get Richer, FORBES, May 15, 1989, at 38.
501. See id.
502. See Wilde, supra note 458, at 982. See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
101ST CONG., 1ST SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS
1990-1994 15 (Joint Comm. Print 1989).
503. See Wilde, supra note 458, at 982.
504. See id. at 1012-15.
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decision makers and the public."505 Wilde recommends that the tax cer-
tificate program be replaced with a direct government spending pro-
gram. °
Faced with criticism as to its effectiveness and the suggestion that it
may be unconstitutional,5" section 1071 seemed fatally flawed from a va-
riety of angles. Thus, after fifty years of tax breaks, Congress decided to
repeal 1071 and to use the tax savings as part of an offset required to
make the health care insurance deduction for self-employed persons per-
manent.
(3) The Murdoch Exception
Not content to see a bad program scrapped carte blanche, Congress
decided to give out a few last benefits. This was accomplished by ma-
nipulating the effective date for the repeal of section 1071. It is here that
Rupert Murdoch entered the picture and had a tax break slipped in for the
benefit of his companies. P.L. 104-7 repealed section 1071 as to "sales
and exchanges on or after January 17, 1995," and to "sales and ex-
changes before such date if the FCC tax certificate with respect to such
sale or exchange is issued on or after such date."
5 8
Between January 17 and March 15, 1995, the date of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee consideration and markup of P.L. 104-7, almost twenty
broadcast-related transactions involving section 1071 FCC tax certificates
were pending °.5  Only two of these transactions were binding on the par-
ties regardless of the issuance of an FCC tax certificate.10 One of the
two deals was between Rupert Murdoch's company, Fox Television
Group, and Qwest, Inc.5 u The terms of the transaction provided for
Qwest to pay $162 million if an FCC certificate was not obtained, but
$150 million if the certificate was obtained.512
505. Id. at 1015.
506. See id. at 1016.
507. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Court upheld section
1071 as constitutional. Id. at 566. However, there is reason to believe the decision is flawed
since it is based on the deference given by a 5-4 majority to FCC "expertise," which determined
that a nexus existed between minority ownership and programming diversity. See id. at 569.
508. Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 1.
509. See Edmund Andrews, Little Noted Tiptoe Through a Closing Loophole, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1995, at Al.
510. See id.
511. Qwest, Inc., was 55% minority-owned, with the rest owned by Chicago's Tribune Co.
See William Douglas, Clinton: I'll Approve Bill with Break for Murdoch, NEwSDAY, Apr. 7,
1995, at A17.
512. See Basil Talbot, Dems Rip Moseley-Braun Over Key Tax Break Plan, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at 13.
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The parties to the transaction enlisted the assistance of Illinois Sena-
tor Carol Moseley-Braun, a Democrat, who insisted in a Senate Confer-
ence meeting on March 28, 1995, that the Murdoeh/Quest transaction be
made eligible for the tax certificate.513 The resulting tax break saved
Murdoch an estimated $38 to $63 million dollars, of which $12 million
was passed on to Qwest.514 Of the other nineteen pending contracts, only
one transaction, which involved Warner Brothers, became eligible for the
tax certificate after the repeal of section 1071.
The language of the exception to the repeal of section 1071 included
parties who had binding contracts as of January 16, 1995, and who had
applied for the FCC tax certificate before that date. 515 This included the
Murdoch/Qwest transaction. Under the exception, a contract was not
considered binding if the "material terms of such contract were contin-
gent, on January 16, 1995, on the issuance of an FCC tax certificate. "516
To insure that the Murdoch/Qwest deal would be exempt from the section
1071 repeal as a binding contract, Senator Moseley-Braun orchestrated
the insertion of language that was tailor-made to insure that the Mur-
doch/Qwest transaction would qualify for the exception to the repeal." 7
Why was the Murdoch exception passed? First, it is significant that
one senator got involved personally. Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, an
Illinois Democrat, was the force behind the Murdoch exception. Argua-
bly, she put the provision in the bill as a favor to the Tribune Company,
an Illinois corporation, and to Quincy Jones, a Moseley-Braun fundraiser.
But one might observe that the Republicans, not the Democrats, con-
trolled both houses of Congress. The Republicans let the provision stand
in the bill. It may be noteworthy that Rupert Murdoch is a Republican
fundraiser. Further, House Speaker Newt Gingrich, a Georgia Republi-
can, represents an Atlanta suburb covered by WATL-TV."' Although
Gingrich was at the time negotiating a potentially lucrative book contract
with a Murdoch affiliated publisher, he placed the blame for the tax break
on Senator Moseley-Braun.519
513. See Douglas, supra note 511, at A17.
514. See Talbot, supra note 512, at 13.
515. See I.R.C. § 1071 (d)(2)(A) (1994).
516. I.R.C. § 1071 (d)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
517. See I.R.C. § 1071(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1994), providing:
MATERIAL TERMS.-For purposes of clause (i), the material terms of a contract
shall not be treated as contingent on the issuance of an FCC tax certificate solely be-
cause such terms provide that the sales price would, if such certificate were not issued,
be increased by an amount not greater than 10 percent of the sales price otherwise pro-
vided in the contract.
Id.
518. See Douglas, supra note 511, at A17. See also Talbot, supra note 512, at 13.
519. See Talbot, supra note 512, at 13.
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President Clinton was against giving a $38 to $63 million tax break
to one individual."2 Unfortunately, self-employed taxpayers were anx-
iously waiting for news of the extension of section 162() and delay would
have required them to file without the deduction and amend their returns
at a later date. Lamenting the provision for Rupert Murdoch and the lack
of a line item veto, President Clinton signed the bill less than two weeks
after the Murdoch exception was added.521
Had the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 been in effect when President
Clinton signed P.L. 104-7, would he have been able to veto the Murdoch
exception? If the line item veto is to have any impact, surely it should be
able to reach the Murdoch exception. As we shall see in the next Section,
the definition of "limited tax benefits" and exceptions to the definition
create some doubt as to whether this most obvious example of pork-barrel
tax legislation would have escaped the President's line item veto pen, and
accordingly, the definitions need to be broadened.
VI. Recommendations
This Article has acknowledged a number of weaknesses in the tax
legislative process and raised the question of whether the line item veto
will address or rectify any of those problems. It is clear that the line item
veto will not have a significant impact on the deficit. In areas where it
could have an impact, Congress can draft around the veto either by incor-
porating the special legislation in such a way as to preclude striking the
provision without radically changing the other provisions in the bill, or by
drafting tax benefits in such a way as to identify more than 10 or 100
beneficiaries, as the case may be.
It is possible that the line item veto could have a positive effect on
the public perception of the integrity of the tax system. If the threat of
the veto induces Congress to avoid special tax legislation or use of the
veto demonstrates that the President will aggressively pursue the elimina-
tion of special tax legislation, the perception of fairness will be enhanced.
The President's use of the veto is, however, severely limited. Not
only has Congress narrowly defined the category of tax legislation that
will be subject to the veto, but it has delegated to the JCT the responsibil-
ity of identifying limited tax benefits. 52 For the most part, what is needed
is for the line item veto to be more broadly defined as applied to tax leg-
islation, and, for this, Congress must be willing to delegate greater power
to the President. Therefore, the recommendations contained herein reit-
520. See William Douglas, Clinton Will Sign Boon for Murdoch, NEwSDAY, Apr. 7, 1995,
at A24.
521. See id.
522. See Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691f (West 1997)).
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erate or summarize some of the problems identified in the foregoing dis-
cussion.
A. Constitutional Changes
If the line item veto is held unconstitutional, the problems discussed
in this Article will remain. Therefore, it would be prudent for Congress
to place the line item veto on solid constitutional grounds by approving an
amendment that authorizes the President's veto of parts of individual bills.
As an alternative, the amendment could define the word "bill" in such a
way that Congress' ability to circumvent the President's existing veto
power would be eliminated. Even if the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 is
found constitutional, a constitutional amendment would be 'desirable, since
the sunset provision may prevent the President from exercising the full
extent of his authority for fear of losing the veto entirely in 2005."-
B. The Rules Clause
If Congress did not wish to approve a constitutional amendment, it
could develop restrictions against bundling bills within each house under
the Rules Clause of Article I of the Constitution.52 For example, Con-
gress could establish an independent body to identify special tax items.
Each item so identified would constitute a separate bill for which a super-
majority vote could be required. A separate enrollment followed by indi-
vidual votes on each item would not violate any constitutional prohibition.
523. Since a precondition to the exercise of the line item veto is that its use will reduce the
deficit, the line item veto could not be exercised if the budget is balanced as currently planned
for 2002. See id. § 691(a)(A)(i).
524. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, provides that "[elach House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings ... ." This is an important power within the appropriations and revenue proc-
esses. Two types of rules have developed. The first are rules which schedule legislation.
House rules give direct access to the floor (without awaiting action from the Rules Committee)
to appropriations bills, budget resolutions, and revenue-raising bills. See Bopp, supra note 18,
at 1634. The Senate rules protect minority views by limiting amendments to matters germane to
the legislation, allowing filibusters, and requiring unanimous consent to impose time limitations
on the consideration of controversial bills. The "Byrd rule" allows points of order to be raised
against extraneous matters in budget reconciliation bills; to override a point of order requires
approval by sixty of the one hundred Senators. See Graetz, supra note 46, at 616. JCr esti-
mates determine whether a point of order can be raised and OTA estimates determine whether
sequestration is required. See id. at 616-17.
The second set of rules separate the authorization from the appropriations process and re-
quire that no appropriation bill be permitted unless it has first been authorized by law. See
Bopp, supra note 18, at 1635. House rules forbid policy matters from inclusion in an appro-
priations bill. See id. Two notable exceptions are the Holman rule, permitting policy matters if
the policy provides for a reduction in spending, and limitations riders, which prohibit spending
for particular purposes. See id.
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This alternative foundation to limit Congress' ability to pass special tax
legislation uses the power of each house of Congress to determine the
rules of its own proceedings. No sufficient reason is given why Congress
could not implement such a rule other than Congress' own unwillingness
to institute seriously binding rules.
C. In General
The cancellation of limited tax benefits under the Line Item Veto Act
of 1996 will have little, if any, effect on the deficit. The narrow defini-
tion of "limited tax benefit" and the numerous exceptions to the definition
will keep it from having a significant effect on tax legislation." The can-
cellation of limited tax benefits could reassure the public of Congress'
determination to eliminate special interest legislation, and it may restrain
Congress' appetite for "tax pork" through identification and exposure.
However, the 1996 Act's weakness in the area of tax legislation may have
some unsuspected consequences. First, it could force Congress to
broaden the special interest legislation to cover more than 100 beneficiar-
ies (or more than 10 beneficiaries for transition rules), thereby multiply-
ing the waste associated with such special interest legislation. Second,
because spending programs can be canceled more easily, the tax code
could become a much more attractive area for special projects, a result
which would greatly reduce the efficiency and integrity of the tax system.
525. The JCT recognized this problem in its Proposed Guidelines and, to make the defini-
tions meaningful, made the following assumption:
Congress did intend certain limited tax benefits to be subject to the line item veto....
[I]t is clear that certain so-called "rifle shots" (the permanent or temporary transitional
rules that permit certain identified taxpayers to avoid the effects of a change in the
law) are intended to be subject to the line item veto.
Proposed Guidelines, supra note 338, at 17. On August 11, 1997, President Clinton exercised
the line item veto for the first time. The veto was exercised against two limited tax benefits
from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34 (1997). The vetoed items included a
provision which "created a one-year exemption of income earned by U.S. investment companies
from securities traded abroad" and a provision "which would have allowed a deferral of gain on
some of the sales of corporate stock of farm product refiners and processors to eligible farmers'
cooperatives." Godfrey & Glenn, supra note 181, at 875. The two items came from a list of
seventy-nine limited tax benefits prepared by the JCT in connection with the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997. The list is reprinted in Heidi Glenn, Clinton Expected to Exercise Line-Item Veto,
76 TAx NOTES 716 (1997). See also Martin A. Sullivan, Disclosure, Not Presidential Power, is
Key to Line-Item Veto, 76 TAx NOTES 719-20 (1997). Congressional analysts estimated the ve-
toed benefits would have cost $94 million and $84 million over five years, respectively, while
Treasury estimated the losses would be $317 million and $98 million, respectively. See Jackie
Calmes & Greg Hitt, Clinton Uses Line-Item Veto For First Time, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1997,
at A3. The total tax cuts in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 were $152 billion over five years,
with a net tax cut of $95 billion. See Jackie Calmes, Clinton, GOP Leaders Hall Measures to
Balance the Budget Reduce Taxes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1997, at B2.
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It may, therefore, be in Congress' best interest to expand the scope of the
line item veto.
D. Definition of Limited Tax Benefit
To make the line item veto effective against wasteful spending in the
tax code or in reducing the deficit, Congress must strengthen its impact
on limited tax benefits. To accomplish this Congress should broaden the
1996 Act's definition of "limited tax benefit." The definition could in-
elude a new category of limited tax benefit, defined as all revenue-losing
provisions or transitional relief estimated to lose less than $100 million
relative to prior law or to full coverage of new law in any of the first five
years in which such provision is in effect regardless of the number of
beneficiaries. Ideally, the threshold point should be significantly above
$100 million since that level may not be high enough to cover the Mur-
doch exception, which was estimated to lose $38 to 64 million on the
Fox/Qwest deal alone. This additional category would restrict Congress'
ability to micro-manage every aspect of economic life and force it to pass
broader tax legislation.
A corollary to the definition of limited tax benefit would be to define
"provision" as any word, phrase, clause, or sentence in a bill that has in-
dependent economic impact on the revenues lost under the bill. This
would make clear that the various parts of a legislative proposal can be
broken down into individual items and each given a revenue estimate for
purposes of the veto. The JCT recognized the difficulty of identifying the
revenue-losing provision or transition rule within the tax legislation and
resolved the difficulty by providing that "a tax provision will not be sub-
ject to the line item veto unless (1) there is statutory language relating to
the provision that can be stricken and (2) striking such language will not
otherwise alter the substance of the remaining provisions. "526 A more ag-
gressive approach, and one which would have a definite impact on Con-
gress, would be to provide that when language of a statute creates a lim-
ited tax benefit that cannot be extracted without affecting more than the
requisite number of beneficiaries, the entire provision would be subject to
the veto. Such a classification would force Congress to clearly identify
limited tax benefits.
The defition of limited tax benefits could be broadened further by
removing the special exceptions. Exceptions created for businesses in-
dlude provisions that afford the same tax treatment to businesses in the
same "industry," engaged in the same "activity," owning the same type
of "property," or "issuing the same type of investment." 52 The JCT
526. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 338, at 17-18.
527. See Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 691e(9)(B)(i) & (ii) (West 1997).
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found that defining the exceptions was the most difficult problem in the
1996 Act because the exceptions could be used to exempt almost any
piece of tax legislation.52 For example, defining a separate industry is
often a subjective exercise. The JCT proposes to use nine factors "which
demonstrate the degree of similarity of profit-making activities of a
group" to define an industry.529 Other business exceptions include differ-
ences between size and form of business entity, amount involved, or
"generally-available elections" under the Code.53
The business exceptions preserve Congress' ability to micro-manage
economic decisions even though every such decision has the effect of
violating the tax policy criteria of neutrality and efficiency. Indeed, they
are clearly intended to induce economic decisions. To the extent subsi-
dies are necessary, Congress could provide them through direct spending
where amount and duration of the expenditure could be controlled and the
identity of the recipient revealed.
While Congress' desire for the industry and equipment exceptions
can be understood as an attempt to promote economic growth, the need
for individual exceptions is not so obvious. These include exceptions for
general demographic conditions such as income, marital status, number of
dependents or tax return filing status, and generally available elections
under the tax code.53' These exceptions could be removed, since provi-
sions in which these distinctions were relevant would almost always in-
volve more than the requisite number of taxpayers. Is it possible for a
marital status exception to affect fewer than 100 beneficiaries? Are these
classifications to be used by Congress to write special tax bills for indi-
viduals? Would Congress write a tax bill affecting only persons married
in Elkton, Maryland on April 26, 1965? The Proposed Guidelines ac-
knowledged that such a bill would not qualify for the exception for "gen-
eral" demographic conditions.5 32 By reserving such narrow exceptions, it
becomes obvious that Congress is seeking to retain as much power as
possible, while still claiming it has authorized use of the line item veto
against tax legislation.
To limit the use of exceptions, the JCT will deny the application of
the exceptions whenever the group of beneficiaries is deemed to be
"closed," which it has defined as follows:
A class will be considered "closed" if other taxpayers engaging in the
same transaction or activity, using the same type of property, or engag-
ing in the same industry, within the same time period will not be able to
528. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 338, at 19.
529. Id. at 41-42.
530. See Line Item Veto Act, §§ 691e(9)(B)(iii)(I), (III) & (IV) (West 1997).
531. See id. §§ 691e(9)(B)(iii)(II) and (III).
532. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 338, at 48.
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benefit from the rule because the rule identified eligible taxpayers in a
manner that, on the face of the statute, is or will become impossible for
others to meet.
533
The definition has troubling elements when applied to revenue-losing pro-
visions since it utilizes the terms "industry," "activity," and "property" in
an attempt to define those very terms. (For example, the "industry" must
be defined before it can be determined whether the group is closed.)
The concept of a "closed" class is also used to define transitional re-
lief. Here, it will be more useful since the industry, activity, and prop-
erty exceptions do not apply to transition relief. The JCT struggles to
determine meaningful definitions, because its basic view is that Congress
only intended the line item veto to eliminate the most flagrant "rifle-shot"
provisions disguised in generic terms, such as those included in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. 534
Are the definitions so narrow that objectionable legislation would not
qualify as a limited tax benefit? President Clinton's assertion that he
would veto the Murdoch exception is easy when he does not have the
power to act directly or the fortitude to veto P.L. 104-7 in its entirety.
But, assuming President Clinton is willing to veto the exception, would he
have the power to do so under the Line Item Veto Act of 1996? Vetoing
the Murdoch exception seems completely justified on policy grounds.
First, neither Republicans nor Democrats would accept responsibility for
or defend the exception. Second, it was costly and wasteful. The benefit
could have been obtained more cheaply through a direct payment to
Qwest. Finally, it demonstrates that wasteful decisions are made even
when the legislative process is being conducted openly, if influential peo-
ple want the result.
The Murdoch exception is the only provision of P.L. 104-7 that re-
sults in the loss of revenues from 100 or fewer beneficiaries and could be
a candidate for the line item veto.535 Is the exception a limited tax benefit
either as a revenue-losing provision or as a transitional rule? Could a
provision be a "revenue-losing provision" and a "provision which pro-
vides temporary or permanent transition relief" at the same time? The
533. Id. at 39, 50.
534. See id. at 38.
535. The other revenue-losing provision, section 162(o, provides a deduction for self-
employed persons for health insurance. It would not be subject to the veto because the number
of beneficiaries obviously exceeds 100. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(C) (1996). H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-491, at 40 (1996). H.R. 831 (enacted in the 104th Congress) included a provision to restore
a prior deduction of 25% of the amount paid for health insurance for self-employed individuals
and their spouses. The deduction had expired after December 31, 1993. H.R. 831 restored the
25% deduction for 1994 and increased the deduction to 30% for taxable years beginning after
1994. Id. Under the conference report, this provision would not be a limited tax benefit be-
cause it applies to all self-employed individuals who purchase their own health insurance, and
thus this provision would benefit more than 100 individuals.
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answer under the Proposed Guidelines is that, in some cases, it can.536
When a change in the tax law gives more favorable treatment to a group
of taxpayers relative to other affected taxpayers, a revenue-losing provi-
sion could result that is also a transition rule.537 Since the Murdoch ex-
ception merely retained prior law for certain qualifying transactions, the
exception would be a limited tax benefit only if it is a provision providing
transition relief for ten or fewer beneficiaries.
How many beneficiaries are affected by the Murdoch exception? It
was deemed to affect only two pending transactions. If the term "benefi-
ciary" is read narrowly, to include only taxpayers bearing the incidence
of the tax, the Murdoch exception would affect only the two selling par-
ties. It would then be considered a limited tax benefit and subject to the
veto. This narrow reading seems to be the position of the conference re-
porte38 as well as the Proposed Guidelines.539 Since the purpose of section
536. Proposed Guidelines supra note 338, at 51. The Proposed Guidelines provide as fol-
lows:
The line item veto applies in the context of the current Federal tax system; therefore,
whether a provision is revenue-losing is determined by reference to present law. This
principle will lead to two important limits ... First, an exception to a new tax being
imposed by the Congress does not constitute a revenue-losing provision because the
exception does not lose revenue relative to present law. Such a provision, therefore,
would only be identified as a limited tax benefit if it meets the definition of a tempo-
rary or permanent transitional rule.
Id. at 19.
537. The Proposed Guidelines provide the example of a general 15% tax increase but pro-
vide a special rule that gives certain taxpayers a 2% reduction for gain from specified transac-
tions. Presumably, the 2% reduction causes it to be a revenue-losing provision, while the fact
that it is an exception to new legislation qualifies it as transition relief. See Proposed Guide-
lines, supra note 338, at 51.
538. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 39. The 1996 Act does not provide a distinc-
tion between "transitional" relief and revenue-losing provisions. Presumably, transition relief
cannot be analyzed as a revenue-losing provision since such an analysis would make the "10 or
fewer beneficiaries" limitation meaningless. "Relief" could refer to relief from loss of a tax
benefit ("deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference"), in which case "beneficiary" would refer
to taxpayers in this section as well. Id.
539. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 338, at 24. The JCT uses the term "beneficiary"
in "its most plain meaning, that is, the taxpayer who is entitled to the deduction, credit, exclu-
sion, or preference." Id. The Proposed Guidelines provide the example of a proposed $10,000
tax credit per automobile for approximately 300 special automobiles to be sold in a year. If
Congress grants the credit to the manufacturer, then only one beneficiary would be affected and
the bill would be subject to the veto. If the credit were granted to the purchasers, then 300
beneficiaries would be affected, and the bill would not be subject to the veto. See id. at 30.
Economically, the effect of either bill would be the same but, from the standpoint of the line
item veto, Congress has the ability, through structuring of a bill, to insulate it from the veto.
The Proposed Guidelines look at the "statutory incidence rather than trying to identify the per-
sons who are expected to receive an economic benefit from the provision." William P. McClure
& Geoffrey B. Lanning, The Line Item Veto Act as it Relates to Limited Tax Benefits, 74 TAx
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1071, to benefit the minority owners who purchase broadcast properties,
is only achieved if significant minority participation is involved, it could
be argued that the term "beneficiaries" should apply to buyers as well as
sellers, thereby increasing the number of beneficiaries. However, the
1996 Act provides that when a corporation or a partnership is a benefici-
ary, all shareholders or partners are treated as a single beneficiary.54
Since two transactions qualified for the Murdoch exception, the exception
would probably only affect four beneficiaries, even if the buyers are con-
sidered beneficiaries.5 41
Finally, does the exemption for provisions that provide for the "re-
tention of prior law with respect to all binding contracts... in existence
on a date contemporaneous with the congressional action specifying such
date" shield the Murdoch exception from the veto?542 It must be deter-
mined whether the date of the binding contract is "contemporaneous" with
the date of congressional action. The congressional action could be intro-
duction of the bill repealing section 1071, which occurred on February 6,
1995. The bill excepted sales represented by contracts that were binding
on January 16, 1995. Is January 16, 1995, contemporaneous with Febru-
ary 6, 1995? The Proposed Guidelines' answer is that it is not.543 Find-
ing "contemporaneous" to be synonymous with "simultaneous" is ex-
tremely restrictive. Assuming the JCT definition is appropriate,"4 the
Murdoch exception would be a limited tax benefit subject to the Presi-
dent's veto power." However, reaching that result involves numerous
definitions that Congress could manipulate to insulate future bills from the
veto. If the line item veto is to have a significant impact on tax legisla-
tion, the JCT, or Congress, will have to be aggressive in expanding the
definitions.
NOTES 787, 790 (1997). In this, as well as other aspects of the Proposed Guidelines, the JCT
seems overly accommodating toward Congress.
540. See Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(9)(D) (West 1996). The 1996 Act pro-
vides four special rules for the determination of the number of beneficiaries. These rules aggre-
gate into a single beneficiary related corporations and associations; all qualified plans of an em-
ployer; holders of the same bond issue; and shareholders, partners, and estate and trust
beneficiaries. See id.
541. See id. § 691e(9)(A)(ii).
542. See id. § 691e(9)(C)(i).
543. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 338, at 54-55.
544. The definitions adopted by the ICT are extremely important, since the Line Item Veto
Act of 1996 provides that determinations by the JCT are not to be reviewed by the courts. See
Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 691f(d) (West 1997).
545. If the dates were "contemporaneous," inquiry would be made into whether the contract
was binding on January 16, 1995. Since it was necessary to adopt the Mosely-Braun amendment
to insure that Murdoch qualified for the exception, it may be that the Murdoch/Qwest deal
would not be a binding contract under the 1996 Act even if it met the requirements of P.L. 104-
7. The JCT has taken the position that whether a contract is binding is determined by state law.
See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 338, at 53.
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E. Eliminate Outdated Provisions
Notwithstanding the Murdoch exception, the repeal of section 1071
is a vivid example of the need to cleanse the code of unnecessary provi-
sions. There were numerous reasons to repeal section 1071. Its repeal
promoted vertical equity by increasing the tax burden on the businesses of
high income executives and minorities who were the primary beneficiaries
of the section 1071 tax certificate program.
Repeal of section 1071 also removed an economic distortion from the
market for broadcast properties and promotes tax neutrality and effi-
ciency. Efficiency concepts ask whether "the tax allowances of existing
law promote or inhibit the efficient allocation of resources. 546 As origi-
nally conceived, section 1071 may have promoted wider ownership of
broadcast properties and thereby increased competition and efficiency.
However, as an affirmative action program, section 1071 transferred
properties to individuals who were more interested in taking advantage of
the bargain price than promoting affirmative action. As an affirmative
action program, section 1071 was a failure. By not placing broadcast
properties in the hands of the highest bidder, the section created serious
market distortions.
From the standpoint of tax expenditure analysis, section 1071 repre-
sents the unusual situation where a federal agency other than the IRS ad-
ministers a tax subsidy. This is perhaps the worst combination since there
seems to have been no fiscal restraint on the FCC's use of the tax certifi-
cate program. Had the FCC been forced to justify its budget for direct
spending purposes, it might have been more restrained.
The most important lesson is that section 1071 was a World War II
tax benefit that should have been repealed after the war ended, half a
century ago.547 Congress has allowed numerous similar provisions to re-
main in the tax code long after the purpose of the provisions have been
achieved. Recent attempts to remove deadwood from the tax code missed
section 1071.
546. 2 B=ITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 20, at 19.
547. In its report on the repeal of section 1071, the JCT noted:
Code section 1071 was originally enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1943 to help
the FCC implement a new policy .... Congress believed that the involuntary con-
version rules ... should be applied to these transactions, but needed to be liberalized
for sales ordered by the FCC because, "due to wartime restrictions, the purchase of
new radio property [would have been] ... difficult."
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND AND ISSUES RELATING TO: (1) THE
APPLICATION OF CODE SECTION 1071 UNDER THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S
TAX CERTIFICATE PROGRAM; (2) INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS UNDER CODE SECTION 1033;
AND (3) THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (JCX-8-95) 1 (1995).
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Evaluated individually, the components of P.L. 104-7 do not reveal
any serious tax policy considerations.148 Although technically justified, is
it appropriate to use the repeal of an outdated tax break to justify a new
tax break, or alternatively, should the repeal go toward reducing the defi-
cit? Bundling unrelated provisions together as tradeoffs in a single bill
pits one group of taxpayers against another. Congress' decision to repeal
section 1071 should have occurred ten years ago, thereby saving the tax-
payers $1 billion. Instead, Congress used its repeal to justify new tax
subsidies. Congress needs to enhance its process for reviewing revenue-
losing provisions and repealing tax provisions that have outlived their use-
fulness. They should not be used to justify new tax subsidies. Once such
provisions are eliminated, the tradeoffs required by the Budget Enforce-
ment Act of 1990 will become more meaningful. Only then would the
choices and compromises be made between widely supported and desir-
able pieces of tax legislation.
F. Tax Legislation Must Avoid Slogans
As currently drafted, the application of the line item veto to tax leg-
islation is largely window dressing and lacks the substance needed to
make it a meaningful tool against the deficit. Congress needs to move
away from using the tax code for public relations purposes and make a
significant effort to frame the issues substantively in the public's mind.
The public is continually misled on major tax legislation. During the
1970s Congress took credit for tax reductions while inflation and its tax
corollary, bracket creep, raised real tax rates every year. Congress re-
fused for years to address the tax shelter game and allowed enormous tax
breaks for the wealthy to go unrestricted until forced to act in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986.
Once a given deficit level is acknowledged, Congress seems willing
to maintain that level and use any savings to justify more spending. For
example, Congress attempted to use the "fiscal dividend" and the "peace
dividend" to justify additional deficit spending.549 Congress will spend
virtually unlimited amounts so long as an appropriate slogan is devised to
placate the electorate. 550 The "fiscal dividend" represents the savings that
result when interest rates decline along with the deficits. Congress
wanted to use those savings to justify $170 billion of the $245 billion in
548. P.L. 104-7 is consistent with budget policy, tax equity, neutrality, and simplicity, tax
expenditure analysis, and the promotion of a sense of integrity in the tax system. See supra
notes 397-447 and accompanying text.
549. See infra notes 551, 554.
550. See 2 BrTKER & LOKXEN, supra note 20, at 20. Bittker & Lokken note that equity
theorists have been more effective in coining slogans than efficiency theorists. Note, for exam-
ple, the equity theorists' slogans "Upside-down subsidies" and "Tax relief for the rich." Id.
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tax cuts supported by House and Senate Republicans in 1995."l' The con-
cept of a "peace dividend" arose in 1992 when Congress was faced with a
possible savings resulting from the reduction in defense spending follow-
ing the collapse of the Soviet Union. Congress wanted to use the defense
savings to offset proposed increases in domestic spending or to offset a
tax reduction. It was prevented from doing so by the restrictions in the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which limits budget authority to catego-
152ries.
Tax legislation is complex and for the most part impossible for the
average person to understand. 53 It is therefore incredible to think that the
tax code was a major point of discussion during the heat of the 1996
Presidential campaign. There is an urgent need for Congress to establish
an independent commission to provide appropriate education to the public
on issues affecting the tax system. Again, there is a need to restrain Con-
gress from using the most blatant opportunities to mislead the public
through trite slogans.
The problem of Congress usurping any accidental or unexpected
savings or greater tax revenues presents another problem that needs to be
addressed on a large scale so that such savings or revenues are captured
for deficit reduction purposes or, even the unthinkable idea, reducing the
federal debt.55 ' The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 addresses the need for
551. See Jackie Calmes & David Wessel, GOP Weighs $245 Billion Tax-Cut Compromise,
WALL ST. J., June 22, 1995, at A6; see also Godfrey et al., Budget Conference Pauses to Con-
sider Clinton's New Plan, 67 TAx NOTEs 1562 (1994).
552. See Bopp, supra note 18, at 1642 (citing definitions of "breach" and "category" in 2
U.S.C. section 900(c)(3) and (4) (Supp. 1991), respectively, and noting that such definitions
prohibit shifting budget authority between categories. Bopp also cites George Hager, Prospect
of a Peace Dividend Spurs Intense Debate, CONG. Q. 293 (Feb. 8, 1992)).
553. See PECHMAN, supra note 448, which notes:
[T]he report of the Senate Finance Committee on the 1986 tax reform bill consisted of
1,124 closely packed pages of technical language. For anyone but the expert it is vir-
tually impossible to distinguish the major issues from the minor in such a report, let
alone to decide how they should be resolved.
Id. at 54.
554. Congress has provided automatic upward adjustments in the baseline to account for
budget increases resulting from causes (for example, inflation) over which Congress has no
control. Congress could provide a similar rule for unexpected savings. Randolph Paul notes the
environment following World War II as follows:
Everybody also talked hopefully about balancing the budget and reducing the public
debt. Ruml and Sonne warned that "we cannot dismiss the debt as of no importance
simply because we owe it to ourselves," but added that "we need not view the debt
with too much concern, or acquiesce in a policy or retiring a fixed percentage every
year regardless of employment and economic conditions." But this was an unusually
carefree attitude. The Twin Cities group were content with the suggestion that there
ought to be a plan to retire the debt, and that any surplus under the Twin Cities plan
over a period of years should be used to reduce the debt.
PAUL, supra note 21, at 441.
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real change by instituting the "lock-box" concept, which insures that
savings from vetoed limited tax benefits go to reducing the Gramm-
Rudman baseline for the succeeding year. The "lock-box" concept may
prove to be the most potent part of the 1996 Act since it protects the
budget process. However, unless Congress addresses the issue on a
larger scale, the lock-box provisions may prove ineffective.
G. Use of Revenue Estimates
Inherent in the tax legislative process is the use of revenue estimates.
Some have recommended that such estimates should not be used in the
process and others have suggested that the revenue estimating process
should be changed. The difficulty with the use of estimates is that they
automatically become part of the baseline and their accuracy is never re-
viewed. The lack of review and the use of a five-year cutoff for the esti-
mates creates an incentive to make the numbers work in the short-term
and ignore the long-term.
The revenue estimates of P.L. 104-7 met the revenue-neutrality cri-
teria of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 and became part of the
baseline of future budgets without regard to their accuracy. While the
section 162(b revenue losses may be fairly accurate, the revenue gains
resulting from the repeal of section 1071 or the limitation on the earned
income tax credit may be more difficult to estimate. 555 In the latter two
areas, taxpayers could easily take action to avoid the income and the re-
suiting taxes. Viacom, whose transaction did not qualify for the Murdoch
exception, chose not to close the deal and continued seeking tax relief for
the sale of its broadcast property.556
Congress should strengthen the revenue-neutrality requirement of tax
legislation by limiting the duration of tax expenditure legislation to the
five-year period justified by the estimates. Such a provision would not be
burdensome since Congress constantly uses temporary tax breaks when it
cannot justify a longer term.5 7 Further strengthening could be achieved if
tax provisions included automatic adjustments in the event revenue esti-
mates proved inaccurate. For example, if the revenue loss resulting from
section 162(o were greater than anticipated, the percentage deduction
could be automatically lowered to offset the additional cost for future
years. Such adjustments would be prospective and would be no more
555. The taxpayer can circumvent the investment income limitations on the earned income
tax credit and avoid loss of the credit by investing in items which do not produce investment
income under I.R.C. § 32(i) (1997).
556. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: IRS Rules in Favor of Viacom, Ignoring Its Own
Guidance, 71 TAX NOTES 1728 (1996).
557. See Expiring Provisions Never Die, They Just Become "Extenders," 73 TAX NOTES
1009, 1010 (1996) (noting that revenue is the main reason items are kept on temporary status).
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complicated to administer than the inflation adjustments that have been in
use since the early 1980s.
H. Treat Spending and Tax Spending Equally
The line item veto could assist Congress in restraining spending if
Congress placed significant restrictions on its ability to enact new spend-
ing through the tax code. The tax expenditure/direct spending equiva-
lency requires that the definition of limited tax benefits be expanded be-
yond the special tax legislation to a breadth more nearly equal to the
definitions of direct spending. The President needs the authority to cancel
"new tax expenditures." This would allow Congress to structure a "nor-
mal" tax system without being subject to cancellation. By having veto
power over broad areas of deductions and other benefits, the President
could broaden the tax base significantly. The result would be to reduce
the deficit and, in the long run, to allow for a reduction in marginal rates.
Without such equivalence Congress will have the incentive to struc-
ture new tax spending, and thereby further frustrate the disparities be-
tween direct spending and tax spending.
I. Congressional Self-Restraint
From a technical standpoint, P.L. 104-7 meets the requirements of
the tax legislative process and, in many respects, the tax policy criteria as
well. Nevertheless, there is something unsavory about the circumstances
surrounding its passage. The evident self-dealing by influential members
of Congress is unlikely to create a sense of integrity on the part of the
taxpaying public. Indeed, the Murdoch/Gingrich book deal may yet be
investigated and lead to considerable embarrassment to members of Con-
gress. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 does not adequately address this
element.
After reviewing the tax legislative process, one commentator ex-
pressed the following opinion:
Procedural changes by themselves will not greatly improve the results of
the tax legislative process. Powerful forces are arrayed against major
changes in the tax loopholes, while there is rarely an effective lobby for
the general public. The key may be to reform the campaign financing
laws so that congressmen will not be dependent on the financial support
of powerful lobbies for the election. Until the people elect representa-
tives and senators who are able to resist pressure from special interest
groups, progress in reforming the tax system will continue to be slow.
558
The same sentiment applies to the effect of the line item veto.
558. PECHMAN, supra note 448, at 57.
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Conclusion
This Article has explored the constitutionality, wisdom, and applica-
tion of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. The Act did not create a true
veto power in the sense of the Presidential veto of Article I, section 7 of
the Constitution. Instead, it allowed the President to "cancel" certain
legislation after it had been signed into law. Therefore, it constitutes, in
essence, a delegation to the President of the power to impound monies
appropriated for particular purposes, even though the term "impound-
ment" does not exactly describe the cancellation of limited tax benefits.
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 can still be challenged on the
grounds that the veto is a delegation of the legislative function to repeal
provisions of existing law, that it is a delegation of legislative power
without content-based standards, that it represents an unconstitutional shift
of power to the executive, and that a disapproval bill overriding a veto
lacks full bicameral legislative consideration. Either the power to veto
spending legislation or the power to veto tax legislation could be declared
unconstitutional. Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, indicate that
it is likely the Act will be found constitutional. Because of the possibility
of the Act being held unconstitutional and the inhibiting effect of the sun-
set provision, the Constitution should be amended to allow spending and
tax bills to be vetoed in part.
Assuming the line item veto is constitutional, its wisdom lies in the
need to place additional hurdles in the legislative process. It cannot be
assumed that the President will be less captive to special interests than in-
dividual members of Congress or that the President will not demand addi-
tional pork-barrel spending in exchange for restraint in the use of the item
veto. However, in the era of divided government, this additional tool in
the President's hand will restrain the greed of the majority party. If the
government were unified, the party in power could pass whatever legisla-
tion it chose without concern about the line item veto.
The application of the line item veto to tax legislation caused consid-
erable debate. It was highly controversial whether tax provisions should
even be included in the 1996 Act. As a result of the debate, the scope of
tax provisions subject to the veto was so narrowly defined under the term
"limited tax benefit" that the veto of tax provisions will have only a scant
effect on reducing the deficit, a primary objective of the Line Item Veto
Act. By providing that revenue generated by canceled limited tax benefits
will be used to reduce the deficit through the lock-box procedures, some
deficit-reduction is possible. On the other hand, the line item veto creates
an incentive for Congress to avoid legislating in the narrow area deter-
mined by the definition of a limited tax benefit.
The veto of limited tax benefits will become an integral part of the
tax legislative process, a process whose controlling dynamics are revenue-
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neutrality and deficit reduction. The result is tax legislation that relegates
the traditional policy criteria of equity, efficiency, and simplicity to sec-
ondary considerations. Aggressive use of the line item veto could have
the effect of eliminating some of the more obvious and egregious items of
the special interest tax legislation. To the extent the President is success-
ful and acts according to expectations, an element of equity may be re-
stored to the tax system, the public image of the tax system may be im-
proved, and the integrity of the system may be upgraded.
The tax legislative process and budgetary control over the deficit is
facilitated by the use of revenue estimates. Indeed, estimates of the num-
ber of beneficiaries of the tax benefit are used to trigger the use of the
veto against these items. Use of revenue estimates to determine important
legislative questions promotes short-term offsets that may aggravate the
deficit in the long run. Once the legislation is enacted, the estimates be-
come part of the budgetary baseline regardless of whether the revenue es-
timates are actually realized. The tax code should be adjusted annually to
reflect the loss of revenue resulting from unfulfilled revenue expectations.
Monitoring is particularly important when special tax legislation is justi-
fied on the basis of estimates.
The tax legislative process has become a series of trade-offs that re-
alize tax equity on a limited basis and over extended periods of time.
Revenue-neutrality aggravates the process when existing special tax bene-
fits that should be repealed outright become desirable commodities used to
justify new tax spending. Congress needs to move aggressively clear
such items from the tax code so that new tax provisions will require broad
bipartisan support.
As currently structured, the line item veto will not solve any of the
problems in the tax legislative process. It may only operate at the mar-
gins to eliminate a few special tax breaks. The veto should therefore be
expanded since the broader it becomes, the more likely it is to have a
positive impact on the perceived fairness of the tax system. However, an
expanded veto will be effective only if the President has the courage to
stand firm in the face of an out-of-control Congress.
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